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INTRODUCTION
Democracy is impossible without a free press. At least courts and
commentators tell us so.' This consensus, however, floats above crucial,
t I have benefited from many comments on earlier drafts, even when failing to respond
adequately. For this I thank Oscar Gandy, Lani Guinier, Michael Madow, Carlin Meyer, and
Jim Pope.
I Justice Murphy expressed the common sentiment when he stated, "A free press lies at
the heart of our democracy and its preservation is essential to the survival of liberty." Craig v.
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more controversial matters. What type of free press does democracy need
and why does democracy need it? Answers to these questions allow the
next question. Are existing media in this country adequate? Do they pro-
vide for the informational or communication needs of democracy? And if
not, in what way do they fail, and what can be done? If there are inadequa-
cies, do they reflect bad decisions made by media professionals, such that
the prime need is for better, smarter, tougher editors and reporters or better
training in journalism schools? Or do inadequacies reflect, at least in part,
deeper structural problems? And if governmental policy correctives are
necessary to make matters better, what interventions would promote a more
"democratic press"--that is, a press that properly serves a society commit-
ted to democracy?
These questions implicate central issues of First Amendment theory.
Agreement on two abstractions-that democracy requires a free press and
that the First Amendment protects a free press-is relatively easy. But what
constitutes "freedom of the press"? That question cannot be answered
without understanding the role or purpose of the constitutional guarantee. If
the Press Clause is a structural provision designed either to support or to
protect a press that adequately serves democracy, how does this premise af-
fect the interpretation of the Press Clause?
Well, that's the agenda. But how to proceed? To assess the media's
service to democracy requires a theory of democracy. A choice among pos-
sible theories will largely reflect why the chooser values democracy, a nor-
mative issue about which people inevitably disagree. Although variations
may be infinite, three or four rough approaches may capture most people's
view of the normative rationale for democratic government. First, elitist
theories of democracy often reflect the somewhat cynical view that the only
good thing (although a very important thing) about democracy is that it is
Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 383 (1947) (Murphy, J., concurring). Compare Justice Frankfurter's
statement that "[a] free press is indispensable to the workings of our democratic society."
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 28 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). More striking
is Madison's claim that "[a] popular Government, without popular information, or the means
of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both." Letter from
James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), reprinted in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES
MADISON 103, 103 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910). Despite deploring "the putrid state into which
our newspapers have passed," Jefferson argued that "our liberty depends on the freedom of
the press, and that cannot be limited without being lost." THOMAS JEFFERSON, DEMOCRACY
150-51 (Saul K. Padover ed., 1939), quoted in Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200, 208 n.6 (1971)
(Douglas, J., dissenting). And this view, generally accepted as a truism, is certainly not
merely American. See, e.g., Henricus G. Schermers, International Human Rights in the
European Community and in the Nations of Central and Eastern Europe: An Overview, 8
CONN. J. INT'L L. 313, 316 ("Freedom of the press is an essential element of democracy.").
See generally Pnina Lahav, An Outline for a General Theory of Press Law in Democracy, in
PRESS LAW IN MODERN DEMOCRACIES 339 (Pnina Lahav ed., 1985).
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better than the next best alternative. Somewhat more optimistically, many
people value democracy as the only form of government that respects peo-
ple's equality and affirms their autonomy. It embodies the equal right of
each person to participate in matters of collective self-determination. De-
mocracy is a political order that respects each person as an equal in her
status as a citizen and as a moral agent. Democracy provides a form of
public liberty that is inextricably bound to private liberties, whose existence
requires, and is required by, public liberty.2 Within the legal- and political-
theory literature, two dramatically different ways of respecting people's
equality are often described. In a liberal pluralist or interest group concep-
tion of democracy, an ideally functioning democratic system is equally in-
fluenced by the desires of each person; a well-functioning democracy is the
fairest mechanism of aggregating preferences or desires for purposes of
making law and policy. In a republican conception, an ideally functioning
democracy is open to everyone's participation in the formulation of collec-
tive ideals and public goals; democracy is an open process of defining and
advancing the public good.
The next Part fleshes out these three theories of democracy, describing
premises that make each plausible and maybe even appealing.3 It also de-
2 The argument for this claim is complex, but it has been a theme in recent works of Jir-
gen Habermas and Frank Michehan. See generally JORGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS
AND NoRMs (1996); Frank I. Michelman, Justification (and Justifiability) of Law in a Con-
tradictory World, in JUSTIFICATION, NOMOS XXVIII 71 (J. Roland Pennock & John W.
Chapman eds., 1986). Roughly, public liberty can only result from choices of autonomous
agents whose autonomy is constituted by private liberties, and the necessary content of private
liberties can only be determined collectively by the exercise of public liberty.
3 The different "theories" are presented as ideal types or models, not as descriptions of
the views of any particular theorist. They also differ from any full theory of democracy in
that they simplify with the goal of noting features that are particularly relevant for press the-
ory. Important themes of more robust versions of a particular theory, for example, republican
theory's worry about the corruption of civic virtue, are sometimes ignored or marginalized to
the extent that the theme seemed less relevant for the concerns canvassed here.
Moreover, since my concern is with justification, I have tried to describe normative rea-
sons why each "ideal type" would have appeal even if many of the most prominent theorists
usually connected with the corresponding notion of democracy tried to present a solely de-
scriptive (or scientific), not a normative, theory. This attempt at a descriptive or scientific
theory is a characteristic common among elite democrats and also proclaimed by many plu-
ralist or interest group theorists. See, e.g., ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC
THEORY (1956); DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS (1951). My categori-
zation aims at seeing how different possible elements of democratic theory have implications
for evaluating the media. For other purposes, the categories could be drawn differently. For
example, some theoretical accounts of pluralism provide a basis for explaining why elitism
produces reasonably acceptable results. Thus, Macpherson's "pluralist elitist equilibrium"
model combines what I am calling elitist democracy and liberal pluralist democracy. See
C.B. MACPHERSON, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 77-92 (1977) (critiquing
an account of the democratic process based on an analogy to economic markets). However, a
pluralist vision can also provide a quite powerful account of the point of democratic partici-
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scribes what each theory-the elitist, the liberal pluralist, and the republican
theory-require of or hope for in the media. In addition, the next Part de-
scribes a fourth approach, which I label "complex democracy," that may be
somewhat less familiar, but which I defend and to which I believe our con-
stitutional order is roughly committed. Complex democracy claims to ex-
press a more realistic empirical, and a sounder normative, perspective than
offered by either liberal pluralist or republican democracy. It expects the
media to take on the tasks assigned by each of these theories and, in addi-
tion, to support the self-constitution of pluralist groups.4 Since these differ-
ent tasks are sometimes in tension, complex democracy complicates the
problem of assessing media performance. It turns out, or so I argue in Part
IV, that this complication restricts the issues that should be resolved consti-
tutionally. Before getting to the constitutional issue, however, Part II identi-
fies the democratic theory implicitly held by several prominent conceptions
of journalism, and Part III considers each democratic theory's implications
for media policy.
I. DEMOCRATIC THEORIES AND THEIR CORRESPONDING MEDIA
A. Elitist Democracy
Modem societies require governments for a host of reasons, many in-
volving the need to sidestep collective-action problems that would exist in a
world of purely private action. Governments can increase the flexibility, the
pation. Because of the normative power of the account, I have isolated this version of plural-
ism and labeled it as one type of participatory democracy. Finally, my descriptive choices
have been guided by factors that I find provide the most persuasive versions of a particular
theory. For instance, I emphasize the need to handle technical complexity in justifying elite
democracy. Other versions of this theory could, however, emphasize the merits of govern-
ment by wise leaders. See, e.g., EDMuND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN
FRANCE (1790), reprinted in 8 THE WRrrImGs AND SPEECHES OF EDMUND BURKE at 53, 111
(L.G. Mitchell & William B. Todd eds., 1989) ("The science of constructing a common-
wealth, or renovating it, or reforming it, is, like every other experimental science, not to be
taught a priori. Nor is it a short experience that can instruct us in that practical science ...
4 Although the notion of a group is important for my discussion, I should emphasize now
that it is neither formal nor essentialist; it does not assume any necessary institutional em-
bodiment, although that will sometimes occur. Groups refer basically to situations where
some people identify with other people on some basis-although I do not exclude the notion
of latent groups, that is, groups with which people would identify on the basis of reflection or
circumstance that has not occurred. Although people sometimes identify with a group be-
cause outsiders so identify them, that is hardly necessary; moreover, a person is not a member
unless she sees herself as such. Membership is hardly forced; on the other hand, although
groups will often have organizational embodiments from which people can be excluded, there
is a sense in which a person can be relevantly part of a group whose other constituents do not
identify her as a member.
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usefulness, and the effectiveness of a legal or normative order that is used to
resolve disputes, help people coordinate private behavior, and encourage
productive or "pro-social" behavior. The question is what type of govern-
ment would be best at performing these functions. At least one analysis, the
first to be considered here, suggests democracy, but democracy of a dis-
tinctly limited sort.
Good governments must routinely respond to problems that are techni-
cally complex. Moreover, governmental interventions are often most effec-
tive if implemented before people experience a problem. Effective re-
sponses frequently rely on intricate economic and scientific analyses. Most
people have neither the interest nor the ability to understand, much less to
devise solutions for, the problems facing society that government should
address. Experts and specialists at understanding the economic, human, and
natural environments must do the bulk of the government's decision making
work. As Walter Lippman argued seventy-five years ago:
"There is no prospect... that the whole invisible environment will be so clear
to all men that they will spontaneously arrive at sound public opinions on the
whole business of government. And even if there were a prospect, it is ex-
tremely doubtful whether many of us would wish to be bothered, or would take
the time.... ,5
More recently, Vince Blasi questioned whether citizen involvement de-
scribes either the "reality" or the "shared ideal of American politics"; he
suggested that "occasions for involvement in public affairs [such as the ne-
cessity to stop totalitarian forces] are a cause of sadness," not a description
of the good society.6  Widespread popular involvement in government
seems, to many, at best a romantic, but idle, fantasy-and at worst a disas-
ter.7 The complexity of the modem world requires that policy-oriented de-
5 WALTER LIPPMAN, PUBLIC OPINION 197 (Free Press paperback ed. 1965) (1922); see
id. at 157, 250-51; JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPrrALIsM, SOCIALIsM, AND DEMOCRACY
260-62 (Harper & Row 1976) (1942).
6 Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 Am. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 521, 562.
7 Lippman argued that democratic theory falls apart given its view that human dignity
depends on each person being involved in all public decisions. It would be wiser, he argued,
to recognize that self-determination is only one interest and that a government should be
measured by how well it serves people's "desire for a good life, for peace, for relief from bur-
dens." Lippman, supra note 5, at 195; see id. at 197 (arguing that "if, instead of hanging hu-
man dignity on the one assumption about self-government, you insist that man's dignity re-
quires a standard of living," then government should be judged on whether it provides such a
standard). Lippman argued that even in legislative bodies, most laws are "rejected or ac-
cepted by the mass of Congressmen without creative participation of any kind." Id. at 183; cf.
SCHuPETER, supra note 5, at 247 ("[Tlhe people never actually rule but they can always be
made to do so by definition.").
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cision making be a full time activity. A country can only be governed sen-
sibly by vanguard leadership elites or skilled experts. Nevertheless, three
practical problems come with government by experts, by technicians, or by
purportedly wise leadership elites. These three problems point to the desir-
ability of a limited form of democracy-that is, where "people have the op-
portunity of accepting or refusing the men who are to rule them" as a result
of "a free competition" for votes 8-as the most practical form of govern-
ment, at least for more developed societies.
First, an effective government cannot rely primarily on force to gain
obedience. Reliable legal orders require high levels of voluntary compli-
ance to most of their laws, by most of the population, for most of the time.
To a significant degree, voluntary compliance often reflects habit, lack of
reason to deviate, or the overlap of the laws' substantive directives with be-
havior adopted for a person's own practical or normative reasons. Still,
compliance with legal commands that require conscious conformance can
be expected to be more stable and secure when people view the government
as basically legitimate.9 The problem is, at least in a world dominated by
Enlightenment values, that people are unlikely to accept a self-perpetuating
government of elite technicians as legitimate.
Second, some experts and technicians will be more skilled than others
in responding to a society's problems. In the economy, the invisible hand of
the market (hopefully) works to determine which "experts" do the best job.
Competition assures that ineffective solutions and inept problem solvers
lose out.10 In governance, however, no such system works automatically.
Optimistically, badly managed regimes will collapse in the long run, as ar-
guably happened with the Soviet Empire. But the long run is hardly heart-
ening for those living at any moment. Think of the pain that could have
been avoided and the gains that could have been obtained if the Soviet re-
gime (at least, accepting common critical assessments of it) could have been
replaced earlier (at least, if replaced by something better). A country needs
8 SCHUMPETER, supra note 5, at 285. Even as to this limited form of democracy,
Schumpeter argues that its advantages are empirical and only exist under certain, specifiable
conditions. See id. at 290.
9 This empirical claim, which is heavily indebted to the work of Weber, see generally
MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., Univ. of Cal.
Press 1978), obviously requires more support, and may turn out to be wrong or more compli-
cated in various circumstances. See, e.g., Alan Hyde, The Concept of Legitimation in the So-
ciology of Law, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 379, 385 (asserting that "the Weberian model ... at best
is problematic and unproven and at worst is probably wrong"). But for purposes here, the
claim's actual truth is less relevant than is the belief in its truth by elite democracy theorists.
10 See SCHUMPETER, supra note 5, at 258 ("No doubt, a manufacturer may be indolent, a
bad judge of opportunities or otherwise incompetent; but there is an effective mechanism that
will reform or eliminate him.").
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some systematic, structural means of replacing less effective, less intelligent
experts with others who may do better.
Third, no one's commitment to the public good is ever perfect. 1 Cyn-
ics suggest that, as opposed to a person's dedication to her own personal or
private good, dedication to the public good is seldom evident. Outright cor-
ruption, as well as small-time advantage seeking, is endemic to government
and governmental leadership. 12 No matter how idealistic the revolutionar-
ies, no matter how patriotic the coup's new rulers, history consistently por-
trays them as losing their civic virtue over time and well-intended govern-
ment degenerating into corrupt administrations. Reasonably acceptable
government, whether or not comprised of elites, depends on finding system-
atic, structural means to keep the level and type of corruption within limits.
Democratic elections provide partial solutions to each problem. For
reasons not necessary to consider here, the legitimacy of unelected govern-
ments is widely challenged today. Simply as an empirical matter, people in
the modem world are apparently much more likely to accept a government
as legitimate if they perceive it as democratic. This legitimacy gain due to
elections should improve governmental effectiveness, especially if the elec-
tions do not otherwise seriously interfere with governance by elites.
Elections also create some circulation of elites. People inevitably expe-
rience problems that they believe the government should-but did not-
help solve. Other problems, they believe, the government has caused. The
accumulation of grievances eventually leads voters to replace one set of
rulers with another that make somewhat believable promises to govern
better. The regular occurrence of elections also creates some incentive for
leaders to do a better job and to avoid corruption or, at least, to avoid
widespread, observable corruption. Of course, some incentives created by
this system may be undesirable-for example, elections may create
incentives for governmental leaders to look to the short-run, pleasing
current voters while avoiding helpful but unpopular responses to long-run
problems. On the whole, however, democratic elections provide a relatively
11 Robert Dahl stated the central proposition of Madisonian democracy to be: "If unre-
strained by external checks, any given individual or group of individuals will tyrannize over
others." ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 6 (1956).
12 Advocates of limited government routinely lodge this criticism, often without noting
the ubiquitousness of corruption in private enterprise as well. Of course, market competition
often generates monitoring techniques that provide some discipline in the private sector.
Market discipline, however, does not necessarily further the public good. Illegal or corrupt
practices by private firms are often profitable and, from the point of view of the firm, effi-
cient. One complaint about market competition is that it encourages corrupt, socially ineffi-
cient, or otherwise objectionable practices. Think of profit pressures leading firms to secretly
dump their pollutants or airline competition leading airlines to ignore safety requirements.
1998]
324 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
functional method both to dislodge less effective elites and to create incen-
tives for better performance. Most importantly, an effective electoral proc-
ess provides the best, and perhaps the only, process for preventing or limit-
ing governmental tyranny and overt corruption.1
3
Of course, democratic elections hardly exhaust the list of structural de-
vices that might improve governmental performance. Consider allocating
authority to different branches and different levels of government, structur-
ing the relation between these loci of power, and imposing process require-
ments on governmental operation. These are all methods that, if well de-
signed, could facilitate the replacement of elites when appropriate, increase
the incentives and capacity of elites to act intelligently for the public good,
and provide potential checks on their abuses of power. Designing and ex-
plaining devices like these are major tasks of political science and are cen-
tral to constitutional theory, especially in relation to the Constitution's
structural provisions involving separation of powers and federalism. Nev-
ertheless, even if one accepted elite rule as wise or necessary, democratic
elections may perform the crucial tasks described above, thereby justifying
this limited version of democracy.
To fulfill its mission, elite democracy requires a free press-a press to
which it gives relatively specific assignments. A free and independent press
can make important structural contributions that are as great or greater than
the constitutional and administrative devices just mentioned. If corruption
or incompetence of elites is the problem, exposure is at least part of the
remedy. The possibility of exposure can deter corruption and create incen-
tives for proper performance. Exposure promotes the orderly replacement
or rotation of elites.
The press, however, need not provide for nor promote people's intelli-
gent political participation or reflection. Meaningful understanding of so-
cial forces and structural problems is beyond the populace's capacity and
marginal to its interests. Exposure of government corruption or incompe-
tence-the watchdog role or what Vince Blasi dubbed the "checking func-
13 David Held identifies Max Weber and Joseph Schumpeter as his exemplar democratic
elitists, noting that some commentators find a point by point correspondence between their
views of democracy. See DAVID HELD, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY 179 (2d ed. 1996). Held
argues that "virtually the only role [Weber] envisaged for the electors" was "being able to
dispense with incompetent leaders." Id. at 173. Held also argues that, for Schumpeter, the
"essence of democracy was ... the ability of citizens to replace one government by another,"
a capacity that checks "the threat of tyranny." Id. at 179. C.B. Macpherson observed that
after Schumpeter's identification of this capacity as a key function and after his critique of
democratic theory, there is little left for democracy "except the sheer protection-against-
tyranny function." MACPHERSON, supra note 3, at 91.
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tion" 14 -is probably the most important contribution the press can make to
either democracy or to the public sphere. Publication of the Pentagon Pa-
pers and, even more so, the Watergate episode, dramatically illustrates the
press living up to this potential. But exposure of less dramatic corruptions
and incompetencies and, even more, a constant deterrent effect, are more
routine, day-to-day features of a free press.
A separate issue that will become especially relevant to later discus-
sions of media policy and constitutional interpretation is whether an equally
important role of the press is to expose private corruption and incompe-
tence. Fear of elites' abuses of power could reasonably extend to private
elites. Private enterprises exercise vast power in the modem world. A plau-
sible policy goal is to create a press that will maximally "check" or expose
abuses of power regardless of whether the abuser is public or private, gov-
ernmental or corporate. A possible implication of this goal is the need to
make the press structurally independent of both government and private
economic power. In contrast, as long as exposing government corruption or
incompetence remains the key concern, a press structured by private power
might be as willing and able to perform this function as would any press re-
sulting from government intervention.
For elite democrats, a press that checks the corruption or incompetence
of private power is desirable but should not rank as an especially high pri-
ority.15 First, the danger created by the potential of private evil arguably
does not compare to that created by governments, which have a monopoly
on legitimate violence. Only governments could do what the United States
did in Vietnam or the Nazi and Soviet governments did earlier in the cen-
tury, examples that led Vince Blasi to conclude that "the threat posed by the
totalitarian state represents ... the overriding problem of twentieth-century
politics." 16  Second, two powerful forces potentially "check" private
power-market competition 17 and, most importantly, government regulation
14 Vince Blasi treats the checking function, which he sees as following from the demo-
cratic theories of John Locke and Joseph Schumpeter, as a major purpose of both the First
Amendment's Speech and Press Clauses. See Blasi, supra note 6, at 542. On both theoretical
and historical grounds, I have argued that this checking function is primarily relevant to an
understanding of the Press Clause. See C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM
OF SPEECH 225-49 (1989); see also Potter Stewart, "Or of the Press," 26 HASTNGS L.J. 631
(1975). My own view is that the constitutional right of speech freedom has been and should
be much more about individual liberty than about serving an instrumental political function.
15 See also Blasi, supra note 6, at 538-41 (discussing the greater importance of the press
serving as a check on government).
16 Id. at 538.
17 Although market competition provides some check on incompetency, it is less clear
that it checks, rather than encourages, many forms of illegality, corruption, and inefficient
externalizing of costs onto members of the public. See supra note 12.
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and law enforcement, hopefully crafted and implemented by competent,
noncorrupt governmental elites. The central constitutional role of the media
results from the unavailability of these forces to check abuse by govern-
ment, which can only be controlled by "the power of public opinion."
18
Public opinion, in turn, can only be a force for good if it is informed. Jus-
tice O'Connor is right, from this perspective, to emphasize that "the prem-
ise" of the First Amendment is that "government power, rather than private
power,... is the main threat to free expression; and as a consequence, the
Amendment imposes substantial limitations on the Government even when
it is trying to serve concededly praiseworthy goals."
19
Elite democracy has additional implications for the press. First, the
media should not be expected to raise serious questions about the underly-
ing legitimacy of the country's constitutional order. As long as elites are
honest and competent, the press acts properly in reinforcing the general
sense of the system's legitimacy. At most, the press should focus on critical
substantive issues about which elites are divided. Despite commentators'
criticism of this recurrent practice as "palace court journalism, '' 20 only when
elites are divided is public discussion really relevant. Division raises the
possibility that the currently ruling elite should either change directions or
be replaced. Second, since corruption and competence of elites rather than
the public participation in determining the structure of society is the central
democratic concern, heavy emphasis on the character and behavior of indi-
vidual public figures is therefore appropriate. To facilitate competition
among, and timely rotation of, elites, the press should also question how
well the current governmental administration responds to particular prob-
lems. Third, public chronicling of elite debate as well as "neutral" devel-
opment of information that aids elites in their own position-taking is useful.
Finally, the provision of objective information about major problems in so-
ciety can help assure appropriate elite rule in two ways. First, it provides
elites with valuable information. Then, by identifying unsolved problems,
the information also provides a basis for identifying possible elite incompe-
tence in handling the problems, thereby stimulating both deterrence of in-
competence and elite rotation.
18 Blasi, supra note 6, at 539.
19 Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 685 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
20 MARK HERTSGAARD, ON BENDED KNEE: THE PRESS AND THE REAGAN PREsIDENcY
54-76 (1988) [hereinafter HERTSGAARD, ON BENDED KNEE] (attributing the problem in part
to the press's dependence on the very officials it is supposed to be checking); see also Mark
Hertsgaard, Media Matters: The Star Wars Mirage, NATION, June 24, 1996, at 10 (describ-
ing palace court journalism).
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B. Liberal Pluralism or Interest Group Democracy
Fourth of July speeches extol the will of the people, not the virtues of
elites who govern an ignorant or apathetic population. Despite attracting
supporters among some self-perceived hard-nosed or realistic academics,
21elite democracy has little popular appeal. Sloganizing for democracy
praises popular participation and praises a self-governing people. People
have a right to rule; the popular will ought to prevail. Widespread and
popular critiques of existing practice bemoan the lack of voting and the lack
of participation. The necessity for popular discourse to have this content
suggests that deeply ingrained values are at stake in people's purported
democratic commitments.
Here and in the next Subpart, I will outline two strikingly different ac-
counts of the point of popular participation. These accounts, which I label
"liberal pluralist democracy" and "republican democracy," share certain
objectives. Possibly most important, both purport to explain why popular
participation or, at least, real opportunity for participation, is crucial for
normative legitimacy.
Elite theory values democracy, in part, to maintain a popular sense of
legitimacy for government. Its concern with legitimacy, however, is purely
sociological. Elite theory predicts (or observes) that people feel and treat
their government as more legitimate-and thus are more prepared to obey
its laws-if it is democratic. 22 In contrast, for the various participatory ac-
counts of democracy, the concern with legitimacy is usually ethical. The
normative defensibility of government is at stake.
A jurisprudential illustration can help here. Jurisprudents observe that
the legal order asserts that people are obligated, not just obliged, to obey the
law. 23 Of course, the persuasiveness of any assertion of obligation depends
on the values and perceptions of those addressed. Given values or premises
that are widespread in the modem world, theorists find that only orders that
respect people's right of self-government-that is, only the existence of de-
mocracy-can support the claim of obligation that the legal order presup-
poses. Of course, no argument or discussion will, in fact, convince all that
21 It has also received considerable social science criticism. See generally PETER
BACHRACH, THE THEORY OF DEMOCRATIC ELITISM: A CRITIQUE (1980) (arguing that de-
mocractic elitism is unsound in theory and has failed to meet contemporary political needs in
practice).
2 Cf Hyde, supra note 9, at 384 (critiquing this notion of legitimacy).
23 See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 79-88 (1961) (showing that obligation is not
a matter of actually being obliged or forced or the probability of negative consequences from
noncompliance, thereby rejecting Austin's predictive interpretation of obligation).
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are subject to a law of the law's legitimacy or its obligatory force. Some
will always resist unless "obliged" to conform.
Even putting aside this problem of convincing the subjects of law, there
is the parallel concern that those exercising governmental power should be
able to explain to themselves why they are justified in exercising power
over those who object. Their best answer, I think, includes the claim that
their exercise of power grows out of a practice that treats the subjects of law
as intrinsically significant moral agents whose liberty and equality the legal
order respects. Only such a practice justifies their "request," whether or not
accepted by the subject, that the subject recognize herself as obligated rather
than merely obliged. A large part of the debates within normative political
theory involves disputes about what content such a practice requires. A
common element, however, is that the legitimizing practice must include
participatory democracy--only this process recognizes both people's right
to choose (autonomy) and people's equality as to this right.
People inevitably interact within humanly created frameworks that cre-
ate opportunities for and impose constraints on people. Two factors lead
inexorably to a normative requirement that these frameworks and environ-
ments be subject to law and that the law be ultimately subject to formulation
by a participatory democracy. First, people's important projects often re-
quire binding rules-for example, property rules against theft or trespassing
or contract rules that allow for the creation of binding obligations-or re-
quire the dedication of resources to particular uses. As compared to some
alternatives, any particular set of rules or dedications will, however, disfavor
or burden or conflict with some people's preferred projects. The conflict
suggests the need for an authoritative way to determine the rules or the use
of the resources-that is, people's individual flourishing depends on the
possibility of government decision making and on the existence of a legal
order. Second, only people's abilities to participate in that government will
respect their claim to engage in self-determination on a basis of equality.
The first point requires government, the second requires that the govern-
ment be democratic. Thus, the claim is that a participatory democracy is
necessary for (normative) legitimacy of the framework on which people's
flourishing depends.
24Up to this point, liberal pluralists and republicans might agree. Both
emphasize the opportunity for participation. Many also tie the right of par-
24 In this discussion, I offer a normative account of liberal pluralist democracy. Never-
theless, many of the scholars who are most identified with pluralist democracy, such as
Truman or Dahl, had little explicit interest in these normative justifications. See supra note 3.
Moreover, many pluralists emphasized the interaction of interest groups while finding it most
functional to have relatively limited citizen involvement. In the normative account offered
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ticipation to the legitimacy of government. They differ most overtly in their
understanding of the point and nature of participation. Here I will describe
a liberal pluralist view, returning to a republican view in the next section.
The liberal pluralist recognizes that each person has her own interest
and each group has its own interest, each with a conception of the good life.
These interests and values are largely exogenous to the political order.
They often conflict with those of other persons or groups. This plurality,
the liberal pluralist emphasizes, is a fact. The liberal pluralist observes that
a telling aspect of many elite theories (and often republican theories as well)
lies in their silence. Elite theorists seldom discuss class. Other potential
lines of fundamental conflict, like race or ethnicity, usually are identified
only as problems to be managed in a process of teaching groups about their
true commonality of interest. Since religious disagreement cannot be ra-
tionally overcome, elite democrats de-emphasize the extent that religious
conflict matters, or should matter, for and in public practices. Religion is
discursively and institutionally segregated. Elitists and republicans accept
religious freedom but largely ignore the religious world-view. In contrast,
liberal pluralism recognizes intractable diversity. Conflict among world-
views, among both values and interests, is seen as incorrigible.
Liberals' theoretical response to this pluralism varies. Some versions of
liberal pluralism back away from conflict. They argue that the state has no
business advancing any particular vision of the good.25 In contrast, the em-
pirical political scientist typically observes how the system manages con-
flicts to produce relative stability, or, to the extent that the commentator
turns normative, she considers how interests ought to influence results.
Treating people as equals and as autonomous means that the properly func-
tioning democracy should respond fairly to the different concerns of each.26
here, however, people's actual or potential participation provides the theoretical basis to en-
able the different groups to get their due.
2 Early on, Dworkin offered a version of this view. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 274 (1977) (stating that "the liberal conception of equality... prohibits a
government from relying on the claim that certain forms of life are inherently more valuable
than others"). This view also seems implicit in Ackerman's conception of neutrality. See
BRUCE ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE AND THE LIBERAL STATE 11, 43 (1980). Rawls's em-
phasis on the priority of the right over the good and his emphasis on organizing society based
on principles that are primarily distributive-equal basic liberties and other primary goods
allocated by institutions designed to embody the difference principle-could be seen to en-
dorse the view that society should not favor one view of the good over another, except for its
appropriate disfavoring of views inconsistent with justice. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE 504-11 (1971). But see C. Edwin Baker, Outcome Equality or Equality of Respect:
The Substantive Content of Equal Protection, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 933, 949-59 (1983) (cri-
tiquing Rawls's interpretation of justice as irrational partly because of its discounting of po-
litical expression of people's conceptions of the good).
26 Cf JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 80-82 (1980).
1998]
330 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
Laws and policies should respond equally to each person's interests. In any
event, since values are exogenous, liberal pluralists uniformly treat the key
political issues as essentially distributional.
Liberal pluralists plausibly argue that, if properly structured, democracy
provides the mechanism most likely to take into account and properly weigh
all interests. Interests are detectable and influence government policy pri-
marily due to interest group pressures or representation. Political mobiliza-
tion by each group creates political capital and gives each group leverage in
the political bargaining that generates a democratic regime's laws and poli-
cies. Popular political participation provides a currency which assures that
a group's interests are taken into account, hopefully in rough proportion to
the group's size and the intensity of its interests. Participation protects peo-
ple's rights and interests-it is "preservative of all rights."27 This method of
properly accounting for interests provides the normative significance, the
legitimizing contribution, of democracy.
According to liberal pluralist theory, the design of institutions (includ-
ing the media) should be guided by the end of creating fair compromises or
bargains between groups. When possible, constitutional provisions should
be interpreted to protect such institutions, to mandate their maintenance, and
to facilitate their creation. Of course, various conditions could undermine
the pluralist democratic bargaining process, including "prejudice against
discrete and insular minorities ... which tends seriously to curtail the op-
eration of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon.. ,",28 In
this circumstance, pluralist democratic theory tries to devise approaches or
structural devices, possibly including interpretations of constitutional provi-
sions such as the Equal Protection Clause,29 that either help to repair the
process or to mandate the fair outcome which a properly working process
would have achieved. In this Article, however, the relevant inquiry is to
determine how the press can contribute to this pluralist democracy and to
identify the media policies or Press Clause interpretations that best enhance
these contributions. I will momentarily postpone this inquiry because it can
be explored best in contrast to the implications of another version of partici-
patory democracy.
27 Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966) (quoting Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886)). For a view that this statement can be better read as sup-
portive of a constitutive discourse rather than a liberal bargaining, see C. Edwin Baker, Re-
publican Liberalism: Liberal Rights and Republican Politics, 41 FLA. L. REv. 491, 506-07
(1989) and Frank I. Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional Ar-
gument: Voting Rights, 41 FLA. L. REV. 443, 480-85 (1989).
28 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
29 See ELY, supra note 26, at 82, 151-53.
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C. Republican Democracy
Critics argue that liberal pluralism's purportedly unsentimental realism
is actually not so realistic. Interest group pluralism neglects two basic at-
tributes of most people and these attributes are central to a sounder demo-
cratic theory. First, people are not, certainly not always, narrowly self-
interested. People are social, communal, and caring, not purely selfish and
atomistic. They formulate their aims as not being merely the advancement
of their personal interests. People are often motivated by conceptions of a
common good and by a concern with others' welfare. Second, people's in-
terests do not spring up full blown from some inner source or even from
their group identity. Rather, people expend considerable effort to formulate
and choose interests and values to which they then give allegiance. This
task requires self-reflection, discourse, or sometimes both, and normally
takes place at least partly in interaction with others.
Republican democracy treats as basic these two attributes that pluralists
ignore. Whether naturally or by socialization, most people in the real world
are, to varying degrees, oriented toward a good that involves a concern for
others, what can be called a common good. Furthermore, most people en-
gage in practices-discussion, reading, and reflection-partly in order to
understand or to formulate their own notions of the right and the good.
Both attributes affect action within all spheres of life, but they arguably
have special relevance to action oriented towards the collective order, the
political realm. A person might focus on others' welfare when she goes
shopping or when she decides what to do with her time in the evening after
a long day at work and after taking care of the children. A concern with
other people is especially likely, however, at more discrete points in time-
when a person sees herself acting in, or thinking about, the "public sphere."
People's political concerns are often much more public spirited than
much of their private economic and consumptive behavior. Many people
see their interests in politics as predominantly related to a concern for jus-
tice or for a better world for everyone, even if these concerns are only occa-
sionally central to their nonpolitical practices. Economist friends often tell
me that even the mere fact of voting is hardly rational for most people, in
terms of a calculation of personal advantage gained compared to effort spent
on voting. 3 Nevertheless, voting can be valued and rational in itself as a
self-definitional expression of being a part of a community, as a perform-
30 See HABERMAS, supra note 2, at 333-34 (discussing the difficulty of economic theo-
ries of democracy in accounting for the phenomenon of voting, and arguing that "the empiri-
cal evidence sp[eaks] against all models [of voting] that were premised on egocentric decision
making").
1998]
332 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
ance of a responsibility, as an act of selfless service to the community, and
as a means of being a participant in the collective project of choosing be-
tween contested notions of the public good. Even if, in practice, people's
voting usually corresponds to their narrow economic or group interests, this
observation would not necessarily discredit the republican view of democ-
racy. First, a political scientist's report of people's votes tracking self-
interest is at best a statistical observation that leaves huge numbers of votes
to be explained in terms of something else-possibly ignorance, but alter-
natively, a public orientation. Moreover, the characterization of the votes as
self-interested reflects the political scientist's external analysis-the voter
may believe that she is trying to advance the public good. Any vote's ap-
parent correspondence to self-interest (or group interest) that conflicts with
the observer's conception of public interest could easily represent limita-
tions in the voter's understanding of the public good or her real, even if un-
wanted, partiality of perspective. This does not demonstrate narrowness of
commitment.
The republican conception of the nature of politics is implicit in the
norms about what interests are properly voiced in public political speech.
The practical need for the candidate's or legislator's speech to appeal to as-
sertedly broader, common goods demonstrates that people, in fact, believe
that democracy and politics should be about common or public, not merely
private, goods. Narrow self-interest purportedly observed in actual voting
should not be accepted as normative but as a problem that an ideally work-
ing democracy would help alleviate. From the republican perspective, the
extent to which current politics is narrowly self-interested merely indicates
the degree to which it is currently corrupt.
These considerations suggest that a central feature of democracy must
be a (public) realm especially dedicated to people's formulation and pursuit
of their "common good." Government should be designed to institutional-
ize a responsiveness to a public realm in which people consider the public
good. Republican democracy shares with liberal pluralism a critique of the
elitist focus on merely sociological legitimacy. But where the liberal plu-
ralist sees normative legitimacy as the result of fair distributions resulting
from fair bargains, the republican sees legitimacy flowing from commitment
to, and agreement on, the common good. An autonomous, moral agent
ought to be self-governing. This principle rules out subordination to exoge-
nously given interests. For self-governance, a person must be able to par-
ticipate in and be able to accept the mandates of the collective process.
In this republican view, politics is most fundamentally about discussing,
formulating, and understanding common ends and then pursuing them.
From both the individual and group perspective, participation is not merely
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or primarily an aspect of efficient or fair self-interested bargaining. Rather,
it is intrinsically valuable as part of the life of a self-defining, reflective per-
son and people. The liberal pluralist critiqued the elitist for not seeing the
need to build mechanisms into the structure of government to take fair ac-
count of true differences of interest, especially those concerning distribu-
tional issues. The pluralist sees bargaining over these differences, along
with the handling of collective-action problems, as the central function of
politics. The republican, however, critiques the pluralist for ignoring the
people's activity of formulating truly "common interests." She rebukes both
the elitist and the liberal pluralist for treating values and conceptions of the
good as mere empirical facts advanced either by expert administration or
fair bargains.31 In contrast, the republican believes that a public good is
found or formulated only through the deliberations of civicly virtuous citi-
zens. From this view, "the experience of democracy is not ultimately about
winning but about deliberating and acting together.... [Democracy] is
about how we equalize politically in acting together for shared purposes. 32
Further description requires a choice in how to model republicanism.
So far, the account has emphasized two central themes: civic virtue and a
public or common good.33 Civic virtue is an orientation of people toward
the common good. But the relation between virtue and the common good
can be seen in alternative ways. First, even if all virtuous people were ori-
ented toward the common good, their conceptions of the common good
could vary and compete. Although a civicly virtuous person must remain
31 The difference between these two critiques of elite democracy can be seen in the dis-
tinction between two critiques of a law and economics methodology. In the context of
choosing legal rules or settling disputes, the economic methodology typically takes some hy-
pothesized existing distribution of wealth and some set of preferences as given. The liberal
pluralist's critique emphasizes that the distribution is precisely what cannot be taken as a
given, but instead, is what is at issue; any methodology that ignores distributional disputes
will be inadequate. The republican agrees with this, but also asserts that the content of the
preferences is also unsettled and needs political formulation. Both critiques easily show that
efficiency is a theoretically indeterminate criterion. It becomes determinative only if the ana-
lyst makes normative assumptions about what distribution and what set of preferences to
identify as "existing" or as otherwise appropriate to employ. See C. Edwin Baker, The Ideol-
ogy of the Economic Analysis of Law, 5 PHiL. & PUB. AFF. 3, 27-33 (1975); C. Edwin Baker,
Posner's Privacy Mystery and the Failure of Economic Analysis of Law, 12 GA. L. REV. 475,
493 (1978).
32 Sheldon Wolin, Democracy & Counterrevolution, NATION, Apr. 22, 1996, at 22, 24.
33 An overriding concern with corruption has also been a republican theme. In the liberal
pluralist account, where self-interest is accepted as the norm, corruption, or what I sometimes
call "overt corruption," presumably means the improper or illegal pursuit of self-interest.
This is the behavior that press theorists hope the press's "checking function" will expose or
deter. Because the republican proclaims "civic virtue" as the proper norm, she will see a
much larger realm of potential corruption. Under this republican conception, a "fall from
virtue," in addition to the liberal idea of "overt corruption," is a feared form of corruption.
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open to hearing and considering alternative conceptions of the common
good,34 in the end she should struggle to have her understanding prevail,
even if opponents are not, and never could be, convinced. This competition
can lead to "republican moments"--times of intense politics when old or-
ders are transformed by people's struggles to have new conceptions of the
public good come to dominate politically.35 Alternatively, some theorists
believe (or at least theorize as if they believe) that, with sufficient delibera-
tion, agreement on a common good would be possible among civicly virtu-
ous persons. A conception's "commonness" relates to it really being the
good for all-or, at least, for all within the relevant community. Invocations
of the popular notion of an "ideal speech situation" often appear to be at-
tempts to describe a context in which this consensus could be reached. The
ethical premise that free or autonomous people must live under laws that
they help to author and that they accept suggests the importance of this pos-
sibility. Freedom or autonomy purportedly exists for people only when the
legal order represents a truly common good that all can accept.
As will be discussed later, these alternative conceptions of the common
good lead to somewhat different notions of ideal media policy. Given the
concerns of this Article, it is analytically useful to label them as involving
different conceptions of democracy. The first alternative is intrinsic to what
I will call "complex democracy," the next type of democracy to be de-
scribed. Here, I will call the second alternative "republican"--namely, the
notion of a politics aimed at a truly common good that is or would be ac-
cepted by all within a community after appropriate discourses.
John Dewey might serve as an exemplary republican democrat. He has
inspired many advocates of a more participatory democracy and of a press
that better serves participatory ideals. More to the point here, he argued for
broad participation as a way to find and pursue what we have or need in
common. In the book most cited in this connection, The Public and Its
Problems,36 Dewey consistently stresses "common concerns." Democracy
"forces a recognition that there are common interests." 37 Unlike elitists, he
tells us that the many do not need investigative expertise but rather the abil-
ity to "judge of the bearing of the knowledge supplied by others upon com-
34 Jim Pope takes this feature of openness to distinguish true republican politics (and re-
publican moments) from, for example, practices of the Klan-that is, political activism de-
signed to silence opponents. See James Pope, Republican Moments: The Role of Direct
Popular Power in the American Constitutional Order, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 287, 313-15
(1990).
T See id. at 311-15.
36 JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS (1927).
37 Id. at 207.
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mon concerns." 38  Unlike pluralist democrats, Dewey does not mention
deep conflict within the public. Rather, the public's "essential need... [is
improved] debate, discussion, and persuasion."' 9 Conflict is only implied
by the need for the public to prevail over elites. "No government by experts
in which the masses do not have the chance to inform the experts as to their
needs can be anything but an oligarchy managed in the interests of the few.
And... [the public must] force the administrative specialists to take ac-
count of the needs."40 Clearly, democracy must be participatory. "From the
standpoint of the individual, it consists in having a responsible share ac-
cording to capacity in forming and directing the activities of the groups to
which one belongs ... .,41 But this "responsible share" seems deliberative
and solidaristic, in a republican sense, rather than a matter of interest group
bargaining or conflict. Future improvements of democracy, Dewey argues,
must "make the interest of the public a more supreme guide and criterion of
governmental activity, and.., enable the public to form and manifest its
purposes still more authoritatively.... [T]he cure for the ailments of de-
mocracy is more democracy. ' , 2 A full blown republican theory would have
relevance for the design of many structural features of a democratic order.
Here, the point is that the press or the media constitutes a central democratic
institution. Its design ought to facilitate the process of deliberating about
and choosing values and conceptions of the common good.
D. Complex Democracy
It is difficult to deny the existence of people's altruistic impulses. Peo-
ple often act selflessly to aid others and to serve varying common goods.
43
Social life as we know it would be impossible without these elements.
Likewise, people surely need processes by which they can clarify both their
individual preferences and their conception of more general common goods,
38 Id. at 209. Dewey observes that "[Ihe world has suffered more from leaders and
authorities than from the masses." Id. at 208.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 147.
42 Id. at 146.
43 Obviously, an act done to further a common good of which the actor is also a benefici-
ary is not necessarily altruistic; however, it is altruistic (or an embodiment of a claim of soli-
darity) to the extent that the direct benefit to the actor is less than the direct cost of the act to
the actor. In this circumstance, the act can be, and experientially is, justified by the benefit to
the group. The claim that the act is still not altruistic because the actor's identity is tied to the
benefited group (or, if the act benefits a stranger, because the actor's identity is tied to hu-
manity) and, therefore, the actor benefits to the extent that the group (or stranger) does, is
not-at least for my purposes-a refutation of altruism, but rather an argument that places
solidarity as opposed to self-interest at the core of a person's being.
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the feature most emphasized by republican theory. It is equally difficult to
deny that much of politics (and of life) involves bargaining, reflects self-
interest, and often relates to real conflicts of values. A further complexity is
involved in the many cases where political bargaining does not reflect peo-
ple's narrow self-interest, but rather groups' conceptions of the good that
their members favor. Here, a person may favor this good within the politi-
cal or public arena not out of any personal desire for a benefit, but solely
because of solidaristic, even altruistic, impulses to further the group's inter-
ests. A more "realistic" theory would assume that a participatory democ-
racy would and should encompass arenas where both individuals and groups
look for and create common ground, that is, common goods, but where they
also advance their own individual and group values and interests.44 Moreo-
ver, normatively, it is difficult to argue that either type of political striving is
inappropriate for an ethical person or within ajustifiable politics.
Individuals and groups can have both real conflicts of individual or
group interests ("I or we want more country music rather than your classical
'junk."') and unresolvable disagreements about the common good ("As a
people, we would be better-off with more wilderness areas rather than the
roads you want."). In relation to these conflicts, when real and unresolv-
able, the political structure should facilitate fair bargains or compromises.
These conflicting group interests or alternative conceptions of common
goods, however, have complicated histories. Republican theory as de-
scribed above emphasizes that common ground or societal public goods do
not spring forth preformed, but require discursive development. This same
point is also true of groups' own "common goods." Groups require their
own internal processes of value formulation and clarification. Processes
that the republican intends to serve discursive value formation and clarifica-
tion for society as a whole should be duplicated at the group level to serve
each group's internal discursive needs. An adequate participatory demo-
cratic political order must provide institutional or structural support for dis-
cursive political processes at levels below society as a whole.
As noted, some liberals argue that the collective treats differences fairly
only if the law does not favor any conception of the good.45 In contrast, re-
44 Nancy Fraser develops most elements of what I call complex democracy in her critique
of Habermas's original formulation of the notion of the public sphere, although I find Haber-
mas's position, especially as developed in his more recent discussion of democratic theory,
fully consistent with Fraser's approach. See Nancy Fraser, Rethinking the Public Sphere: A
Contribution to the Critique ofActually Existing Democracy, in HABERMAS AND THE PUBLIC
SPHERE 109, 137 (Craig Calhoun ed., 1992) (arguing "against four constitutive assumptions
of the bourgeois conception of the public sphere" while identifying "some corresponding ele-
ments of a new, postbourgeois conception"); cf infra text accompanying note 55.
45 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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publicans sometimes claim that there is a truly "common" good to be found
or formulated and then furthered. From the republican perspective, group
assertion of distinct interests and maintenance of divergent perspectives is
always a matter of concern-a sign of inadequate integration. "The ques-
tion is how to cultivate the spirit of solidarity .... ,6 The melting pot
dream looks to the time when all people's interests will be merely human
interests. From a left republican perspective that seeks politics of equality
that will embody the "essence" of "Americanism," the "squandering of en-
ergy on identity politics ... is an American tragedy.
' 47
The choice, however, need not be between liberal pluralism and repub-
licanism (as described above) 4 -or, worse still, a "partial good" imposed
by an oppressive elite. In contrast to republicanism, an adequate democracy
must recognize that different groups and different interests do exist. Such
differences are probably inevitable in a free society.49 More importantly,
they are desirable. Multiculturaism-the recognition and celebration of
difference-could be a move towards a realistic and, most importantly, a
more inclusive, nonoppressive conception of society. Even though there
may be real "common goods," significant aspects of any single group's
good will differ from that of others, just as is true for individuals. A good
society will have many groups that develop divergent, potentially conflict-
ing "common goods." Inevitably, these differept:es and conflicts often will
not be dissolved through discussion. As a result, many of these conflicting
goods will not be realized perfectly in society. But a democratic order must
encompass giving different groups-just as it gives different individuals-
46 TODD GITLIN, THE TWILIGHT OF COMMON DREAMs 217 (1995).
47 Id. at 35, 44. Gitlin notes the pervasiveness of this theme on the left. In addition to
citing Dewey, Carl Sandburg, Paul Robeson, Frank Capra, and Woody Guthrie, he quotes
Communist Party Leader Earl Browder: "'Communism is twentieth century Americanism."'
Id. at56.
48 I emphasize this because some people who consider themselves liberal pluralists or
republicans will think my description overly flat; some will view the conception described
here as complex democracy to be closer to their self-described republican or liberal views.
49 This conclusion helps explain, for example, the attention recently given by John Rawls
to showing that certain principles of justice can be defended on the basis of an overlapping
consensus of reasonable views. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 10 (1993) (dis-
cussing how "political liberalism looks for a political conception of justice that.., can gain
the support of an overlapping consensus of reasonable religious, philosophical, and moral
doctrines"). Although many see the later book as representing a change from his earlier A
Theory of Justice (1971), an alternative reading can see them as congruent but as engaged in
different tasks. The earlier book is a philosophical argument that "justice as fairness" is the
best liberal account of justice, while the later book takes up the politically or pragmatically
important task of arguing to a pluralist society that the acceptability of "justice as fairness" is
not dependent on its liberal pedigree.
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fair scope to develop and live their differences.5 And "fair scope" will pre-
sumably be a matter, at least partly,5 1 for bargaining and compromise.
A pluralist society will encompass different groups whose separate con-
ceptions of the good will partly overlap and partly be in tension. The ap-
propriate extent of societywide common goods and of legitimate integration
should be a matter for noncoerced agreement by individuals and groups.
But any search for the more inclusive "public goods" will be noncoercive
only if groups first have an adequate opportunity to develop their differing
perspectives, and then have their perspectives fully voiced and given their
due. 2 Purportedly "common" public spheres, especially if they claim to
bracket differences, inevitably manifest particular cultural content, usually
that of dominant groups. 3 Any majoritarian or elite denial (or bracketing)
50 Mill treated his argument for free speech as illustrative of his argument for liberty.
JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Bobbs-Merrill ed. 1956) (1859). Mill ignored a difference
between his argument for freedom of expression and for liberty-with the difference being
quite relevant to the argument for different theories of democracy. According to Mill's writ-
ings on thought and discussion, people's actions and their concepts of the good are best
founded on truth, discoverable in the long run by free speech. See id. at 19-67. This premise
seems to suggest that differences-like differences in opinion-are ultimately only instru-
mentally valuable as a means to arrive at truth and that truth would be the same for everyone.
Mill maintained that "no belief which is contrary to truth can be really useful," id. at 28, and
that "the well-being of mankind may almost be measured by the number and gravity of the
truths which have reached the point of being uncontested." Id. at 53. Although Mill valued
liberty, in part, for these same reasons of experimental progress, he also valued liberty be-
cause "different persons ... require different conditions." Id. at 82. In order to give "fair
play to the nature of each, it is essential that different persons should be allowed to lead dif-
ferent lives." Id. at 77. In the terminology used above, the first argument, which instrumen-
tally values freedom of speech, aims for a melting pot, while the second argument, which val-
ues liberty (and difference) as an aspect of the good for persons, celebrates multiculturalism.
51 To the extent that the "good" conflicts with principles ofjustice, like the "good" of the
sadist, a justifiable democracy would try to rule out or suppress, rather than bargain over, the
practice of that conception of the good. See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Counting Preferences in
Collective Choice Situations, 25 UCLA L. REv. 381 (1978).
52 Fraser makes this point. She emphasizes that reducing the oppression of a stratified
society requires flourishing public spheres of "subaltemian" groups and thematizing rather
than bracketing difference in such societies. She also emphasizes the contribution of a plu-
rality of public spheres within a desirable, egalitarian, multicultural society. See Fraser, su-
pra note 44, at 120-25. In other words, these partial public spheres are valuable both as a
means and as an end.
53 Robert Post persistently argues that attempts to structure public discourse predictably
lead to this result-that is, the improper rule of dominant perspectives. Post's observations
are relevant as objections to censorship or limitations on individual autonomy. To the extent,
however, that they are leveled against Cass Sunstein's arguments for a more managerial ap-
proach to the media, see ROBERT C. POST, CONsTITUTIONAL DOMAINs 268-89 (1995), Post
risks ignoring the fact that media institutions are inevitably legally structured and that this
legal structuring historically often has been and should be oriented toward conceptions of the
good in general and towards serving favored conceptions of democracy in particular. See C.
Edwin Baker, Turner Broadcasting: Content-Based Regulation of Persons and Presses, 1994
SUP. CT. REV. 57. Given inadequacies and distortions of market media production, blanket
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of actual or experienced differences during a purportedly impartial or "rea-
soned" democratic search for a public good inevitably involves ideological
oppression. Greater societal integration may or may not be desirable. But
integration can be nonoppressive only if historically subordinated groups
first are able to develop, examine, and articulate independently their own
identity and consolidate their own strength. These groups need their own
discursive development, their own public spheres and media in which they
can independently develop identity and strategies. Only then can a group
properly agree on "common goods." If these observations are right, a le-
gitimate democracy properly includes a discursive search for common
goods and agreement, but it also must involve recognition of goods that are
not common and about which there must be fair bargaining and compro-
mise.
5 4
This complex view combines elements of liberal pluralism and republi-
can democracy. It assumes the reality and legitimacy of bargaining among
groups over irreconcilable goods, but also hopes for discursive development
of common conceptions of aspects of the good. This vision of complex de-
mocracy generally corresponds to the democratic theory recently developed
by Jtirgen Habermas. Habermas argues that democracy is not a matter of
merely following appropriate principles of justice while maximizing and
allocating private goods, as claimed by some interest group pluralists (the
liberal view). He also contends that democracy is not solely a matter of
finding, constituting, and pursuing societywide common goods (a republi-
55can account). A preferable "discourse" theory of democracy encompasses
republican-type discourses aimed at ethical self-understanding and self-
objections to a managerial approach are misguided; the need instead is for principles that limit
managerial abuse and democratic theory that guides managerial input. Sunstein's approach
may be entirely consistent with the perspective of complex democracy described here. He
emphasizes the democratic value of "disagreement and heterogeneity"--that is, "diverse per-
spectives, and contributions to democratic discourse made by people differently situated."
CASs SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 242 (1993). Neverthe-
less, Sunstein often seems to value this diversity much as Mill seemed to value freedom of
speech: as an aid to a common discourse useful in reaching appropriate conceptions of a truly
common good (or, in Mill's case, of the truth). See MILL, supra note 50, at 19-67. To this
extent, Sunstein's conception of democracy is more aligned with what I have labeled as re-
publican democracy than with complex democracy.
54 This bargaining is not only over distribution but also over conceptions of the good that
will be promoted or embodied in law and public policy. Respect for difference, however, re-
quires that losing (or possibly only temporarily losing) conceptions not be suppressed even if
they are not embodied or promoted.
5 See generally Jtlrgen Habermas, Three Normative Models of Democracy, 1
CONSTELLATIONS 1 (1994). This theme reoccurs at many points in Habermas's major recent
book on legal theory. See HABERMAS, supra note 2, at 166-67, 180, 283-86, 296-302 (dis-
cussing a "discourse theory of deliberative politics," which combines elements from both the
liberal and republican models).
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constitution of specific historical communities. This ethical self-
constitution, however, should be "subordinate to moral questions. 56 Ac-
ceptable political decisions must be consistent with, although not entailed
by, principles of justice that "claim universal validity., 57  Moreover,
Habermas argues that "compromises make up the bulk of political proc-
esses"--that is, politics also includes "fair" bargaining leading to compro-
mises between groups that presumably maintain separate identities under
conditions of cultural and societal pluralism.
In this account of democracy, Habermas sees politics as encompassing
different types of discourses that take on different tasks. These discourses
include both compromising interests and finding elements of a shared com-
mon good. Presumably, groups or communities within the inevitably plu-
ralistic society also retain the task of defining non-societywide, more par-
ticularistic "common goods." Thus, this account rejects republicanism's
totalizing conceptions as oppressive, but incorporates the republican idea of
self-defining or public good-constituting discourses as one key aspect of
politics. Given pluralism, different self-defining discourses must occur at
both the societal and group level. This implicitly requires different "public
spheres"--those in principle open to all and also those open to all who are
members of, or who identify with, smaller, pluralistic groups. Finally, this
account rejects liberal pluralism as founded on an unrealistically stunted
conception of people and politics; but it incorporates the liberal pluralist's
recognition of fundamental value conflicts and the need for bargaining and
compromise.
E. Methodological Aside
A central theme in this Article is the implicit connection between a per-
son's allegiance to one or another vision of democracy and her other
views-a claim that this Article discusses mainly in terms of how different
democratic commitments affect judgments about the role of the press. Here,
however, I illustrate this claim by tentatively suggesting that these demo-
cratic allegiances can also relate to a person's preference among differing
legal methodologies.
Scholarly methodologies are tools. A tool's usefulness varies depend-
ing on the task. Thus, although the choice of methodologies will not rigidly
track political or normative commitments, my claim is that different value
56 HABERMAS, supra note 2, at 97. Here, "moral" refers to purportedly more universal
normative principles, while "ethical," although also referring to normative principles, is more
culturally and historically specific, more overtly open to choice and variation among societies.
57 Id. at 5; see also id. at 452.
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commitments often suggest different ways of approaching or seeing prob-
lems and should resonate most with specific methodologies. I suggest, for
example, that much of law and economics scholarship fits most comfortably
with elite democracy theory. Law and economics typically evaluates a legal
rule's or legal institution's efficiency, taking distributions and preferences
as given. An easy, though not necessary, jump goes from a scholarly focus
on questions of efficiency to the view that achieving efficiency is the proper
focus of government. If a distribution and a set of preferences is taken as
given, as in law and economics, or is taken as not being in real or serious
dispute or involving disputes that the government can and should largely ig-
nore, as elite democrats often believe, the key governmental issues seem
technical-for example, how to efficiently serve people's preferences. The
task of figuring out technical solutions wisely can be turned over to experts
or elites-that is, often to economists. From this perspective, political fail-
ure lies in not finding efficient solutions. Corruption can be defined in eco-
nomic terms basically as "rent seeking." It is best countered by virtue, but
democratic elections provide a systematic means both to deter corruption
and to replace a corrupted elite with one promising greater virtue and skill.
Elite democracy makes considerable sense if society's key problems are
those thematized by law and economics.58 Or, from the reverse perspective,
for an elite democrat, the most obviously useful legal methodology would
lie in the type of problem-solving capacity offered by an efficiency-oriented
economics.
In contrast, the main branches of positivist political science fit better
with liberal pluralist understandings of democracy. The tough-minded,
positivist political scientist sees politics as a struggle for advantage. To a
significant extent governmental decision making is about whose interests
prevail or, even more crudely, about the distribution of wealth in its many
forms. Positivist theorists describe the struggle. Or, given a normative in-
terest in fair outcomes, the positivists' inquiry can be directed at the design
of institutional arrangements that will best achieve fair distributions or a fair
58 Elite democrats are not inevitably efficiency oriented, however. The key to the corre-
lation between elite democracy and economic efficiency analysis is that the interest of the
whole is largely objective. Edmund Burke favored rule by a natural aristocracy capable of
governing and saw the only role of elections as a means to pick this elite-a rationale fully
consistent with his belief in restricted electorates and the complete lack of popular involve-
ment in governing. See HANNA FENICHEL PrrKrn, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 168-
89 (1967). Pitkin describes Burke's view of interests as being basically objective. Given this
relatively objective concept of interests (both of the whole and of the parts), the best govern-
ment will result when "with at least one able representative of every [broad, objective] interest
participating, rational deliberation discloses the national interest." Id. at 188. Thus, Burke
emphasizes the elites' "judgment, virtue, and wisdom derived from experience," id. at 169,
rather than their efficiency calculations.
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response to different groups' interests. These inquiries roughly equate to
the pluralist conception of democracy. 59 Of course, this competitive strug-
gle for advantage is not the only plausible vision of politics or of govern-
ment as an object of study. As C.B. Macpherson pointed out, this "pluralist
elitist equilibrium model" of politics makes sense only as long as (and to the
extent that) market society and the market image of humans totally domi-
nate the world.60
Other methodologies could plausibly be associated with commitments
to other theories of democracy. Neither the democratic elitist nor the liberal
pluralist, for example, would see much point in "story telling" or "law and
literature." These methodologies, however, could be vitally important to
republicans and, for potentially different reasons, to complex democrats.
These methodologies explore particular values and cultural commitments,
portray alternatives, and raise normative dilemmas concerning differing
ways of being. For the republican and sometimes for the complex demo-
crat, stories can usefully contribute to a deeper and often more inclusive
mutual understanding of the whole. For the complex democrat, however,
stories will often (primarily) address more limited audiences. The stories
(or the scholarship) will function primarily within the internal debates of a
specific group, helping the group to find and to understand its own identity,
commitments, and strategies.
Similar observations may be made about other interpretative method-
ologies such as anthropological ethnographic studies. Legal students' and
scholars' commitments to different conceptions of democracy and different
understandings of the nature of public issues will influence the methodolo-
59 The law and economics and positivist political science that I contrast here are admit-
tedly very similar in many respects. Both approaches are relatively Hobbesian. Both assume
basically self-interested individuals. Both tend to take interests or preferences as a given. (I
only say "basically" and "tend"---the best practitioners of any methodology often problema-
tize an assumption usually taken for granted in the methodology.) Both then consider how
economic or political orders facilitate or prevent people from efficiently or fairly advancing
their interests. Most practitioners are sufficiently self-aware to see that their inquiries only
engage a limited range of concerns and are aware that others, using slightly or radically dif-
ferent methodologies, develop interesting visions. In standard applications, however, al-
though both treat preferences as exogenous, they differ in that the economic model usually
also takes the existing distribution of wealth as a given while the political scientist sees the
struggle over distribution as central. Even reinstating the analogy by suggesting that the plu-
ralist political scientist takes the existing distribution of power as given is not quite right in
that the political scientist often investigates how particular institutional arrangements distrib-
ute power while "law and economices" economists usually emphasize how different frame-
works affect efficiency.
60 See MACPHERSON, supra note 3, at 77-79, 91-92 (explaining that in this model,
"[d]emocracy is simply a market mechanism: the voters are the consumers; the politicians are
the entrepreneurs").
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gies that they find useful. Of course, a methodology's utility is not objec-
tively determined. Rather, its usefulness depends on those issues that a per-
son's value commitments-such as her theory of democracy-indicate are
the most important to explore.
F. Participatory Theories 'Ideal Media
Each version of participatory democracy treats somewhat different at-
tributes of the governing process as crucial. The optimal design of institu-
tional structures depends on the functions of democracy emphasized by the
favored democratic theory. Similar observations apply to the design of the
press, which, though usually privately owned, is widely recognized as an
institution that plays a crucial role in democratic governance.
Liberal pluralist democracy hopes to generate fair bargains as a result of
groups pressing their interests. In this process, the media should perform
several tasks. First, the press should provide people or organized groups
with information that indicates when their interests are at stake. Second, the
media must mobilize people to participate and promote their divergent in-
terests. Note that neither function, information nor mobilization, and pre-
sumably the media structures that facilitate them, is necessary for elitist de-
mocracy. Third, for pluralist democracy to work, information about popular
demands must flow properly-that is, given the practical gap between citi-
zens and policymakers, the press should make policymakers aware of the
content and strength of people's demands.
For at least the first two of these tasks, a common media serving society
as a whole likely will not suffice. Most pluralist interest groups conclude
that only their own media effectively identify when their interests are at
stake. Often, only their own media will develop and present information
relevant to their needs and interests. Groups also need their own media for
the second function. Arguably, the decline of competing partisan daily
newspapers contributed to the decline of voter participation in the United
States.61 Pluralists rely on partisan, mobilizing media entities to help spur
participation. Thus, they should be unalterably opposed to such a monopoly
as it strangles democracy. Moreover, competing media entities should not
compete merely for undifferentiated shares of a single, mass audience.
Segmentation is necessary in the pluralist vision. The hope is for separate
media entities, with each entity focused on, and preferably controlled and
61 See C. EDWIN BAKER, ADVERTISING AND A DEMOCRATIC PRESs 41-43 (1994);
MICHAEL E. MCGERR, THE DECLINE OF POPULAR POLiTICs 116-35 (1986) (describing the
role of the partisan press in making the political world seem accessible, exciting, and impor-
tant, thus generating higher voter turnout).
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maybe owned by, one of the various groups making up the polity (or con-
trolled by individuals whose primary allegiance is to one of these groups).
Republican democracy has a very different vision. Two elements are
crucial. First, the press should be discursive, supporting reflection and
value or policy choice. Second, this discursive press must be inclusive. The
democratic pursuit of, and hopefully agreement on, a real common good re-
quires an inclusive public discourse. Popular involvement in democratic
deliberation requires at least that "serious issues ... be covered in a serious
way" and "that a significant portion of the citizenry is actually exposed to
diverse views." 62 The press ideally should be civil, objective, balanced, and
comprehensive-although some slippage might be allowed if necessary in
order to not overly restrict participation. Still, the republican might be am-
bivalent about mobilization, certainly more so than the pluralist for whom
partisan mobilization, which often lacks civility, is crucial. The republican
wishes to see politics as a matter of the better argument, rather than as pres-
sure politics. Participation by the uninformed and unreflective is hardly a
gain. Nevertheless, corruption, narrow self-interest, or possibly even policy
inertia can also thwart realization of the common good. Thus, a mobilizing
press may be needed, but it should be directed at general civic mobilization
on behalf of honesty, good procedure, and responsiveness to popular de-
mands. The segmented, partisan media required by pluralist democracy is
unnecessary and could be disruptive and thereby impede reflective dis-
course and agreement. Indeed, the republican can be happy with media en-
tities that are dominant within a community as long as these dominant media
are adequately inclusive and comprehensive. But, these media are only de-
sirable if sufficiently responsible-which becomes a crucial republican con-
cern.
Complex democracy seeks a political process that promotes both fair
partisan bargaining and discourses aimed at agreement. Like pluralists,
complex democrats require institutions, including media entities, that assist
groups in recognizing when their interests are at stake and in mobilizing
their members. Segmented media can help groups participate in political
bargaining aimed at obtaining their fair distributional shares of social re-
sources. Complex democrats also require institutions, presumably including
inclusive, nonsegmented media entities, that support a search for general
societal agreement on "common goods." Thus, complex democracy entails
a media system that performs the somewhat conflicting functions respec-
tively highlighted by liberal pluralist and republican theories. And, it re-
quires more.
62 SuNSTEIN, supra note 53, at 20, 22; see also id. at 251.
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According to theories of complex democracy, diverse groups sometimes
can agree on a societywide "common good," but sometimes choose instead
to pursue their own separate vision. Agreement on a common good, how-
ever, is real only if based on each group's own needs, projects, and com-
mitments. A group's own pursuits, however, do not flow from obvious,
objective interests or commitments. Despite the great influence of history
and context, and despite a high correlation between circumstance and inter-
est, these "objective" factors do not strictly determine a group's identity and
interests or value commitments. Identity and interests, as well as the strate-
gies for their pursuit, often result, and, if the group is self-determining ought
to result, from the group's discursive reflection and potentially revisable
choices or commitments. Normally, identity and commitments are best ar-
rived at or properly affirmed through discourses largely internal to the
group. Unless groups' internal needs for discourse are met, purportedly
broader solidaristic or altruistic conceptions of the public good almost in-
evitably mask dominant groups' oppressive impositions of values. "Dis-
senting" or minority groups are left with the unfair choice of assimilating
under oppressive conditions or appearing selfish as they deny purported
common goods and pursue their own apparently narrow interests. To avoid
these alternatives of oppression or marginalization of minority groups, com-
plex democracy increases the assignments given to the media.
Complex democracy requires media entities that support groups' inter-
nal discursive and reflective needs for self-definition, cultural development,
and value clarification. All functions that republican theory assumes the
media should perform at the societal level, the complex democrat expects a
segmented press to perform for each group at this subsocietal, group level.
The centrality of these self-reflective and self-defining activities also points
to media forms largely ignored in the vision of the elitist or pluralist. Fic-
tion, art, and dance are not only valuable in themselves, but also play inte-
gral roles in individuals' and groups' reflective and definitional processes.
If preferences or interests are fixed, and the only issues are technical (elitist)
or distributional (pluralist), these media forms have little democratic rele-
vance. Art and fiction, like other consumer goods, may have social value-
and some lawyers with an impulse toward favoring free speech may want to
provide them with some constitutional privilege. Elitist or pluralist press
theories, however, can properly disregard these forms. That conclusion
changes somewhat for the republican. Even then, those fictional or artistic
contents that would be truly useful in republican discourse are unlikely to be
in much danger of political suppression. For a complex democrat, however,
these media forms not only have major significance to groups' self-defining
discourses, but also may be in danger of inadequate economic nourishment
or direct suppression. Dominant groups sometimes find the art or fiction of
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outlying groups to be exotic, while, at other times, to be unrefined and base,
perhaps even threatening. Often dominant groups see the cultural expres-
sion of outliers (or, as another example, each generation's children) as the
paradigm of "unreason"--sometimes dangerous and, at best, an arousing,
63offensive diversion. Nevertheless, complex democrats would expect these
media forms to make significant democratic contributions to groups' inter-
nal discursive needs. The vibrancy of these media provides some evidence
of the health of the complex democrat's ideal media realm.
Thus, complex democrats have the most robust hopes for the media.
They seek both a societywide press called for by republican theory, and a
strong, partisan, segmented press called for by pluralist theory. In addition,
segmented media entities should support the same value and identity clarifi-
cation tasks internally for "each" individual group that societywide media
entities provide for society as a whole.
The difference between the visions of the media held by each demo-
cratic theory is further exemplified by their views towards the nature of the
information that media should produce-for example, the nature of the in-
formation produced about the public itself. In a representative democracy,
elections provide some, but usually quite inarticulate, information about the
public. Democratic theorists would want the media to help fill the gap-
providing whatever information flows out to the public or up to the
government elites that the theorist believes democracy requires. For elite
democrats, this may be limited to basic information about people's unmet
needs. For participatory democrats, however, the expectations are greater,
with the specific expectation varying with the participatory theory.
Consider two notions of public opinion: (1) a common current view
that defines public opinion as the sum of polling data about any matter,
gained by privately questioning people without any requirement that they
engage in reflection, and (2) the classical view that public opinion is what
members of the public think, after reflection or discussion, about a public
issue, possibly further restricted to reflective views asserted in public.
For the liberal pluralist, the first notion may serve. The "polling" con-
ception of public opinion could seem natural to a pluralist who takes inter-
ests as exogenous and considers only their advancement as internal to the
political process. For the pluralist, a legislator engaged in political struggle,
like a poker player, needs to know what cards she holds; when bargaining,
she needs accurate information concerning the depth and breadth of con-
stituents' preferences. To some extent, polling organizations supply this in-
63 See Kenneth Karst, Boundaries and Reasons: Freedom of Expression and the Subor-
dination of Groups, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 95, 109-16.
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formation. The major problem is that polls typically fail to reflect the inten-
sity of concerns. (Different attitudes about this failure are possible, how-
ever. For example, George Gallop saw this blindness as a desirable way to
"neutralize the power of pressure groups." 64) For pluralists, the only doubts
about polling concern the empirical question of whether polls cause more
distortion by failing to measure intensities of preferences, than they elimi-
nate by more adequately reporting those preferences of unorganized groups
that are undermeasured by other means.
The republican should favor the more classical accounts of public
opinion. The classical accounts understand "public opinion" as views for-
mulated in public discussions about common interests. From that per-
spective, polling has little to do with either identifying or measuring public
opinion. Instead, polling duplicates liberal pluralism in its focus on existing
private preferences, while lacking any methodological concern with reflec-
tive and discursively developed views. In the classic accounts, only the later
represent politically significant public opinion.
66
Overall, pluralists are generally pleased that the press provides regular
reports on polling data. Publication adds political force to people's (private
and usually unreflective) opinions. The reports provide information about
majoritarian attitudes. This information can have political effects both di-
rectly on government decision makers and indirectly to the extent that other
members of the public often conform to apparent majoritarian attitudes. For
liberal pluralists, this is as it should be. In contrast, republicans will be
deeply suspicious of, if not irate about, this type of reporting by the press.
Their concern is that reports of polling data give too much weight to unre-
64 Charles T. Salmon & Theodore L. Glasser, The Politics of Polling and the Limits of
Consent, in PUBLIC OPINION AND THE COMMUNICATION OF CONSENT 437, 440-41 (Theodore
L. Glasser & Charles T. Salmon eds., 1995). Salmon and Glasser contrast plebiscitary de-
mocracy, implicit in opinion polling, with a preferred alternative that amounts roughly to what
I describe as republican democracy. See id. at 449.
65 See Harry C. Boyte, Public Opinion as Public Judgment, in PUBLIC OPINION AND THE
COMMUNICATION OF CONSENT, supra note 64, at 417, 417 (discussing public opinion as "the
outcome generated by a body of people ... who come together through a process of discus-
sion, debate, and dialogue about current affairs"); Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, Public Opinion
and Rationality, in PUBLIC OPINION AND THE COMMUNICATION OF CONSENT, supra note 64,
at 33, 34, 47-48 (describing the two main concepts of public opinion as rationality and social
control, and maintaining that polling is relevant mostly to the second); John Durham Peters,
Historical Tensions in the Concept of Public Opinion, in PUBLIC OPINION AND THE
COMMUNICATION OF CONSENT, supra note 64, at 3, 10-11 (discussing public opinion in the
context of the press, as a "whole-scale conversation" among citizens). The classic critique of
polling is Herbert Blumer, Public Opinion and Public Opinion Polling, 13 AM. SOC. REV.
542 (1948).
66 Recent moves toward the use of focus groups to gather data may represent the conclu-
sion that something closer to the classic notion is also instrumentally most efficacious.
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flective, untested private views. In their view, the object of politics should
be to generate and give force to the better argument-thus, any political ef-
fect of mere polling data is inappropriate. Further, republican theorists ob-
ject to a media using its limited resources to focus on private preferences
rather than on issues needing public attention and on the information and
discussion relevant to their consideration. Complex democrats should agree
with the substance of the republican objections, but recognize that the State
appropriately responds in part to private needs and concerns, which are part
of the data for bargaining discourses.
II. JOURNALISTIC IDEALS
Journalistic practice and journalistic ideals can reflect or be critiqued
from the perspective of a particular conception of democracy. Here I ex-
amine journalism's dominant professional paradigm and the most important
current alternative (or modification). These examinations first identify the
conception(s) of democracy implicit in each. Then, since I consider com-
plex democracy most appealing-an admittedly disputable judgment-I
also consider each paradigm's adequacy from this democratic perspective.
A. Social Responsibility
The most influential modem American account of the goals of journal-
istic performance comes from the Hutchins Commission's report, A Free
and Responsible Press.67 Published shortly after the end of World War II,
this work, especially as restated in the cold war classic, Four Theories of the
Press,68 describes a "social responsibility model" of the press.69  The
67 THE COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, A FREE AND RESPONSIBLE PRESS: A
GENERAL REPORT ON MASS COMMUNICATION: NEWSPAPERS, RADIO, MOTION PICTURES,
MAGAZINES, AND BOOKS (1947) [hereinafter HUTCHINS COMMISSION REPORT]; see also
Everette E. Dennis, Internal Examination: Self-Regulation and the American Media, 13
CARDozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 697, 698-99 (1995) (stating that many media executives and
critics have subscribed to the Hutchins Commission Report, and that it has been used as a text
for journalism schools and media ethics courses). But cf Lee C. Bollinger, Why There Should
Be an Independent Decennial Commission of the Press, 1993 U. CI. LEGAL F. 1, 1-2
(claiming that the Commission's report has "assumed only minor status within the history of
freedom of the press in this century" but urging that it merits much wider influence).
68 FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS: THE AUTHORITARIAN, LIBERTARIAN, SOCIAL
REsPONsIBmrrY, AND SOVIET COMMUNIST CONCEPTS OF WHAT THE PRESS SHOULD BE AND
Do (1956) [hereinafter FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS].
69 See id. at 74-103; cf LAST RIGHTS: REVISITING FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS 1 (John
C. Nerone ed., 1995) (describing Four Theories of the Press, as "an influential classic in
communications theory" that "has had a tremendous impact on teaching and thinking about
freedom of the press"); Jerilyn S. McIntyre, Repositioning a Landmark: The Hutchins Com-
mission and Freedom of the Press, 4 CRITICAL STUD. IN MASS COMM. 136, 137 (1987) (sug-
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Hutchins Commission identified five responsibilities, the fulfillment of
which could serve as a measure of press performance. The press should 1)
provide "a truthful, comprehensive, and intelligent account of the day's
events in a context which gives them meaning," a commitment evidenced in
part by objective reporting; 2) be "a forum for the exchange of comment
and criticism," meaning in part that papers should be "common carriers" of
public discussion, at least in the limited sense of carrying views contrary to
their own; 3) project "a representative picture of the constituent groups in
the society"; 4) "present[] and clarify[] the goals and values of the society";
and 5) provide "full access to the day's intelligence," thereby serving the
public's right to be informed.70 The Commission also identified three tasks
that are central to the press's political role: to provide information, to en-
lighten the public so that it is capable of self-government, and to serve as a
watchdog on government.7' Fulfilling the five listed responsibilities would
presumably accomplish these three tasks.
This conception of the press implicitly assumes that what a properly
functioning democracy needs most from the media is "information." The
press should present the day's events, a picture of all elements of society,
and the day's intelligence-fulfilling the first, third, and fifth functions
listed above. Thus, in 1953, Norman Isaacs, the president of the Associated
Press Managing Editors Association explained: "'The one function we
have that supersedes everything is to convey information."' 72 Presumably,
wise politics and wise decisions will follow. In addition to information, the
Commission also recognized the obvious importance of values. Societal
values need to be "presented" to, and "clarified" for, the public. Thus, the
media's role is primarily as an educator. A professed commitment to per-
forming this educational responsibility was evidenced by the media's own
"codes of performance, which urge the media to respect accepted values and
to portray the traditional virtues. 73
The Hutchins Commission's study took place in the context of an in-
creasing concentration of the mass media. The long trend toward media
gesting that the Commission has had its "greatest circulation and influence" by way of Peter-
son's social responsibility theory).
70 HUTCINs COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 67, at 21, 23, 26-28; see also Theodore
Peterson, The Social Responsibility Theory of the Press, in FOUR THEORIEs OF THE PRESS,
supra note 68, at 87-91.
71 See Peterson, supra note 70, at 74. In addition to its political 'ole, the Commission
noted the press's role as an advertising medium and an entertainment medium, and its need, as
an ongoing entity, to be financially sound.
72 Id. at 90 (quoting Norman Isaacs, A Small Town Paper Has One Supreme Ethical
Dut -To Print The News, QUILL, Dec. 1953, at 7, 15).Id. at91.
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monopolies, regularly in the news in the 1990s, was clearly observable in
the 1940s, and the Commission advocated some government policies to
promote pluralism and competition. Rather than object to the inevitable,
however, the Commission treated this apparently irreversible trend primarily
as evidence that the media must be responsible. "A press characterized by
bigness, fewness, and costliness in effect holds freedom of the press in trust
for the entire population.,
74
"Responsibility" can be understood as a pragmatic response that makes
the most of the fact of largeness and monopoly. A telling feature of each of
the five responsibilities identified by the Commission-both those related to
values and those related to information-is its compatibility with monopo-
listic media. With adequate professionalism and dedication, a single master
of ceremonies, a monopolistic media enterprise could apparently perform
them all. Echoing declarations commonly made by owners of modem mo-
nopoly newspapers," the Commission asserted that power and monopoly
impose obligations on media entities to present all sides of an issue and to
provide the public with sufficient information. 76 Journalists' professional-
ism arguably qualifies them to identify the societal issues requiring attention
and to gather the relevant information. Media critics should and do exist to
point out lapses. The public should demand quality performance. Even
then, a constant danger exists that a monopoly press will not be responsible.
However, as long as journalists' professionalism, critics' watchfulness, and
the public's demands lead the press to meet their responsibilities, a monop-
oly press poses no serious problems.
Much about the Commission's vision is praiseworthy. Providing in-
formation, performing the watchdog function, and maybe teaching people
proper values are all that elitist democracy requires of the press, and all
democratic theories demand at least the first two functions. To varying de-
grees, however, those who support participatory conceptions of democracy
should be troubled by what the Commission leaves out (as well as the argu-
able naivet6 of aspects of its vision). Republicans should have the fewest
complaints. Like republican democracy, the social responsibility theory in-
dicates a concern that "partially insulated groups come to understand one
another." 77 Still, the top-down implication of the fourth function-present-
74 Id. at 101.
75 See id. at 83 (pointing out that during the twentieth century publishers began to speak
"not merely of their right to exercise their freedom but also of the responsibilities attached to
its exercise").
76 See Introduction to FouR THEORIES OF THE PREss, supra note 68, at 5 (explaining that
the basis of the social responsibility theory was the belief that "the power and near monopoly
position of the press impose on them an obligation to be socially responsible").
77 HUTcrINs COMMIssION REPORT, supra note 67, at 25.
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ing and clarifying society's goals and values-sounds inadequately discur-
sive. Similarly, the emphasis generally seems to be more on providing in-
formation than on promoting discussion, even though the second function
(being a "forum") may address this need. Finally, the republican may find
the Commission's vision inadequate in failing to call for a media that sup-
ports civic mobilization. Admittedly, some references suggest an interest in
participatory democracy. Still, the Commission explicitly does "not assume
that all citizens.., will actually use all the material" but rather, more in line
with elitist democracy, assumes that many will "voluntarily delegate analy-
sis and decision to leaders whom they trust.
' 78
Social responsibility pales from other perspectives. It gives little struc-
ture or support to the social conflict emphasized and valued by the liberal
pluralist. The Commission's list does not satisfy the pluralist's demand for
media that aids groups in pursuing their agendas and mobilizing for struggle
and bargaining. 79 Likewise, it does not satisfy complex democracy's addi-
tional demand for media that assist groups' own internal discursive devel-
opment of identity and values. The Report does wish, ideally, to have "spe-
cialized media of advocacy" in addition to general media. The reason for
the wish, however, is more elitist or, maybe, republican: partisan media
could serve as checks on the fairness of the general media and provide
"partial safeguards against ignoring important matters. ' 0
Thus, the Commission's vision embodies an elitist, or, in some respects,
a republican rather than a complex conception of democracy. Like republi-
can or elitist conceptions, the Commission's socially responsible press must
assume that society contains few deep divergences in interests and perspec-
tives. Deep divergences cause different "facts" to be relevant for different
groups--"responsible" presentation must make choices based on particular
perspectives.81 Given deep divergences, even the same facts will have dif-
ferent meanings. The media simply cannot report the "context which gives
them meaning" because that context will vary for different groups. In con-
trast, in the absence of deep social divisions, the same information and
context could serve all. Reporting and contextualizing only require that re-
porters act professionally and that the press act "responsibly." Thus, only
the lack of deep divisions (or the failure to recognize these divisions) can
make notions like objective reporting, "a comprehensive.., account of the
78 Id. at 28.
79 The Commission does note that the republic involves "conflict and conscious com-
promise among organized groups." Id. at 20. I see no evidence, however, that the Commis-
sion relies on this observation in its assignment of tasks to the media.
80 Id. at 25.
81 Id. at 21, 28.
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day's events," and "the day's intelligence" appear unproblematic as ideals.
8 2
Only then could values be primarily a matter of "presentation" or "clarifica-
tion," not debate and conflict. Without these deep divisions, by "rais[ing]
social conflict 'from the plane of violence.., to the plane of discussion,"'
free expression can "promoteo the harmonious, fruitful society."83 Appar-
ently, a responsible press not only defangs conflict, but in the end exposes
conflict as irrational.
Without deep divisions of interest and value, or with only divisions that
do not profoundly color perceptions of facts and values, government deci-
sions might be primarily a matter of problem solving, possibly best per-
formed by experts. Although people's individual, private preferences may
differ, significant societal issues and relevant information are largely an ob-
jective matter. Only this assumption allows the monopolist press to identify
(as well as present) "all ideas deserving a public hearing." 84 Politics, if any,
would be a matter of republican citizens coming together.
Of course, even in an elitist or republican democracy, society needs a
watchdog. The public needs to accept the results of government. For this,
they should be "enlightened." And whether the government is by elites or
by a republican people, decision making requires information. Remember,
the requirements of elitist democracy-a watchdog, enlightenment, and in-
formation-are the press's three politically relevant tasks emphasized by the
Commission.
In contrast, if ideology (or experience) deeply colors perceptions of
facts and values, even a "responsible" media entity is likely to effectively or
primarily present issues and information relevant to the society's dominant
ideological perspective. If conflict and divergent ideological perspectives
are and should be central to politics, a monopoly media is likely to be able,
at best, to report the differences. More likely, a monopoly public-affairs
media will suppress differences-claiming objectivity for what is really a
partisan vision. For example, outside a moderate to moderate-liberal, de-
velopment-oriented stratum, The New York Times, perhaps the country's
best paper, seems like a wildly biased and censorious apologist for estab-
lished elites. 85 Democracy needs competing media to develop and promote
alternatives. While this does not rule out the need for some socially respon-
82 Id.
83 Peterson, supra note 70, at 102-03 (quoting HUTCHINs COMMIssION REPORT, supra
note 67, at 113) (emphasis added).
84 Id. at 101. The press does not need to present "preposterous" ideas. Id.
85 For example, for several years, a progressive magazine, Lies of Our Time (or "LOOT')
was devoted to exposing the distortions, errors, and "lies" of The New York Times. LOOT
was published monthly from 1989 to 1994 by the Institute for Media Analysis (N.Y.).
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sible media entities that try to be inclusive, informative, and clarifying, both
pluralist and complex democracy also requires a segmented, partisan, mobi-
lizing press. Furthermore, complex democracy requires these pluralistic
media not merely to interpret groups to each other and to mobilize, but also
to satisfy each group's legitimate internal discursive needs.
B. Public Journalism
The social responsibility model aligned itself more with elitist than with
participatory democracy primarily in relation to what it left out. It empha-
sized providing information and being a watchdog-or, paternalistically,
clarifying societal values. Performance of these functions should help elites
in governing and aid the public in identifying and, hopefully, in throwing
out corrupt officials. However, this vision of a socially responsible press
placed no emphasis on mobilization or truly effective encouragement of
popular participation.
The ethos of a socially responsible press is to provide merely the
facts-or maybe the facts supplemented by context-that is, "the truth
about the fact[s]."86 Critics, however, recognize that values inevitably de-
termine the choice of facts. This ethos of responsibility is itself not neutral.
Its practice and content inevitably amount to a value-laden conception of the
press's role-values that are further involved in, adopting more specific in-
terpretive frames. The socially responsible press uncovers wrongdoing. It
avoids being tricked; instead, it identifies officials' hidden agendas, reso-
lutely exposing public persons' inevitably hidden, self-interested concerns.
It provides information that a moralistic public would consider discrediting.
By making these choices, the press necessarily participates in and helps cre-
ate, rather than merely reports on, the public order. The choices recom-
mended by social responsibility-acceptance of an ethos of objectivity and
of the informational and watchdog roles-align the press with the needs of
elitist, rather than participatory, democracy. The press facilitates elites' ra-
tional decision making while deterring and exposing violations of the
largely unproblematic norms of public office.
In the 1990s, many within the profession found neither democracy nor
the press in good health. These critics observed that journalism's estab-
lished routines provoked popular cynicism.87 Detached objectivity encour-
86 HUTCHINS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 67, at 22.
97 See, e.g., JOSEPH N. CAPPELLA & KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON, SPIRAL OF CYNICISM:
THE PRESS AND THE PUBLIC GOOD 209-28 (1997) ("The thesis of our research [is] that the
structures of the news about politics have direct effects on the public's cynicism."); JAMES
FALLoWs, BREAKING THE NEWS 7 (1996) ("Deep forces in America's political, social, and
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aged a sense of powerlessness about civic processes. With considerable
academic and foundation support, some editors and journalists spoke of
"civic" or "public journalism" as an alternative to the existing journalistic
orthodoxy.88 Central to civic journalism is a view of the relation of jour-
nalism to democracy. More specifically relevant to the point that I want to
assert here, civic journalism relates not just to democracy, but also embodies
a conception of republican, rather than elite, liberal pluralist, or complex
democracy.
Public journalism's leading academic champion, Jay Rosen, repeatedly
emphasizes that public journalism is oriented toward "citizens as partici-
pants, politics as problem solving, democracy as thoughtful deliberation."
89
The image is that through "deliberation" the "public" can find its "common
interests." In place of narrow self-interest, public life is about common
problems, the common good, common work, common ground. "Common"
seems to be the key-the word is used continuously within civic journalism
circles. We are all in this together. In this picture, ours is a world where
there are real issues, real problems, and real choices to be made, but where
there is little fundamental conflict of basic values or identifications. The
people-not the politicians or journalists-know their common problems
and the people ought to be involved in applying their intelligence to solving
them. Thus, Frank Enton, editor of The Wisconsin State Journal, defines
civic journalism as "helping the public find the solutions to problems" as if
politics was a matter of consensual problem solving rather than conflict.
90
Journalism, according to Rosen, quoting Davis Merritt of The Wichita Ea-
gle, should be based on "'broad, shared values."' 91 Public life needs delib-
eration, but apparently neither class nor identity-based struggle. "'The most
basic form of politics is conversation about.., choices and about what is
really in the public's interest."'
92
economic structures account for most of the frustration of today's politics, but the media's
attitudes have played a surprisingly important and destructive role.").
88 See, e.g., ARTHUR CHARITY, DOING PUBLIC JOURNALISM (1995); DAVIS MERRITT,
PUBLIC JOURNALISM AND PUBLIC LIFE (1995).
89 JAY ROSEN, GETTING THE CONNECTIONS RIGHT: PUBLIC JOURNALISM AND THE
TROUBLES IN THE PRESS 16 (1996); cf id. at 13, 50, 69 (asserting that the press should aim at
"civic participation, deliberative dialogue, politics as problem solving, and the cultivation of
'democratic dispositions"').
90 Robert M. Steele, The Ethics of Civic Journalism: Independence as the Guide, in JAY
BLACK, MIXED NEWS: THE PUBLIC/CIVIC/COMMUNITARIAN JOURNALISM DEBATE 162, 162
(1997).
91 ROSEN, supra note 89, at 74 (quoting Davis Merritt, Public Journalism: Defining a
Democratic Art, MEDIA. STUD. J., Summer 1995, at 131).
92 Id. at 50 (quoting DAVID MATHEws, POLITICS FOR PEOPLE: FINDING A RESPONSIBLE
PUBLIC VOICE 40 (1994)). David Mathews is president of the Kettering Foundation.
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This civic vision calls for new journalistic practices. Journalism should
self-consciously intervene in public affairs-not on behalf of particular
viewpoints, but on behalf of invigorating public involvement. By sponsor-
ing open community meetings, for example, a newspaper or broadcaster lit-
erally convenes the public for deliberation about public issues, and then re-
ports on those deliberations. At present, public journalists insist that they
are experimental, still trying to find ways to involve the public. Rather than
try to catalog and evaluate its experimental practices, however, I want to
first note the movement's justifiable appeal. Then, I will describe some of
the vision's most troublesome limitations.
The distance of public journalism from the Hutchins Commission's
elitist democracy is implicit in its characterization of the press's watchdog
role as important but too limited.93 Public journalism continually indicates
that journalism's special role is to actively serve democracy-or, more spe-
cifically, "to promote and indeed improve ... the quality of public or civic
life [and to] foster[] public participation. 94 Unlike the view of some ver-
sions of pluralistic democracy, public journalism properly rejects treating
people and politicians as merely self-interested. It favors asserting and re-
porting on solidarity between people and on their common, civic interests.
Its leaders recognize that a useful vision of journalistic practices must be
tied to a conception of journalism's function. They see that function, to a
significant degree, (without excluding making money for owners and em-
ployees and providing amusement and information for audiences) serves
democracy. Public journalism tries to fulfill the democratic roles that the
early Habermas saw performed by the people, although unfortunately, only
the new bourgeoisie within a public sphere or public space.
95
Like the Hutchins Commission's model, however, civic journalism is
consistent with the economic interests of a monopolistic press. If a single
public interest exists, and if the political task is problem solving, then a sin-
gle responsible convener of the public discussion could be ideal. Also, con-
veniently, civic journalism could help secure the press's financial viability, a
point that its advocates do not ignore. Only if people are oriented towards
civic problem solving, only if they participate in a public deliberative proc-
93 See id. at 2, 82.
94 Theodore L. Glasser & Stephanie Craft, Public Journalism and the Prospects for
Press Accountability, in BLACK, supra note 90, at 120, 121.
95 See JORGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC
SPHERE: AN INQUIRY INTO A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS SoCIETY (1989); James W. Carey,
The Mass Media and Democracy: Between the Modern and Postmodern, 47 J. INT'L AFF. 1
(1993).
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ess, will they need the "news," the press's "value-added" product.96 Still,
critics of public journalism are wrong to see "convening the public" as
merely a marketing ploy. Given the assumptions of republican democracy,
professional journalists responsibly can find out what the public thinks and
wants as a part of a participatory democratic process.
97
Still, civic journalism's slide into republican democracy may reflect less
a considered judgment about democratic needs than an implicit acceptance
of existing economic constraints. Today, monopolistic daily newspapers are
the norm. These papers are unlikely to allow any journalism that threatens
their extraordinary profitability. 98 As early as the late nineteenth century, an
industry trade journal warned that newspaper partisanship could be suicide
in a small town because it invites the opposing party to establish its own pa-
per.99 Arguably, the erosion of the economic basis of partisanship and the
corresponding economic advantages of objectivity result from advertising.
Advertising makes the ability to attract the largest audience the key to prof-
itability. Hence, as the role of advertising in newspaper finances increased,
it should be no surprise that avoidance of partisanship, except mildly on the
editorial page,100 increasingly became the norm. 10 1 Whatever its merits, any
democratic theory that recommends partisanship is unavailable to civic
journalists, who largely accept the existing structure of the industry. In-
96 See ROSEN, supra note 89, at 83 ("People have to participate, so that they'll want and
need to become informed."); see also id. at 20; cf MICHAEL SCHUDSON, THE POWER OF
NEWS 27 (1995) ("Political activity leads people to follow the news. News does not ordinar-
ily lead people to political activity.").
97 Of course, there can be tension between serving democratic ideals and serving profit.
Arguably, public (taxpayer) support for public journalism could improve its performance.
See Theodore L. Glasser & Stephanie Craft, Public Journalism and the Search for Demo-
cratic Ideals, in MEDIA, RITUAL, AND IDENTITY 203, 215-16 (Tamar Liebes & James Curran
eds., 1998) (suggesting that like libraries, museums, and schools, public journalism serves the
public good and may deserve public support).
98 See BEN H. BAGDIKIAN, THE MEDIA MONOPOLY 119, 265-66 (4th ed. 1992) (de-
scribing an average 17.1% return on equity for publicly traded newspaper companies in 1980
and a five year average profit margin of 18.3%).
99 See Gerald J. Baldasty & Jeffrey B. Rutenbeck, Money, Politics and Newspapers:
The Business Environment of Press Partisanship in the Late 19th Century, 15 JOURNALISM
IST. 60, 66 (1988).
10 The development of a ghettoized editorial page that purportedly separates opinion
from news may have been a response to market advantages of emphasizing objective news, a
consideration that even led The New York Times and The New York Herald to consider drop-
ping their editorial pages. See MICHAEL SCHUDSON, DISCOVERING THE NEWS: A SOCIAL
HISTORY OF AMERICAN NEWSPAPERS 98 (1978).
101 See GERALD J. BALDASTY, THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF NEWS IN THE NINETEENTH
CENTURY 127-34 (1994) (describing the de-emphasis of politics in newspapers in accordance
with market demands); see also C. EDWIN BAKER, supra note 61, at 28-29 (analyzing histori-
cal evidence and commentary to demonstrate that advertising played a significant role in the
decline of partisanship in American newspapers).
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stead, civic journalism champions participation, involves activism, but does
not "cross the line." Even as civic journalism's proponents expose absurdi-
ties in the traditional notions of value-neutral objectivity, they continue to
proclaim abstention from partisanship except for a partisan commitment to
democracy and other broadly shared values. 102 They claim to "function as
'fair-minded' participants in community life whose participation focuses on
non-partisan processes and procedures." 103 Journalists are to participate by
"helping the public gain confidence in its own ability to reach consensus
and solve problems."'
104
More sinisterly, a radical critic might charge that civic journalism
amounts to ideological boosterism-a refined technique for legitimizing the
existing order without challenging major injustices or structures of domina-
tion. A central motif in arguments for civic journalism is the need to re-
spond to the current democratic distemper, the loss of faith in both the press
and the political order.105 Civic journalism seeks participation. Thus, The
Charlotte Observer asks readers what should be done about rowdies taking
over a neighborhood park. If this "journalism" successfully involves people
more in civic life, it should count as a clear gain despite plausible worries
that the paper would censor any radical views-the paper "said it would
only print constructive suggestions."'1 6  The more serious question is
whether civic journalists also identify as problems and raise questions about
the class structure of the city or the need for material redistributions of
power. Christopher Conte notes that after The San Jose Mercury News en-
couraged readers to respond to the problem of special interests' influence on
the legislature, the paper then blocked the "convened" citizens' impulses to
lobby for limits on campaign spending. It viewed that response as too po-
litical. Instead, the paper encouraged its convened citizen readers to for-
mulate a statement, which legislators could sign, concerning accountabil-
ity.
107
A few examples prove little. Still, civic journalists' emphases on delib-
eration and on problem solving easily connects with their consistent empha-
102 See ROSEN, supra note 89, at 70, 72-73.
103 Glasser & Craft, supra note 94, at 123 (quoting CHARITY, supra note 88, at 11).
104 ROSEN, supra note 89, at 72 (quoting Osborn Elliott, former editor of Newsweek and
former Dean of Columbia University's journalism school).
105 See id. at 21-22 (discussing how the media coverage of politics has contributed to a
drop in public confidence in the press); see also CAPPELLA & JAMIESON, supra note 87, at
209-28; FALLOWS, supra note 87.
106 Christopher Conte, Angels in the Newsroom, GoVERNING, Aug. 1996, at 22; cf.
CHARITY, supra note 88, at 86-87 (noting that twenty-two thousand people responded to Ak-
ron pw~ers' question of what can be done about racism in the city).
See Conte, supra note 106, at 23.
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sis on common ground and common interests. As a journalism of conver-
sation, it "favors a publicly tested consensus over the spectacle of con-
flict."' ' Richard Harwood, a public journalism advocate, argues that "re-
porters should pay attention to areas of agreement, as well as conflict."'
0 9
As professionals, civic journalists recognize that false reporting of harmony
is improper; still, the repeated emphasis is on the importance of finding
common ground and a real public interest. For example, in October 1994, a
newspaper committed to civic journalism called a meeting between con-
tending sides in a community dispute. The reporter originally assigned to
cover the story first described the meeting as filled with conflict. The pub-
lished version, however, was much brighter, describing how the meeting
helped participants "find some common ground."' 10
From the perspective of complex (or pluralist) democracy, the pictures
of both democracy and press activism offered by civic journalism are at best
inadequate and at worst naYve and apologetic. Admittedly, civic journalism
merits considerable praise for favoring participatory over elite democracy
and for recognizing that journalism inevitably participates in, rather than
merely objectively reports on, politics. These well-founded developments
are revolutionary in many traditional journalistic circles. But civic journal-
ism's emphasis on commonality distorts reality and at least stunts and ar-
guably misdirects journalism's participatory role. Values and interests are
often in real conflict. Some groups benefit and others suffer from existing
oppression. Greater involvement in a "nonpartisan" pursuit of important but
uncontroversial goals-safer parks or honest legislators--or in problem-
solving agendas largely defined by and consistently acceptable to commu-
nity elites, could substitute for popular struggles around issues involving
real societal division and could divert popular challenges to inequality.
If democracy is, in part, about bargaining between segments of society
with conflicting interests and about the struggle of the disadvantaged and
their allies against the injustice of privilege, then a democratic order needs
more partisan journalism. Particular groups, especially oppressed groups,
also need more segmented or partial dialogues in which to develop their
self-conception and their understanding of their own interests. Oppression
may consist, in part, of the impoverishment of these partial discourses. At
best, from the perspective of complex democracy, civic journalism's repub-
licanism is inadequate. Common ground is valuable. Groups do need to
talk with each other about collective problems. But these are not the only,
108 Glasser & Craft, supra note 94, at 124.
109 Conte, supra note 106, at 24.
110 Mike Hoyt, Are You Now, or Will You Ever Be, a Civic Journalist?, COLUM.
JOURNALISM REv., Sept.-Oct. 1995, at 27, 27.
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and sometimes not the most pressing, needs. At worst, civic journalism
could be a technique of co-optation or legitimization that creates a false
sense of participatory involvement without challenging entrenched elite in-
terests. If so, it unwittingly serves the ideological needs as well as the eco-
nomic interests of its owners. In any event, complex democracy would rec-
ommend going far beyond civic journalism and assigning additional
partisan roles to the press.
III. FEARS AND POLICIES
Each theory of democracy, with its thematic assignment of duties to the
press, generates its own set of fears about how the media might fail. Policy
typically attempts to allay fears and serves the hopes of an operative norma-
tive theory. Not surprisingly, each normative democratic theory has differ-
ent implications for media policy. Of course, since some theories do not re-
pudiate but rather add to other theories' assignments, neither fears nor
policies will always be unique to a specific theory. For example, although
participatory democratic theories add citizen mobilization to the media's as-
signments, these theories share elitist democracy's fear that the press will be
prevented from checking or otherwise unable to check government malfea-
sance or misfeasance. Here, I will describe each democratic theory's fears
about media performance and suggest potential policy responses.
First, a preliminary matter should be noted. Do democratic media have
any reason to seriously fear anything other than government? If not, maybe
media policy itself is the only real threat. Proper media policy might be
simply: "Government, hands off." Fears necessarily reflect both values and
factual assumptions. Factually, the market may create the press that democ-
racy needs. For example, if democratic institutions ought to be what people
want them to be and if markets automatically respond to (or, better, reflect)
people's wishes, then a "hands off' conclusion could follow. An alternative
route to the "hands off' principle might look to history and ask: has not
government intervention, always loudly defended as furthering desirable so-
cietal interests, usually been found in retrospect to have improperly inter-
fered with press freedoms and the press's democratic roles?"'
In this broad form, the abstract argument must be rejected1 12 The me-
dia contributes to democracy in ways not captured by the purchasers of the
III See generally LUCAS A. POWE, JR., AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 216-47 (1987) (making this type of argument with respect to broadcasting and
cable television).
112 See C. Edwin Baker, Giving the Audience What It Wants, 58 OiO ST. L.J. 311
(1997).
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media product. The quality of the media contributes substantially to public
opinion and political activity and thereby to consequent governmental deci-
sions. Thus, democratic discourse (and struggle) may determine whether a
person gets good medical care or a clean environment or safe streets. These
personal benefits, or their absence, are affected not merely by the media that
the person buys for herself but even more so by the media content that other
citizens consume. But this person has no adequate economic incentive to
bring these benefits to bear in her purchase decisions, and hence, they nor-
mally play no role in the economic transactions that lead media producers to
provide a better or worse product. Some of the media's major contributions,
such as deterring corruption, do not even produce a product for it to sell.
When the media's negative and positive contributions are external to market
exchanges, market-oriented media enterprises will not, or at least not fully,
take account of the value that people place on the media's contribution to
what each person considers a well-functioning democratic order.
People also may be committed to a democratic theory that requires me-
dia practices that a market order does not even claim to provide. For exam-
ple, just as with basic educational opportunities, people might be committed
to an equality of opportunities to consume and maybe even to participate in
the creation of media products; they may value media products designed for,
or tailored to, the interests of all people equally. But these egalitarian com-
mitments are not realized by a market that designedly responds to unequally
distributed dollars. Moreover, markets do not provide reliable evidence of
the extent of people's commitments to (or preferences for) this sort of
equality. 13 Operationally, the evaluation of markets avoids this circularity
only by relying on the discursive elaboration (and political embodiments) of
these commitments.
An ideal account of media policy might determine the democratic the-
ory and then the corresponding conception of the press to which people are
committed or would be committed after discursive reflection. This Part
takes on a more modest task. It identifies each of the democratic theories'
primary fears concerning the failures of or inadequate performances by the
press and then examines their policy implications. For example, all demo-
cratic perspectives fear that the lure of profits or the competitive forces of
the market could cause the press to short change its democratic role. Dif-
113 Public good and collective-action problems prevent markets from properly taking into
account these preferences for equality even as weighted by the market's criterion of willing-
ness and ability to pay. See Harold M. Hochman & James D. Rodgers, Pareto Optimal Re-
distribution, 59 AM. ECON. REV. 542, 542-43 (1969). Markets are even more inappropriate
to the extent that the preferences should be democratically weighted. See Baker, supra note
112, at 388-97.
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ferent democratic theories, however, vary in their view of when and where
the short-changing occurs. Consequently, different democratic theorists
vary in the policy responses, if any, that they would find congenial.
A. Perspective of Elite Democracy
Elitist democrats' primary media-related fear is governmental censor-
ship that will undermine the media's checking function. Even benign gov-
ernmental interventions threaten eventual censorship. Worse, the mere pos-
sibility of interventions can lead to media self-censorship as a means to
avoid unfavorable regulation or to ensure favorable regulation. Any sacri-
fice of independence is dangerous. The press must keep government at
arms length-which it cannot do once it is subject to regulation. Thus,
some commentators interpret the First Amendment's Press Clause to man-
date that government keep its hands off. Others add that the Press Clause
protects the press's institutional integrity.
Elite democrats might develop a more complex view. While the danger
of government undermining the checking function is real and constant, it is
not the sole threat to the effective performance of the media's watchdog
role. That role could be threatened from at least two additional directions.
First, journalists and editors could abandon adequate performance due to
laziness, incompetence, coziness with government officials, or conflicting
professional ideals. Not surprisingly, a major worry about "civic journal-
ists" is that, in order to find "common ground" and to engage all segments
of the community in solving community problems, they will sacrifice their
drive to expose and willingness to offend and, instead, will get into bed with
local elites. 114 Likewise, critics of traditional journalist routines, many of
which reflect economic "realities," observe that these routines create incen-
tives and dependencies that threaten the press's ability to be an effective
watchdog. Journalists' relationships with government sources and their re-
liance on news beats focused on the most regular and productive sources of
information can breed the dangerous dependencies and coziness that Herts-
gaard calls "palace court" journalism.
1 15
114 See Hoyt, supra note 110, at 32 (noting fears that public journalism leads to a "soft-
ness" of newspapers and the avoidance of controversy, out of fear of offending readers); Carl
Sessions Stepp, Public Journalism: Balancing the Scales, AM. JOURNALISM REV., May
1996, at 38, 40 (describing the danger of the press losing its outsider status); Mike Tharp, The
Media's New Fix, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 18, 1996, at 72, 74 (noting the fears that
papers will become too cozy with a community's elite). But cf ROSEN, supra note 89, at 2,
82 (arguing that the criticism is misguided).
HERTSGAARD, ON BENDED KNEE, supra note 20, at 54.
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Second, and possibly more relevant to constitutional issues, private
centers of power can generate pressures that impede press performance.
These pressures can be either internal or external to the media. Critics
regularly blame the recent decimation of many papers' investigative jour-
nalism units on an increased bottom-line mentality within media enterprises.
Printing news clipped from wire services is much cheaper than hiring in-
vestigative reporters. 116  Either increasingly competitive conditions or
greater assertions of control by bottom-line oriented chains and conglomer-
ates can trigger newsroom budget cuts that leave the press without the re-
sources to be an effective watchdog. Conglomerate ownership can also cre-
ate pressures for the media units not to interfere with the economic interests
of the nonmedia parts of the organization. The result can be that media en-
tities become less watchful of the problematic corporate or government ac-
tivities that intertwine with corporate interests. Outside the press itself, in-
stitutionalized critics, sometimes derogatorily called "flak producers," can
undermine press performance by making the press worry about appearing
biased or inadequately patriotic.' Dependency on advertising can also un-
dermine performance. Journalists (or publishers) who fear offending valu-
able advertisers may, for example, avoid reporting a local tax authority's
(corrupt?) failure to fairly assess and tax a downtown department store's
property. The media owner's other economic interests can blunt the re-
porting of problems generated by the city building a new stadium or con-
vention center.
The press depends on both private and governmental power centers as
the locational or content source for its routine news-producing activities.
Some observers argue that this dependence causes today's press to be not a
watchdog but rather a "guard dog" for groups with power and influence.
118
To the extent that they share this view, elite democrats, though settling sim-
ply for the press's watchdog role, might favor government interventions that
116 Editors identify a high proportion of staff-written content to wire service or feature
material as a major criterion of a good paper. See LEO BOGART, PRESS AND PUBLIC, 253-65
(2d ed. 1989).
117 See EDWARD S. HERMAN & NOAM CHOMSKY, MANUFACTURING CONSENT: THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE MASS MEDIA 26-28 (1988). A press that exposes periodic
abuses of power could appear on casual observation to be "biased" against the powerful even
if that press leaves routine use of power unexamined. This view will likely be nurtured by the
powerful, especially wealthy corporations and individuals, who have the easiest access to the
resources needed to advance this view of press bias. Thus, performance of its essentially
mainstream watchdog role can cause inaccurate portrayals of the press as having a leftist tilt.
118 See Clarice N. Olien et al., Conflict, Consensus, and Public Opinion, in PUBLIC
OPINION AND THE COMMUNICATION OF CONSENT, supra note 64, at 301, 305 (suggesting that
the media serve not as watchdogs for the community as a whole, but as guard dogs for groups
with power and influence).
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increase the media's capacity and readiness to perform that role. Still, the
checking function is most overtly threatened by government censorship.
For whatever reason, elite democrats seldom develop much passion for me-
dia policies other than those protecting the press from government.
119
More than other democrats, elite democrats center their focus on the
Constitution. Policy interventions seem inherently dangerous-more dan-
gerous than they are worth. In order to ensure that the watchdog is not
muzzled by those watched, the Constitution forbids governmental meddling.
The extreme formulation of this view rules out any intervention that has the
effect of "distorting" the press's communication. It requires a "wall of
separation" between the press and the government. 120 Even favorable spe-
cialized treatment by the government can create a dependence and a will-
ingness to bend to gain favor, thereby undermining the press's watchdog
role. The Newspaper Preservation Act,12' usually seen as a benefit to the
press, 122 illustrates the problem. Apparently, both Knight-Ridder's Miami
Herald and its Detroit Free Press ordered their cartoonists not to lampoon
Attorney General Edwin Meese at the time when he had discretionary
authority to decide whether to allow The Free Press to enter into a joint op-
erating agreement with another Detroit paper.
123
Justice Potter Stewart has been the premier judicial advocate of pro-
tecting the structural integrity of the press. He argued that "[t]he primary
119 Cf. Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 685 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) ("[T]he First Amendment... rests on the premise that it is gov-
ernment power, rather than private power, that is the main threat to free expression ....").
120 See Randall P. Bezanson, The New Free Press Guarantee, 63 VA. L. REv. 731, 732
(1977) (making an analogy to the Establishment Clause). On that basis, Bezanson concluded
that the Constitution created a presumptive principle that the press could not be singled out
for either benefits or burdens. Id. at 733-34.
121 This statute is codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1801-04 (1994).
122 But see Committee for an Indep. P-I v. Hearst Corp., 704 F.2d 467, 481-82 (9th Cir.
1983) (noting Congress's realization that the Act actually benefits some of the press at a cost
to others).
123 See JAMES D. SQUIRES, READ ALL ABOUT IT! 123 (1993); see also LucAS A. POWE,
JR., THE FOURTH ESTATE AND THE CONsTrrTInON 219-20 (1991). The Newspaper Preserva-
tion Act gives the Attorney General broad discretionary power to confer a major benefit-ap-
proval of a joint operating agreement-on individual papers. In contrast, media regulations
that apply broadly and do not create discretionary official power to provide benefits or ex-
emptions create much less of a problem. A legislative body is unlikely to strike at the press as
a whole in response to the behavior of an individual entity. And, even if it would, an offend-
ing media entity is less likely to be deterred since it would itself bear only a fraction of the
cost of such a response. No individual public television station, for example, should worry
that its actions will cause reduced funding to the system as a whole. By structurally external-
izing a "cost" (government wrath) on outsiders (other media entities), governance by me-
diawide rules should encourage individual media entities to act appropriately aggressive. Of
course, increasing concentration of the media (or cross-ownership by enterprises dependent on
government favor) reduces this safeguard.
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purpose of the constitutional guarantee of a free press was... to create a
fourth institution outside the Government as an additional check on the
three official branches." 124 He argues, for example, that the Constitution
bars the government from "attempting to annex the journalistic profession
as an investigative arm of government." 125 To prevent a government's ap-
propriation of journalists' work products, Stewart would restrict govern-
ment's power to force journalists to disclose the names of their confidential
sources or to search newsrooms. 126 The loss of confidential sources and se-
cure newsrooms increases the danger that the press will become little more
than a mouthpiece for official statements and press releases.
Although the elite democrat sees merit in the press both explaining
government policies to the public and providing elites information about the
public's concerns and needs, only the press's watchdog role justifies con-
stitutional protection. Government control and manipulation arguably pres-
ents the most serious threat to performance of this checking function.
Therefore, the elite democrat likely is to be uninterested in media policy and
opposed to most interventions. Instead, she is likely to favor a constitu-
tional doctrine that is strong enough and clear enough that it will block sup-
pression of the press even during pathological times-times when the
checking role may be most vital, but when even judges may be inclined to
approve purportedly justified interventions.
127
B. Perspective of Republican Democracy
Republican democrats recognize two primary dangers that can be exac-
erbated or lessened by the press, in addition to the concern with the press's
watchdog role that republican and other democratic theorists share with elite
democrats. First, republican democrats fear inadequate popular political
124 Stewart, supra note 14, at 634; see also generally William J. Brennan, Jr., Address at
the Dedication of the S.I. Newhouse Center for Law and Justice in Newark, New Jersey (Oct.
17, 1979), in 32 RUTGERS L. REV. 173 (1979).
125 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 725 (1972) (Stewart, J. dissenting).
126 See id. at 731 ("[W]hen governmental officials possess an unchecked power to com-
pel newsmen to disclose information received in confidence, sources will clearly be deterred
from publishing it .... "); see also Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 573 (1978)
(Stewart, J. dissenting) (explaining that unannounced raids by police on a newsroom will in-
evitably have a deterrent effect on the availability of news sources). I have described (and
defended) Stewart's approach to protecting the institutional integrity of the press as justifying
constitutional "defensive" but not "offensive" rights on behalf of newsgathering. This ex-
plains Stewart's rejection of special press constitutional rights of access to information or
rights to violate normal criminal laws such as trespass, speeding, or wire-tapping laws in or-
der toget a story. See BAKER, supra note 14, at 234-40.
12 See Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85
COLuM. L. REv. 449, 449-50 (1985).
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participation. Rather than talking with the public to "engage us in solv-
ing... shared problems," the republican fears that the press will "con-
tribut[e] to a mood of fatalistic disengagement." 12  Although the press
ought to stimulate citizen involvement,12 9 republican critics worry that the
media's "relentless emphasis on the cynical game of politics threatens pub-
lic life itself."13 Ironically, the ideals of detachment and objectivity, im-
plicit in the Hutchins Commission Report and in the emphasis on the press's
"outsider" watchdog role, may contribute to this disengagement. 131
The second republican fear is social disintegration. 13  Society cannot
exist as a babble of voices. A bleak vision foresees one family member
watching only hours of MTV (music videos), another watching only old
movies, and a third watching only public television. New media will follow
magazines in dividing and subdividing targeted audiences into smaller and
smaller ethnic, age, gender, occupational, and recreational groups. Each in-
dividual will receive over the Internet a customized newspaper that she de-
signs in accordance with her individual interests or that her "intelligent
computer agent" shapes in accord with her prior reading habits or personal-
ized directives. The advertising industry's new "relationship" marketing,
made both feasible and cost effective by new computer technology, in-
creases the economic base for this radical disintegration. 133 As this media
segmentation advances, people will not develop any common fund of
knowledge. They will become unable to engage in civic talk; they will have
nothing to say to each other. Any common public sphere will wither and
die.
This fear of disintegration envisions either popular habits or economic
forces, causing the breakdown of a central, dominant media. The nightmare
128 FALLOWs, supra note 87, at 240, 243.
129 Fallows is quite explicit about seeing the tension as between what I have called re-
publican democracy and elitist democracy-or as he describes it, between the views of John
Dewey, whom he prefers, and those of the early Walter Lippman, whom Fallows character-
izes as believing that the "only hope for effective modem government lay in cultivating a
group of well-trained experts, who would manage the country's journalism as well as its gov-
ernmental affairs." Id. at 236.
130 Id. at31.
131 See ROSEN, supra note 89, at 2, 5, 13-15, 82; see also, BAKER, supra note 61, at 41-
43.
132 See Todd Gitlin, Public Spheres or Public Sphericules?, in MEDIA, RITUAL &
IDENTITY, supra note 97, at 168. See generally Elihu Katz, And Deliver Us from Segmenta-
tion, in ROGER G. NOLL & MONROE PRICE, A COMMUNICATIONS CORNUCOPIA 99 (1998).
133 See generally OsCAR H. GANDY, JR., THE PANOPTIC SORT (1993) (discussing the
economics and complex technology involved in the collecting, processing, and sharing of in-
formation about individuals and groups that is used to control their access to life-defining
goods and services); JOSEPH TUROW, BREAKING UP AMERICA: ADVERTISERS AND THE NEW
MEDIA WORLD (1997) (describing advertisers' contributions to social fragmentation).
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intensifies as technological options and price structures change in the new
world of broadband communications, including the Internet. Each separate
community (or worse, each individual) will develop its own unique inter-
pretation of the world, its own agenda, its own basis for action. Tribal seg-
regation within self-enclosed media worlds will contribute to an unraveling
of civil society. This radical pluralism threatens not just stability but the
very possibility of legitimate authority. Of course, a public that is split be-
tween 500 cable channels and that reads personalized newspapers is a far
step from the national or ethnic segmentation in portions of Eastern Europe
or Africa, with the apparently consequential violence and governmental
collapse. Still, the Yugoslav example purportedly stands as a warning.1
34
The republican sees a dominant, nonsegmented media providing the neces-
sary foundation for an effective public sphere and a truly common dis-
course. Society should avoid any media-driven "balkanization" of the pub-
lic.
As noted, public journalism tries to respond to these dangers from
within the profession. It is possible that republican media can only be cre-
ated by struggles within the press, with thoughtful journalists taking the
lead. Regulatory intervention may be too blunt a tool to induce appropriate
performance of the media's republican discourse role. "[L]ike many other
virtues... [press responsibility] cannot be legislated."' 35  Still, structural
legislation is often motivated by the hope that it will lead to better content
and more responsible performance. 36 As a radical illustration, law could
require that owners permit journalists to elect their managing editors,
137
134 Ironically, one interpretation argues that the recent Yugoslav violence resulted, in
part, as a rebound against the former Communist state's manipulative and authoritarian at-
tempt to suppress segmented discourse. Cf Thomas I. Emerson, TOWARD A GENERAL
THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 11-14 (1966) (noting, as one of four values of the sys-
tem, the maintenance of a balance between stability and change). Certainly, nationalistic po-
litical entrepreneurs during the breakup of Yugoslavia have manipulated the press to promote
the Yugoslav ethnic animosity and conflict. See Warren Zimmermann, The Captive Mind,
NEW YORK REV. OF BOOKS, Feb. 2, 1995, at 3, 3. Zimmerman, however, implicitly adopts a
social responsibility perspective and rejects pluralistic media, twice mentioning with undis-
guised horror proposals to create politically opposing or ethnically separate broadcast services
in Serbia. See id. at 6. Interestingly, he noted that a survey found nine out often viewers op-
posed to this segmentation. See id.
135 Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256 (1974).
136 See BAKER, supra note 61, at 61 (history).
137 The Court in Miami Herald did not describe itself as protecting owners but rather as
protecting editors. The law failed, the Court said, "because of its intrusion into the function
of editors." 418 U.S. at 258. The Court said that it was protecting "the exercise of editorial
control and judgment." Id. The proposal in the text would seem to embody the Court's con-
cern to protect editors-in this case from owners. In fact, restrictions on the decisions of
editors by corporate owners could be seen as the "non-governmental combinations" that do
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thereby arguably restricting owners' abilities to enforce a bottom-line ori-
entation. Such a law would be premised on the assumption that, like most
workers, journalists take pride in their work.138 Editors rooted in journalism
and empowered by law are likely to resist attempts by bottom-line oriented
publishers to erase the line between advertising and editorial efforts. Edi-
tors could also engage in republican discourse. Many less radical legal
policies, however, can also help create the inclusive discourse that republi-
cans favor. This Subpart considers a few of these.
Given the fear that legal interventions inherently threaten the press's
watchdog role, one republican policy response might be to divide the
press-leaving a "watchdog" realm untouched while creating a second
realm where regulation affirmatively promotes a common democratic dis-
course. 13 9 Historically, much broadcast regulation fits the solidaristic speci-
fications of republican democracy. Regulatory policy could direct local
broadcasters toward promoting republican political involvement. One strat-
egy is to promote localism as the locus of actual popular participatory in-
volvement.141 This was, in fact, the policy of the FCC. Although the fast
fading dominance of the networks makes it easy to forget, the FCC's chain
broadcasting rules tried to maintain local station control over program-
ming.142 Other FCC policies explicitly designed to promote localism in-
cluded limits on the geographical reach of stations' signals, licensing that
favored locating television stations in each community rather than creating
regional stations (which would have encouraged an earlier introduction of a
fourth network), and licensing preferences that rewarded an integration of
ownership and control.
not receive First Amendment protection "if they impose restraints upon [the] constitutionally
guaranteed freedom." Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
138 Much evidence for the proposition could be found. For example, when investigative
reporters were asked in a survey to rank, in order of importance, "the rewards that sometimes
result from doing 'successful' investigative pieces," out of five choices, 56.1% said that the
"reformer in you was satisfied" was the most important element; 2.6% listed "monetary re-
wards" as most important. Some market! See DAvID L. PRoTEss ET AL., THE JOURNALISM
OF OUTRAGE: INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING AND AGENDA BUILDING IN AMERICA 276-77
(1991).
139 Cf Lee C. Bollinger, Jr., Freedom oftthe Press and Public Access: Toward a Theory
of Partial Regulation of the Press, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1976).
140 See Jonathan Weinberg, Broadcasting and Speech, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1101 (1993).
141 Although seldom noted, with the exception of some concern for presidential elections,
virtually all of the projects associated with the political activism of civic journalism have con-
cerned local, or at most state, problems or issues. Rarely are national, and never are interna-
tional, issues addressed.
142 See NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 224-27 (1943) (sustaining various FCC
regulations concerning the relations between broadcasters and networks).
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Broadcasting policy added regulatory inclusiveness to regulatory local-
ism. Congress and the FCC took steps to promote a common discourse in
which many voices could be heard, not each on its own station, but all on a
single media entity. 143 Early on, Congress required that broadcasters give
candidates equal access, presumably fearing the power of broadcasters to
shut out disfavored candidates. In response to the danger that broadcasters
would shun all candidates, Congress later added the mandate that broad-
casters grant candidates reasonable access to the airwaves. 144 The currently
defunct fairness doctrine required broadcasters (1) to cover important issues
and (2) to present alternative views on controversial matters of public im-
portance. 145 These regulatory policy initiatives follow directly from the de-
mands of republican democracy: important issues should be discussed in
the public sphere and the discussion should be inclusive. 146 "Balance" is
hardly ideologically neutral, but its purported inclusiveness is the heart of
republicanism. Of course, the licensee is still the gatekeeper. The licensee
decides which issues are important, whether any particular perspective or
particular speaker gains access, and how the various sides are presented. In
contrast with the possibility of a wide open common carriage system in
which self-appointed representatives could receive time for whatever they
choose to say,147 the licensee's role as an inclusive but "responsible" gate-
keeper tracks the republican concern that discussion be rational and civil.
Some republican democrats might favor limited censorship to further
this concern with civility. Racist or sexist speech adds little to reasoned dis-
course. If this speech "silences" speech by some portions of the commu-
143 See Carroll Broad. Co. v. FCC, 258 F.2d 440 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (approving the notion
that the government could choose to create additional scarcity if the fragmentation caused by
a new station would operate against the public interest in having broadcasters be economi-
cally viable). In the recent deregulatory environment, the Carroll doctrine has been largely
abandoned. See In re Policies Regarding Detrimental Effects of Proposed New Broadcast
Stations on Existing Stations, 3 F.C.C.R. 638 (1988) (formally abolishing the Carroll doc-
t4 See 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (1994) (granting reasonable access); id. § 315 (requiring
equal opportunity). The "equal opportunity" requirement was in the 1934 Act, but "reason-
able access" was added to § 312 in 1972.
145 Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (upholding the fairness doctrine);
Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (upholding the FCC's repu-
diation of the fairness doctrine on statutory grounds).
146 Cf. Stewart, supra note 14, at 636 ("[I]f there were no guarantee of a free press, gov-
ernment could convert the communications media into a neutral 'market place of ideas."').
147 See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 382-86 (noting that Congress surely could have chosen this
alternative if it wished); cf CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 121-32 (1973)
(holding that neither the Communications Act nor the First Amendment requires broadcasters
to accept paid editorial advertisements).
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nity, restrictions arguably serve compelling democratic concerns.1 48 A de-
mocracy must allow forceful advocacy of any policy--even criticisms of re-
publican democracy's inclusiveness. But speech that in the very act of its
expression narrows republican discourse, as opposed to the speech that at-
tempts to persuade, is hardly a part of a democratic dialogue. If republican
discourse is to be inclusive then speech that denigrates other potential par-
ticipants in the debate is not helpful. Just as the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibits governmental denigration of people on the basis of race, 149 such
expression when voiced by private individuals or media remains inconsis-
tent with and could impede republican discourse.
Other media policies have special prominence for republican democ-
racy. Elite democrats can be content as long as an alert press watches for
problems. However, the elite democrat could be skeptical about the help-
fulness of a freedom of information act.150 Would officials, to the extent
that they are corrupt, obey an act's requirements to disclose documents
showing their corruption? On balance, the elite democrat might rely on the
strength of a strong press to confront and embarrass reticent government of-
ficials. She would recognize that the spotlight of publicity can politicize
difficult governmental decision making, causing it to be more difficult to
proceed rationally. Liberal pluralists may even join elite democrats here.
Both might conclude that often the most effective bargaining, or governing,
is negotiated behind closed doors. Disclosures on demand will be at best
burdensome and costly and could make arriving at needed decisions more
difficult.
In contrast, the republican democrat would question whether the loss of
behind doors bargaining is a cost or a gain. The availability of information
about government is absolutely crucial for popular republican discourse. "A
popular Government, without popular information, or the means of acquir-
148 MacKinnon argues that pornography both silences women and makes their speech
inaudible to others. See Catherine A. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech,
20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 63 (1985); see also Frank I. Michelman, Conceptions of De-
mocracy in American Constitutional Argument: The Case of Pornography Regulation, 56
TENN. L. ReV. 291 (1989); Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986
DUKE L.J. 589.
149 Arguably the constitutional evil of racial segregation struck down in Brown v. Board
of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), if one can grant the assumption of materially equal facili-
ties, is the meaning or purpose expressed by segregation as a practice and the impermissibility
of the state making the assertion implicit in segregation. See Charles R. Lawrence Il, If He
Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 438-44
(discussing the fact that Brown treats segregation as unconstitutional government speech).
See Stewart, supra note 14, at 636 ("The Constitution... establishes the contest, not
its resolution.").
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ing it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or perhaps both.' 151 Thus,
republican democrats must support extensive freedom of information acts,
open meeting laws, and, perhaps, constitutional rights of access to informa-
tion."'
While no one advocates inefficient monopolies, republican democrats
have little per se fear of monopoly. A "socially responsible" monopoly
press could be ideal in providing a common dialogue. Competition could
even be detrimental if it encouraged uncivil partisanship or undermined
participation in a common discourse. To the extent that a monopoly press is
willing to make the expenditures, the existence of monopoly profits makes it
more possible for the press to act responsibly in providing service to the
community. These monopoly profits could be spent on robustly fulfilling
public service obligations that the FCC could, and partly did, impose on oli-
gopolistic broadcasters. 153 One advantage of cable franchise monopolies is
that local governments can then force the monopolist to use some monopoly
profits to provide "republican public goods"-for example, public access,
educational, and governmental channels ("PEG channels"), as well as the
resources, facilities, and support that these channels need to be meaningful.
Despite cynics who cannot imagine business people being anything but
profit maximizing, the primary assumption implicit in the ubiquitous criti-
cism of chain purchases of formerly independent (monopoly) papers is that
different types of owners tend to act differently. The belief is that the previ-
ously independent, often family-owned, papers often put more resources
into providing a better paper than the mere economic considerations re-
quired, but that publicly traded corporations will put MBAs and cereal ex-
ecutives in charge and normally allow bottom-line considerations to rule.
154
In other words, monopoly media can, and sometimes does, use monopoly
profits to serve republican concerns, while competition dissipates these
profits, thus eliminating the possibility of their beneficial use.
Republican democrats' appropriate concern is not monopoly but the
possible (or likely) "corruption" of monopoly, whether by market forces or
socially irresponsible owners. Republicans should favor any policies that
realistically promise to limit this "corruption." They should approve re-
151 Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry, supra note 1.
152 On constitutional rights, see infra text accompanying notes 239-47.
153 See FINAL REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC INTEREST
OBLIGATIONS OF DIGITAL TELEVISION BROADCASTERS: CHARTING THE DIGITAL
BROADCASTING FUTURE 17-33 (1998).
154 See DOUG UNDERWOOD, WHEN MBAs RULE THE NEWSROOM: How THE
MARKETERS AND MANAGERS ARE RESHAPING TODAY'S MEDIA 14-25 (1993); Iver Peterson,
The Bottom-Line Publisher of The Los Angeles Times Faces the Hard-Line Skeptics, N.Y.
TIMEs, Mar. 9, 1998, at D7.
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quirements imposed on both newspapers and broadcasters to identify "paid
for" inclusions as advertisements, even though these requirements regulate
speech on the basis of "content."' 55 Various access provisions should gen-
erally have appeal. Their goal of greater inclusiveness is a clear plus for re-
publicans, but the quality and pertinence of the discourse resulting from
self-nominated speakers is a worry. Still, cable systems should be required
to maintain public access channels. 156 Arguably, media entities that accept
advertising should be open to all public issue advertising on a nondiscrimi-
natory basis.157 Right of reply laws also have presumptive appeal, although
in the end their merit depends on whether these laws are more likely to deter
valuable speech or to add balance to discourse.
Finally, government could fund or subsidize particular institutional
structures or realms of inclusive republican discourse. Of course, all par-
ticipatory democratic theories could agree on the need for subsidies or
funding for public discourse, but different theories are likely to be at odds
about the design of publicly supported institutions. Consider public broad-
casting. Should the government fund several public systems, each repre-
senting a different ideological viewpoint, 58 or, if only a single public entity
is created, should the government mandate time-sharing so as to allow plu-
ralist groups to separately pursue their own agenda? Alternatively, should
public media offer more inclusive and integrative discourse-striving for
balance in each program? Although complex democrats might favor either
155 See 47 U.S.C. § 317 (1994) (requiring radio station broadcasters to identify spon-
sors); Lewis Publ'g Co. v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 288 (1913) (upholding against a First Amend-
ment challenge a law requiring newspapers receiving second class mail rates to identify ad-
vertising materials); 47 C.F.R. § 76.221 (1998) (requiring cable origination programming to
identify sponsorship); 47 C.F.R. § 73.1212 (1998) (requiring broadcasters to identify spon-
sors). Despite merely requiring information, these rules will predictably cause some potential
advertisers not to purchase some ads and others to change the content of their advertisement.
156 See Time Warner Cable v. Bloomberg, 118 F.3d 917, 927-28 (2d Cir. 1997) (up-
holding an injunction preventing a city from placing commercially produced business and
news services on public access cable channels).
157 Cf. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 123-24 (1973) (noting that a sys-
tem which allocates media access on the basis of financial resources would not necessarily
serve the public interest). An alternative possibility, which might also appeal to complex
democrats, is to require each media entity to announce publicly its policies concerning ads
and then be legally obligated to accept any ad not ruled out by the policy. This approach in-
creases access and openness while permitting a media entity to identify itself either as a parti-
san voice or as an inclusive medium, but an inclusive medium that continues to conform to
express standards of civil discourse.
158 See Robert Cirino, An Alternative American Communications System, in AMERICAN
MEDIA AND MASS CULTURE: LEFT PERSPECTIVES 568, 574-75 (Donald Lazere ed., 1987)
(proposing four independent publicly supported networks, one for each perspective: socialist,
liberal, conservative, and libertarian).
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approach depending on the context, liberal pluralists are likely to prefer the
first approach, republican democrats the second. 159
C. Perspective ofLiberal Pluralist Democracy
In addition to any danger to the watchdog role, liberal pluralists identify
two primary threats to a desirable media order: inadequate pluralism and
corrupted pluralism (or, as I will often describe them, inadequate and cor-
rupted media segmentation).
1. Inadequate Pluralism
Objections to monopoly media are not hard to come by. A self-
satisfied, comfortable monopolist could become a lazy and unaggressive
watchdog. Or, as republican democrats fear, an irresponsible, monopolized
media could be either improperly ideological and biased or inadequately
comprehensive in coverage and inadequately inclusive in perspectives.
These complaints, however, do not assert that monopoly is intrinsically bad.
Rather, they describe specific sorts of "corrupted" monopolization. In the-
ory, a sufficient remedy is "social responsibility." Of course, competition
might better promote responsibility (or, alternatively, it might lead to ag-
gressive cost-cutting that causes inadequate or irresponsible performance).
If she is too worried that economic forces or ideological motives will un-
dermine responsibility, the republican democrat could support the legal in-
terventions described in the last Subpart. For example, the FCC could re-
quire coverage and mandate balanced treatment of controversial issues.
160
For the liberal pluralist, however, monopoly is intrinsically objection-
able. Monopoly overtly threatens pluralism. John Stuart Mill once re-
marked on the decided advantages of hearing a message from a partisan.
161
The pluralist emphasizes that each segment of society needs its own media
for internal mobilization, for external advocacy, and for recruitment. The
complex democrat would agree-but also would suggest that each group
needs its own media for internal discourses aimed at developing, affirming,
and revising the group's own identity and commitments. A single monopo-
159 Note how this disagreement repeats, in many respects, the debate about multi-
culturalism and core curricula in the university setting.
160 See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (upholding the fairness doc-
trine which required coverage and balance). But cf. Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d
654 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (upholding on statutory grounds the FCC's rejection of the fairness doc-
trine because it does not serve the public interest).
161 See MILL, supra note 50, at 45 (arguing that to arrive at the truth a person "must be
able to hear [arguments] from persons who actually believe them, who defend them in earnest
and do their very utmost for them").
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listic media outlet cannot suffice to meet these needs of varying, often op-
posed, groups. Committed belief, sometimes stridency, particularistic stan-
dards of relevancy, often unique interests, and discussion within the com-
munity-not balance-are hallmarks of pluralism. Only partisan, pluralistic
media entities are likely to be effective at political mobilization or at many
other tasks that liberal pluralists assign to the press. Thus, even if a local
daily newspaper monopoly, possibly because of its paper's stronger fman-
cial base, could provide a paper that would be "better" than would be any of
several competing partisan papers, the liberal pluralist would object. She
predictably favors partisan competition.
Still, the extent of liberal pluralists' devotion to competition requires
further explanation. Typically, pluralists object not only to a monopoly en-
tity within a market but also to media concentration at the national or global
level even if this concentration still allows local competition between a few
multinational conglomerates. Ben Bagdikian generates grave concern with
his description of the "five media corporations [that] dominate the fight for
the hundreds of millions of minds in the global village." '162 Unlike the obvi-
ous reasons to object to local monopolies, it is intuitive, but less obvious,
why liberal pluralists (or anyone else) consider national or global concen-
tration of media ownership to be bad. Certainly, it is less obvious to Wall
Street, which runs up the stock price of these companies, or to government
lawyers who approve the mergers, or to the Department of Commerce,
which concluded that the current legal order is defective in being too re-
strictive of media concentration. 163 Pluralism within a local arena could be
served by competing local entities owned by different, or even the same,
media conglomerate. In fact, these conglomerates may be especially likely
to promote some types of local pluralism. A profit maximization goal
should induce a monopolist, and maybe a conglomerate, to offer diverse
media products that serve various segmented markets. A single conglomer-
ate often supports separate media entities or titles espousing radically differ-
162 Ben H. Bagdikian, Conquering Hearts and Minds: The Lords of the Global Village,
NATION, June 12, 1989, at 805, 807. Bagdikian reports at one point that most of the major
media were owned by 50 corporations when the first edition of The Media Monopoly (1982)
was published, but that this number had declined to 20 when the fourth edition was published
in 1992. See BAGDIKIAN, supra note 98, at ix; cf id. at 21 (listing the change as being from
46 to 23). Mark Crispen Miller recently created a stir with similar information presented as a
Nation centerfold. See Mark Crispen Miller, The National Entertainment State, NATION,
June 3, 1996, at 22, 23-26 (graphically displaying the concentration of media power). The
handful of media giants may be more of a family than oppositional competitors as is illus-
trated by the extensive joint ventures that link each giant with most of its competitors. See
generally EDWARD S. HERMAN & ROBERT W. McCHEsNEY, THE GLOBAL MEDIA (1997).
163 National Telecomm. & Info. Admin., U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Globalization of the
Mass Media (Jan. 1993).
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ent views and serving very different groups. This diversity expands the cor-
poration's overall market coverage without forcing it to compete against it-
self.
In contrast, the existence of many owners may not translate into plural-
istic diversity. If a media entity's "voice" reflects the owner's attitudes, and
if most owners come from the same social class and hold similar views, plu-
ralistic diversity is unlikely. Moreover, market forces can push even diverse
owners toward providing similar content. Economists offer hypotheticals,
many modeling the broadcast system, to illustrate this effect. 64 For exam-
ple, assume that 66% of the audience only like programming of type X,
20% only like type Y, and 14% only like type Z. In a three-firm market,
three competing owners can each expect to obtain, on average, a 22% audi-
ence share by offering programming of type X, which is more than any firm
could obtain by offering either type Y or Z. In contrast, a monopolist owner
of the three stations, rather than compete against herself, could offer a dif-
ferent type of programming on each station, hoping to capture 100% of the
audience rather than leaving 34% with their sets turned off. Here, monop-
oly could produce more diversity of programming and more total audience
satisfaction.
Given this predictable behavior, the democratic theorist must either ex-
plain why national- or global-ownership concentration fails to provide plu-
ralistic diversity, or must identify other problems with concentration.
165
That is, the liberal pluralist has more work to do to identify the circum-
stances that provide or prevent true diversity. Still, the difference between
republican democracy and liberal pluralism is clear. The republican fears
segmentation that destroys a common discourse. The pluralist fears lack of
segmentation and diversity, because this lack could suppress constructive
conflict and undermine pluralist politics.
2. Corrupt Segmentation
Lack of segmentation is not the pluralist's only fear. Equally objection-
able is a corrupted diversity. The notion of "corruption" here implies unreal
164 See Baker, supra note 112, at 337-44. See generally BRUCE M. OWEN & STEVEN S.
WILDMAN, VIDEO ECONOMICs 99-100 (1992) (emphasizing that the welfare-maximizing
choice between monopoly and competition and between advertising and viewer support de-
pends on complex relations between the distribution of viewer preferences and the number of
channels available); Matthew L. Spitzer, Justifying Minority Preferences in Broadcasting, 64
S. CAL. L. REV. 293, 304-17 (1991).
165 To raise this challenge does not mean it cannot be met. For the beginning of a reply,
see C. EDWIN BAKER, OWNERsHIP OF NEWsPAPERS: THE VIEW FROM POSITIVIST SOCIAL
SCIENCE 15-20 (1994).
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or inauthentic interests or identities. For the media to perform its demo-
cratic role, segmentation ought to reflect audiences' "authentic" characters.
Of course, "authentic" need not mean essentialist. Nor does an ability to
identify some cases of corrupted or inauthentic segmentation necessarily
imply the converse, an ability to identify authentic segmentation. Despite
borderline cases, some governmental administrations or regimes can be
identified as unjust and some personal interactions as nonconsensual. An
observer unsure whether justice requires actual material equality still may be
able to conclude that a society which leaves its people to starve through no
fault of their own is unjust. Whether or not consent exists in the absence of
overt coercion, overt coercion typically negates consent. The meaning of
these normative conceptions is disputed and subject to change, facts implicit
in the assumption that the concepts are not essentialist. Likewise, it only
may be possible to describe very roughly what is meant by proper segmen-
tation. Nevertheless, the content of common usage and the manner of
treatment of the concept's normative importance could still justify a conclu-
sion that some features' presence or absence indicates that the system is not
just or the behavior not consensual. Likewise, it may be possible to identify
factors that indicate that a segmentation is corrupt-that the diversity is not
properly responsive to authentic differences.
Uncorrupt or "uncolonized" segmentation would reflect, using Haber-
mas's suggestive language, the logic and needs of the "lifeworld," not the
"systems world., 166 Both markets and bureaucratic organizations, espe-
cially the State, are functional subsystems that modem society presumably
needs to flourish. They provide tremendous benefits. By managing com-
plexity, these functional systems greatly expand society's problem-solving
and productive capacities.
People's everyday lives and interactions (which amount to the life-
world) are routinely "steered" by interpersonal "discourses" aimed at
agreement. For example, such discourses are used to respond to questions
such as where to meet for supper, or whether to invite Pat to join us,
whether to participate in the city's voluntary recycling program, or whether
an integrated school system is best. In contrast, the effectiveness of the
market and the state bureaucracies in responding to complexity depends on
their own steering mechanisms-money and power, respectively. These
"currencies" direct the functional subsystems according to the subsystem's
internal criteria-maximizing profits, efficiently maintaining control and
order, or advancing externally given ends. But the human value of these
166 1 take these terms and much of the discussion in the next few paragraphs from 2
JORGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 113-52 (Thomas McCarthy
trans., Beacon Press 1987).
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autonomously steered subsystems lies only in their ability to serve people in
the "lifeworld." Moreover, their operations necessarily grow out of a "life-
world." They must feed upon culturally developed values and motivations.
The functional systems respond, to some degree, to the demands of the life-
world-that is, they fulfill needs that exist and that often are generated
within the lifeworld. But they also treat the lifeworld as an environment to
be managed in order to further system ends-an effect that can be described
as "colonization." If, however, people are to be self-determinative, these
subsystems must be subordinate to, not controlling and colonizing of, the
lifeworld and its cultural and discursive development.
These distinctions between the lifeworld and the autonomously operat-
ing system realms, and the importance of the lifeworld's priority, explain
my claim that media segmentation, as well as social pluralism, should grow
out of and serve people's discursive needs in the lifeworld. These observa-
tions also point to colonization by system realms as an overt threat to that
possibility; this amounts to a theory of corruption. If people are to be self-
governing, their choices, their identities, and likewise, their media segmen-
tation, should not be anonymously determined by bureaucratic or market
logic. Segmentation that responds to the lifeworld would produce a plural-
ity of public spheres that reflect different groups' self-understandings of
their experiences and needs. Each authentic or lifeworld-grounded group
would use the media (1) to construct itself and to provide a locus of internal
debate, value choice, and value clarification (points emphasized by complex
democracy); (2) as a source of information relevant to the group; and (3) as
an instrument for mobilization, advocacy, and recruitment. 167 Segmentation
ideally represents each group's discursive development within the lifeworld
in response to each group's identification of its needs and values.
Corruption occurs when segmentation reflects the steering mechanisms
of bureaucratic power or money rather than the group's needs and values.
168
For example, bureaucratic steering occurred during World War I to the ex-
tent that the State, acting appropriately according to bureaucratic logic, con-
cluded that various German, anarchist, or communist publications helped to
167 The first use is specifically called foi only by complex democracy, while both liberal
pluralism and complex democracy emphasize the second and third possible uses. One theo-
retical weakness of liberal pluralism arises from its need for a notion of corrupt segmentation.
Because it takes interests or preferences or values as given, and sees politics as mere bar-
gaining between groups furthering these interests or values, it lacks the theoretical resources
necessary to explain the notion of "corruption" of groups' identities.1 168 Corruption of communication also occurs, especially in connection with new com-
puter technologies, when the operators of the system sort and divide people in order to serve
either economic enterprises' or governments' interests in manipulation or exploitation of dif-
ference. See GANDY, supra note 133, at 15-25.
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sustain groups that impeded the government's overriding interests. There-
fore, the government proceeded to deny them mail privileges or to prosecute
the publishers. 169 The First Amendment can be understood as the final line
of defense against such state corruption or suppression of lifeworld seg-
mentation.
170
Market steering can equally corrupt segmentation. The market neither
necessarily nor uniformly reflects or responds to individuals' or groups' di-
verse concerns or interests. 171 When it does not, any corresponding seg-
mentation amounts to the mechanisms of system maintenance colonizing the
lifeworld. This corrupt segmentation undermines both common discourse
and self-governing group life.
To illustrate, imagine five possible women's magazines. 172 Each offers
a combination of news, features, information, and fictional content. As-
sume, however, that each emphasizes a particular theme: (1) upscale fash-
ion and cosmetics, (2) women's health issues, (3) middle-class family life
and raising children, (4) progressive women's political agenda, and (5) the
problems, needs, and interests of relatively poor, single mothers. Which of
these serves authentic interests such that, if written and produced with ade-
quate skill and appropriately priced, it would predictably secure an appre-
ciative audience? Probably all five. Still, if magazine purchases primarily
respond to people's self-examination of their needs and interests, it is very
possible that the last, the magazine designed for poor single mothers, would
attract the largest following. Audience size may increase as one goes down
the list (although arguably I unduly de-emphasize the third). But consider
the existing reality. In the world as it is, a format's success and comparative
circulation size is more likely to correspond to the list's present order, with
the upscale fashion and cosmetics magazine doing best. This rank ordering
and, more generally, the domination of system criteria, may influence the
formulation of women's identities and the nature of the groups that arise
and affect women's interests and their perceptions of need.
Why the divergence between the two orderings? The second ordering
could reflect market forces rather than people's "real" interests-real in the
sense of what they would be if developed independently of the system-based
need for the press to be profitable. Even if the potential audience for the
169 See ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 38-51 (7th prtg.
1967) (discussing the Espionage Acts of 1917 and 1918).
170 Of course, the First Amendment has not always been an effective safeguard. See
Masses Publ'g Co. v. Patten, 246 F. 24, 38-39 (2d Cir. 1917) (rejecting a First Amendment
challenge to the exclusion of left-wing literature from the U.S. mail).
171 See Baker, supra note 112.
172 This hypothetical draws on Baker, supra note 61, at 66-70.
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magazine directed toward poor, single women is larger, and their interest in
such a magazine is more intense than the audience for and interest in the up-
scale fashion magazine, their numbers and interest are unlikely to translate
into equivalent sales, revenue, or profits for the magazine's publisher. In
fact, the poverty of the magazine's potential readers doubly disadvantages
the magazine. The readers' lack of disposable income (and possibly their
comparative lack of free time) will reduce their purchases of the magazine.
In addition, advertising is likely to cover much less of the magazine's cost.
Advertisers do not want an audience that merely desires the advertised
products. They want an audience that will buy. Poor, single mothers' com-
parative lack of disposable income makes their preferred magazine compa-
rably less attractive to advertisers, thereby reducing the advertising outlays
that could help pay for quality content and help keep the cover price down.
This lack of advertising support means that the magazine, if it exists at all,
will achieve a much smaller circulation than if advertisers valued all readers
equally. 173 Thus, the audience's poverty leads to a comparatively smaller
circulation than would be appropriate using the lifeworld criterion of
"authentic" audience interest.
Advertisers' financial involvement has further implications for seg-
mentation. Advertisers construct groups. The criteria they use in doing so
have systemic, not discursive, bases. The first three magazines concentrate
on readers likely to purchase particular consumer goods, making each
magazine especially attractive to the sellers of those goods.174 In contrast,
the diversity of consumption interests and the comparative lack of common-
denominator product interests (except, maybe, for certain books, etc.)
among potential readers of the progressive, political-agenda magazine cause
173 As a comparison, The Daily Herald, the one major labor-oriented newspaper in Eng-
land during much of the twentieth century, failed because of a lack of advertising revenue,
reflecting the poverty of its mostly working-class readers, even though
on its death bed [it] was read by 4.7 million people-nearly twice as many as the
readership of The Times, Financial Times, and Guardian added together... [and re-
search showed that its readers] constituted the most committed and the most inten-
sive readers, with the most favourable image of their paper, of any national paper
audience in the country.
James Curran, Capitalism and Control of the Press, 1800-1975, in MASS COMMUNICATION
AND SOCIETY 195, 225 (James Curran et al. eds., 1977).
174 My objections here and in the previous paragraph assume a static model-a given
distribution of income and a given set of preferences. A dynamic perspective sees even more
corruption of segmentation. Advertising tries, in part, to exploit any latent possibility of cre-
ating or stimulating demand for certain types of goods. For example, advertising helps to cre-
ate the demand for upscale fashion and cosmetics. These created preferences then increase
the likelihood of a media segment catering to consumers of that type of good. That is, adver-
tising not only assembles only certain groups (static distortion), but also creates particular
preferences and hence the possibility of a corresponding group (dynamic distortion).
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it (and, hence, this possible segment) to be poorly designed for marketing.
Even if its readers' disposable income and their money-backed demand for
the magazine are comparable to those of the audiences for fashion, health,
and family-oriented magazines, these factors are less likely to support publi-
cation. That is, even putting aside income differences of potential readers,
some potential segments are more likely to flourish merely because they
better serve marketing needs.
Assume that each magazine would have survived in a world without
advertising. In a world with advertising, however, given comparative shop-
ping, fewer people will buy the fourth or fifth magazine once the revenue
received from advertising allows the first three magazines to reduce their
price and improve their quality. As the last two lose their audience, they
also lose revenue needed to pay for good writing and production. This leads
to a weaker product, a further spiraling decline in audience, and possible fi-
nancial collapse.
Uncorrupt segmentation should respond equally to each person's inter-
ests as experienced by the person, not as valued by the market. If it did, the
fourth and fifth hypothesized magazines might be most prominent. People's
unequal incomes and advertisers' influence predictably prevent this from
happening. Of course, the real world offers a much richer subsegmentation
than my hypothetical. Many slightly different fashion magazines compete,
partly for the same general audience but partly by subsegmenting the fash-
ion market. The fault lines, however, correspond to advertising potential.
Media segmentation selectively responds to interests that map onto efficient
advertising strategies.
175
Segments thrive wherever media entities can construct an audience that
marketers desire. As a result, any interest or identity group whose members
are not disproportionately heavy consumers of one or more product catego-
ries is comparatively undeveloped and underserved by the media. Even
very large groups may be ignored. Welfare recipients, unskilled workers,
union members, blacks, or partisans of a particular political ideology may
either be comparatively poor consumers or, equally objectionable from a
marketing perspective, have product interests that do not diverge much from
those of the general population. If so, advertising would predictably steer
segmentation away from these groups. In contrast, subsets of these under-
175 Control over segmentation is not the only objectionable consequence of the adver-
tiser-based system. Competition for advertising revenue also creates market incentives to ig-
nore particular types of content-content offensive to those members of the audience valued
by advertisers or content that provides information or promotes policies contrary to advertis-
ers' interests. Thus, advertising corrupts not only segmentation but also discourse within
segments.
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served groups hold identities and interests in common with subsets of other
groups-interests in sports, computing, travel, sex, fashion, marriage, mas-
culinity, or household management. To exploit the connection between
these interests and particular consumer goods, the market rewards media
entities that assemble these groups. Again, constructing these segments
comparatively disadvantages the larger categories noted above. Even with-
out advertising, however, segmentation fails to represent true democratic or
cultural cleavages to the extent that it more strongly reflects a group's afflu-
ence than its size.
176
Of course, modem America does not lack diverse media. Within the
proliferation of newsletters and smaller publications, virtually any interest
can find itself addressed. The liberal pluralist concern, however, is about
the comparative nurture or support of different segments. The advertising
and wealth-influenced market largely determines the effort, both creative
and repertorial, lavished on assembling and serving each segment. Many
"natural" cultural cleavages are not ignored-often marketeers find them
cheap to exploit. Support for "natural" or lifeworld-based segments is not
automatic, though. Market-determined segmentation predictably disfavors,
for example, media focusing on political ideology, nonmarket-valued ethnic
and cultural divisions, economically poorer groups, or any lifestyle needs
and interests not easily exploitable for marketing purposes. There is no rea-
son to expect media-favored segments to correspond to the communities,
interests, or identifications that people would choose after reflection and
discussion. Corruption exists to the extent that the segmentation springs
from the needs of the "systems world" rather than the pluralism of the
"lifeworld."
3. Policy
Liberal pluralists should favor any policy (1) that supports more robust
media conduits for pluralist groups not adequately nurtured by the market,
or (2) that reduces systemic corruption of segmentation. They should ap-
plaud, for example, Arkansas's rationale for its sales-tax exemption-to
promote "fledgling publications," especially if the fledgling publications
provide content for otherwise underserved segments of society. 177  Of
176 A targeted audience's ability to treat particular media consumption as a deductible
business expense also distorts segmentation. The government partially subsidizes that seg-
ment while the targeted groups' customers or clients pay the rest. Here again, the market and
the government, not the lifeworld, develop and reinforce segmentation.
177 See Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 232 (1987) (noting that
such a purpose might justify differential grants of tax exemptions, but finding no evidence
that this purpose lay behind the challenged law).
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course, the Court was clearly right that this rationale did not fit the law. It
did not explain the broad sales-tax exemption for all magazines except The
Arkansas Times and, at most, two other Arkansas magazines. Still, liberal
pluralists should be pleased that the Court accepted the possibility that such
a rationale might save an appropriate content-based tax preference from
First Amendment attack.
There are numerous governmental interventions that could promote the
liberal pluralist demand that the pluralist media serve the various groups of
the lifeworld. Advertising tends to corrupt segmentation in some media,
such as magazines, and to encourage homogeneity in others, like newspa-
pers. Subsidies for. nonadvertising-supported media could increase the
availability of diverse media and reduce some of the negative structural con-
sequences of advertising support. For example, by the middle of the nine-
teenth century, Congress had adopted postal rate policies that disfavored
advertising and that presumably reduced its influence. Publications identi-
fied as primarily advertising vehicles were denied subsidized newspaper
rates and, later, were also denied subsidized periodical rates.178 Even more
directly, the Post Office charged more for the portion of a publication's
weight devoted to advertising than for the portion devoted to other commu-
nications, thereby reducing the economic power of advertising within the
newspaper.
179
Segmentation serving groups arising within the lifeworld could also be
supported more directly. Lower postal rates have subsidized communica-
tions of some nonprofit groups. 180 Other countries have promoted diversity
by funneling media subsidies to secondary competitive papers' 8 ' or directly
178 See Richard Burket Kielbowicz, Origins of the Second-Class Mail Category and the
Business of Policymaking, 1863-1879, JOURNALISM MONOGRAPHS, April 1986, at 6, 14, 20.
179 See Richard B. Kielbowicz & Linda Lawson, Reduced-Rate Postage for Nonprofit
Organizations: A Policy History, Critique, and Proposal, 11 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 347,
352 (1988). For a set of proposals to reduce the corrupting effects of advertising, see BAKER,
supra note 61, at 83-117.
180 The Postal Reorganization Act, adopted in 1970, was premised on the notion that,
after an adjustment period, each class of mail would bear its full costs. Nevertheless, postal
subsidies never died out, a result aided by having regular rates include a portion of all postal
service costs while reduced rate categories pay only the costs attributable to carrying that
category. See 39 U.S.C. § 3622(b)(2)-(3) (1994); see RANDALL P. BEZANSON, TAXES ON
KNOWLEDGE IN AMERICA 234-36 (1994) ("To this day, Congress continues to appropriate
funds annually in the form of subsidies for reduced rates charged newspaper and magazine
publishers and nonprofit groups.").
181 Sweden has extensive subsidy programs that are designed to maintain a competitive,
partisan press, which the Swedes have treated as essential for democracy. See BAKER, supra
note 61, at 94-96; PETER J. HUMPHREYS, MASS MEDIA AND MEDIA POLICY IN WESTERN
EUROPE 106 (1996).
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through political parties. 182 Governmental policies could specifically aim at
increasing media outlets owned by minority group members as a plausible
means of promoting media that voice these groups' concerns. 11 The Su-
preme Court rejected an equal protection challenge to FCC policies de-
signed for this purpose, holding that the racial preferences were justified by
the "content-based" goal of increasing the diversity of voices.184 More radi-
cal group empowerment plans are possible, such as a Netherlands-like allo-
cation of broadcast time and resources based on citizen sign-ups that
amount to voting for a particular programmer.1
85
A different pluralist strategy simply favors dispersal of ownership.
Having more owners will hopefully increase instances of supporters of dif-
ferent groups owning media entities and orienting content toward their
groups' interests. The danger is that more owners merely will compete for
the center, in contrast to monopolists, who have an incentive to provide dif-
ferent goods for each niche. Empirical evidence of these divergent possi-
bilities could be gathered. 16 But irrespective of such evidence, a pluralist is
likely to have considerable hesitations about relying on any pluralism pro-
vided by outside monopolists. Her reasonable fear is that the monopolist,
even if providing diverse, segmented fare, will blunt or corrupt partisanship.
Thus, a liberal pluralist might support the (predictably ineffective)18 7 at-
tempt of the Newspaper Preservation Act to keep competing local daily
182 See HLMPHREYS, supra note 181, at 105 (Italy); id. at 106 (Finland). Humphreys
notes that the aim to assure readers access to diverse sources of information was "an aim of
(direct and indirect) state press subsidies across Europe." Id. at 104.
183 See Spitzer, supra note 164, at 334-46 (arguing that both theory and empirical data
suggest that minority ownership may increase minority-oriented programming).
84 See Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 552 (1990) (holding that minority pref-
erences in licensing and sales do not "violate equal protection principles"). The Court later
rejected Metro Broadcasting's conclusion concerning the appropriate standard of review for
congressionally approved racial preferences. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515
U.S. 200, 235-37 (1995) (stating that the government interest must be "compelling" and not
merely "substantial"). Still, the specific holding of Metro Broadcasting currently stands. The
case exhibits the anomaly of apparently using the importance of supporting particular media
content (content reflecting minority interests) to justify violating the equal protection principle
against race-based discrimination, while using the importance of serving minority interests to
justify violating the First Amendment principle against content discrimination. See Baker,
supra note 53, at 125.
185 See HuMPHREYs, supra note 181, at 139-43.
186 Cf Spitzer, supra note 164, at 304-46 (suggesting that empirical evidence supports
the claim that more minority ownership of broadcast facilities would increase minority-
oriented programming).
187 Cf Thomas E. Humphrey, The Newspaper Preservation Act: An Ineffective Step in
the Right Direction, 12 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 937, 954 (1971) (arguing that the
Newspaper Preservation Act, which "provid[es a] limited antitrust exemption, can only slow
down the anti-competitive trend; it cannot eliminate it").
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newspapers' independent voices alive. Strengthened enforcement of anti-
trust laws is a similar pluralist theme, with the caveat that vigorous antitrust
enforcement may not eliminate local monopoly, and, even if it did, compe-
tition may not suffice to create real diversity in the competitors' perspectives
or content. More radically, reduced capital gains taxes or other economic
incentives could be given for sales of media properties that increase decon-
centration. For example, advantages could be given for sales to entities
whose assets after the purchase are still less than half of those of the selling
entity. Such policies could begin a spiral of spin-offs leading to ever greater
deconcentration.
Finally, in addition to affirmative policies, liberal pluralists could rea-
sonably balk at some policies recommended by other democratic theories.
For example, if effective, Is8 balance requirements appear designed to sup-
port republican dialogue, but they could undermine a media entity's parti-
sanship and its service to discrete groups.
D. Perspective of Complex Democracy
Complex democracy is at least neurotic, and maybe schizoid. It exhib-
its all the fears held by the other democratic theories and more. Like elite
democracy (and all other theories), complex democracy fears that the
watchdog will be muzzled, whether by government or private power. Like
republican democracy, it fears that segmentation or corrupted monopoliza-
tion will undermine effective, societywide discourse. Like liberal pluralism,
it fears that monopolization or corrupted segmentation will suppress or dis-
figure media pluralism. Finally, complex democracy additionally fears that
pluralist media will be so oriented toward mobilization and propaganda that
it will not aid pluralist groups in thoughtful internal discussion and debate
about identity and interests. This failure most likely would reflect inade-
quate market support, but it could relate to an overriding instrumentalism,
especially of a group's leadership.
It is necessary to provide some explanation of a theory that holds appar-
ently contradictory fears. Probably, no one would argue that there should
be only specialized media or only media oriented towards the public as a
whole. And surely neither is absent in today's actual media world. Of
course, the market may fail to support adequately-or to corrupt-both
types of media, justifying both the complex democrat's republican and plu-
ralist fears. Even if the total amount of media provision is adequate and un-
corrupt, however, the complex democrat should ask whether the market and
188 But cf. Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654, 659-64 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (not-
ing evidence that the balance requirement deterred the initial airing of controversial matters).
1998]
384 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
legal strticture unduly favor one while providing inadequate support for the
other. Since the issue is partly empirical, the complex democrat must rec-
ognize that the type of media that is corrupted or inadequately supported
may change, for example, because new technologies inevitably introduce
opportunities. The impact of new, electronic, interactive media obviously
needs to be taken into account.189 Nevertheless, I will leave for another
time a pursuit of theoretical expectations and practical issues involving the
growth of these new media, despite the fact that these concerns affect the
key issue here: what democratic tasks are most slighted by the market or by
existing arrangements.
A key insight from the perspective of complex democracy is Lee Bol-
linger's suggestion that different portions of the media might serve differing
functions. Bollinger argues that this justifies different regulatory regimes
for different media.190 James Curran adds that not only will different sec-
tors of the media realm serve somewhat different functions but that they
should differ in their internal organizational principle and possibly their
economic base. 191 Diversity of organizational structures reflects the need to
perform different democratic functions. Given the danger of corruption by
either the government or the market, it is also important to have a diversity
of structures and economic foundations, because they can strengthen the
overall system. This diversity strengthens the system by reducing the threat
of corruption of a particular media sector by forces originating in either the
political or economic system.
Programmatically, Curran identifies five sectors. The "core sector"
should allow "different classes and groups to take part in the same public
dialogue" and "promote a culture of mutuality that facilitates agreement or
compromise. ' 192 Possibly reflecting his British heritage, he suggests that
this sector could be institutionally centered around a revitalized public-
service broadcasting system.193 Second, a very important and, Curran ar-
189 The rosy view that this new technology will eliminate all the old inadequacies of the
media seems distinctly implausible. See, e.g., SCHUDSON, supra note 96, at 1-2; C. Edwin
Baker, New Media Technologies, the First Amendment, and Public Policy, I COMM. REV.
315, 326-27 (1996).
190 See LEE C. BOLLINGER, IMAGES OF A FREE PRESS 116-20 (1991); Bollinger, supra
note 139, at 26-37, 42.
191 James Curran, Mass Media and Democracy Revisited, in MASS MEDIA AND SOCIETY
81, 105-06 (James Curran & Michael Gurevitch eds., 2d ed. 1996).
192 Id. at 105.
193 Cf R. Randall Rainey & William Rehg, The Marketplace of Ideas, the Public Inter-
est, and Federal Regulation of the Electronic Media: Implications of Habermas' Theory of
Democracy, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1923 (1996). In elaborating a Habermasian conception of
democracy (which closely resembles "complex democracy" as used here), Rainey and Rehg
observe that Habermas rejects the republican's exclusive interest in consensus, provides a
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gues, currently troubled "civic media" sector would be a major locus of
group pluralism. Among its elements could be media entities aimed at win-
ning wider support for particular groups. These could include party-
controlled, general-interest newspapers; identity-oriented media entities
such as gay magazines; and organizational-oriented media such as newslet-
ters that provide for groups' internal communication needs. Various poli-
cies could promote this diversity. For example, different political or identity
groups could be given control over their own broadcast facilities. A public
agency, like a modified Swedish Press Subsidies Board, 194 could provide
assistance to new or marginal, group-based communications media. Third,
Curran calls for a "professional sector," controlled by media professionals,
presumably organized democratically, which would be free of any obliga-
tions to serve any ideal other than internal professional standards. Inde-
pendence from both the State and market-oriented firms would contribute to
this professional sector's capacity to serve the media's watchdog func-
tion.1 95 A "private enterprise" sector, Curran suggests, would be responsive
to audience demand' 96 and could add diversity (especially given the mar-
ket's inherent right-wing tilt). Even here, however, Curran suggests that
place for pluralist bargaining, recognizes value pluralism, and places central importance on
diverse associations and other groups in civil society. See id. at 1949-72. However, their
proposal of a Corporation for Public Interest Speech and Debate seems more republican than
complex democratic in inspiration. The proposed institution is much like the existing public
broadcasting except for its exclusive emphasis on public-affairs programming, presumably
greater insulation from distortion by corporate underwriting, and some more explicit attempts
to keep it in contact with grassroots civic associations. Their republicanism and lack of
structural recognition of the pluralistic needs of groups, including groups' needs for partisan
mobilization and internal self-definitional discourses, is evident in their emphasis on devel-
oping mechanisms to exclude bias and ideology. See id. at 1982. Their republican-like, ra-
tional "common discourse" aspect is illustrated by the mandate, which they would impose on
commercial, as well as their noncommercial, public interest corporations, to require all broad-
casters to explore issues "in a balanced and non-partisan manner" and to provide "a reason-
able opportunity for the discussion of conflicting views." Id. at 1983 n.138. Although like
Curran's core sector, such an institution would undoubtedly be very valuable, its republican-
like emphasis on a common and nonpartisan discourse seems very inadequate as compared to
the pluralistic needs of complex democracy. Think of the types of things it would exclude.
Michael Moore's "'angry yet hilarious' (according to Roger Ebert) documentary, Roger and
Me, was an attack on the greed at General Motors that, according to Vincent Canby of The
New York Times, "'makes no attempt to be fair. Playing fair is for college football. In social
criticism, anything goes."' B.J. BULLERT, PUBLIC TELEVIsION: POLITICS AND THE BATTLE
OVER DOCUMENTARY FILM 153 (1997) (quoting Canby and Ebert). Although Canby de-
scribed the film as a "triumph," it hardly meets Rainey and Rehg's standards of balance and
nonpartisanship. See id.
194 See Curran, supra note 191, at 109 (citing 0. HULTEN, MASs MEDIA AND STATE
SUPPORT IN SWEDEN (1984)).
195 See id. at 109-10.
196 But see generally Baker, supra note 112 (arguing that the market's media output di-
verges radically from consumer desires).
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separating ownership from editorial control would improve performance.
Finally, a "social market" sector would "incubate new forms of competition,
rooted in social forces underrepresented in the market, as a way of extend-
ing real consumer choice and power." 197 This sector should try to cure
some market distortions in the "private enterprise" sector. For example, as a
response to market failures, subsidies should be provided for entities and
ownership forms whose mission is to serve public demands to which the
market does not adequately respond. Stringent application of antitrust rules
could help prevent destruction of these entities by media conglomerates and
help provide the pluralism of entities from which social market sector par-
ticipants could be recruited.
Curran's proposal concerning differing media sectors has a number of
merits, but from the perspective of complex democracy the proposal's most
insightful quality is its recognition of different functions that a democratic
media should serve. Especially important is his recognition of the need for
both the republican common discourse (embodied most directly in'the core
sector) and the pluralist mobilization and group-centered media (the civic
sector). He is also right to see the need to provide for a structural basis for
media sectors that are less distorted by the market and right to observe that
this combination is likely to perform the checking function better than the
structurally simpler, pure free market system.
Curran's schema suggests the following key premises that a complex
democrat should recognize for policy purposes: 1) the strongest media or-
der will not rely on any single form of organization; 2) this order must per-
form diverse functions, and differing media entities, possibly organized on
different structural principles or economic bases, will best perform different
functions; 3) although this order should not dispense with the market, gov-
ernment policy should nurture other structures and nonmarket entities in a
variety of ways-for example, with subsidies and by making alternative or-
ganizational forms legally available and economically attractive; 4) the ex-
tent of government involvement and support should vary depending on how
underdeveloped or distorted a particular sector is; and 5) the form or nature
of governmental involvement or support should reflect the particular func-
tions of the media (or, in Curran's terms, the particular sector) being aided.
Two other points should be emphasized. First, there is every reason to
expect that market forces, especially advertising, corrupt both common dis-
course and pluralist segmentation and, moreover, that the market provides
inadequately, whether in amount or quality, for both. Observation should
convince most people of this conclusion, but economic theory also predicts
197 Curran, supra note 191, at 112.
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it. When properly performing these various democratic functions, the media
has significant positive externalities-that is, benefits to people other than
the immediate consumer of the product.198 The economic meaning of a
product having positive externalities is that from the point of view of total
social welfare, free markets will underproduce the product.
This observation leads to the second point. A central principle for the
complex democrat is: Be opportunistic! Complex democrats should em-
brace virtually any opportunity to develop or support differing media or-
ganizations or any of Curran's sectors, except the inevitably supported pri-
vate-enterprise sector. In this respect, complex democracy differs from
republican or pluralist democracy, each of which has a narrow policy
agenda that sees the agenda of the other as a threat. In contrast, complex
democracy can easily justify supporting the affirmative goals of both.
Ideally, a policy analysis should address questions such as whether, un-
der existing circumstances, more partisanship and segmented media or more
common discourse and societywide media are the greater need. The answer
would suggest where to concentrate reformist energies. Often republican,
common-discourse, or majoritarian-oriented products, whose "first copy"
costs can be spread over many people, will have a competitive advantage
over products favored by smaller groups, so-called outliers. If so, the mar-
ket may disfavor pluralistic media more. Moreover, if society should dis-
tribute politically and culturally salient media products in a relatively egali-
tarian manner, like it distributes public education or the vote, special
emphasis should be placed on supporting media products designed for the
poor. Here is not the place for a comprehensive development of these
points. Both economic and democratic theory, however, predict that plu-
ralistic media, especially those designed for comparatively impoverished
groups, are likely to be especially underdeveloped and ought to receive spe-
cial public support. Still, as a practical matter, the key principle for com-
plex democracy is to pursue any opportunity to further government support
for new, noncommercial forms of media discourse. Secondarily, it should
support policies that reduce advertising's "corrupting" effects.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS
Different theories of democracy not only recommend different norma-
tive visions of the press but also may lead to different interpretations of the
198 See Baker, supra note 112, at 346-66. In addition to the underproduction related to
positive externalities, the public good aspect of media products and the egalitarian claim for
political opportunities suggest that the market will selectively fail to provide adequately for
various democratic functions.
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Press Clause. Still, possibly the most important implications of complex
democracy, my preferred democratic theory, may appear modest. This does
not mean, however, that the theory is unimportant. Rather, its conclusions
are anticlimactic in the way that interpreting due process as not justifying
Lochner-style interventions was anticlimactic. For the complex democrat,
the Press Clause mandates very little. Here, I wish to explore those impli-
cations and consider why they are so limited.
Any actual constitutional interpretation relies at least implicitly on some
interpretive theory. In my view, "authoritative" constitutional interpretation
should be, and often is, "motivated conversation"--a conversation in which
the point is to understand the text(s) as part of an attempt to provide for a
legitimate and workable legal order.199 Past court decisions, historical in-
stitutional practice, and the original textual language constitute key conver-
sational "participants." Current interpreters treat these materials as open-
ended (that is, requiring interpretation or elaboration) and presumptively
(although never conclusively) correct-that is, as the reflective views of in-
telligent, earlier interlocutors. These historical, authoritative, conversational
contributions, however, do not control, but current conversationalists must
take them seriously and respond to their implicit claims. Additional con-
straints also apply to this conversation. Interpretations intended to be le-
gally authoritative should be strongly influenced by a conception of the role
of constitutions. They should also be influenced by a conception of the ju-
dicial role. Justices and commentators usually understand these considera-
tions to require that constitutional interpretation be principled. Those en-
gaged in making legally binding interpretations, not only as compared to
those engaged in literary, historical, or psychological interpretations, but
also as compared to those engaged in adopting legally binding legislation,
should be responsive to a particular, narrow set of concerns.
As for the Press Clause, interpretations depend heavily on answers
given to two questions. First is the question of the purpose of the Press
Clause. I will assume that the constitutional order protects the press be-
cause of its crucial contribution to democracy and democratic legitimacy.
Freedom of "speech" might be protected as a vital element of individual lib-
erty.200 The reference to the "press," however, presumably refers to institu-
199 BAKER, supra note 14, at 272-83. "Authoritative"--leading potentially to the appli-
cation of force or limiting power-is especially relevant to the motivation of legal interpreta-
tion and distinguishes it, for example, from literary, historical, psychological, or political in-
terpretations where the motivations for and, hence, the content of, the interpretation are much
more variable and open.
200 Unlike merely hearing others' speech, which like many opportunities and resources
can instrumentally aid more intelligent or meaningful uses of autonomy, speech itself as an
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tionalized structures or legal entities. A discriminatory tax on a newspaper
business, for example, raises a constitutional issue even if the law does not
specifically tax or target any specific printed "speech." Moreover, unlike
individuals, institutions must find their value in their social contribution.
The only obvious reason to think that the press merits special protection
from democratic processes is to provide for its role in that democratic ar-
rangement. Thus, in order to know what specifically to protect, the inter-
pretation of the Press Clause must, at least implicitly, embody some theory
of democracy. Exploration of this variable has been central to this Article.
Second is the question of the democratic adequacy of the market. Can
the market (and centers of private power) be trusted to provide us with the
press that democracy requires or, instead, should the market be expected to
fall to perform (or even at times to undermine proper performance of) the
tasks assigned by (the favored) democratic theory? If a sufficiently favor-
able view of the market is justified, prohibiting all media-oriented govern-
mental interventions might best serve democracy. Even a less favorable
evaluation of the market might not imply that private power would under-
mine the press's crucial democratic tasks. The conclusion depends on the
nature of those tasks. The market might undermine some aspects of the
press's performance but not its crucial democratic roles. If so, the constitu-
tional guarantee of a free press could be understood to block all media-
specific governmental interventions, even if generic welfare considerations
would justify some interventions. The argument here would be that the
constitutional decision is to prohibit intervention because allowing the press
to remain untouched best protects its vital democratic role.
Persuasive critiques of the market's unfortunate effects on the media are
legion, but this is not the place to restate the evidence and arguments. Crit-
ics sometimes emphasize an individual owner's or the ownership class's
manipulative and ideological control. More often, critics point to predict-
able distortions resulting from the normal functioning of economic markets.
Sometimes it is unclear which is the problem. Did Murdoch cancel the
publication of a book on Hong Kong by the conservative Chris Patten for
personal or political reasons? Murdoch says it was not commercially moti-
vated. Or, like his 1994 decision to take the BBC off the Chinese broad-
casts of his satellite television service, was this a profit-maximizing decision
based on not offending the Chinese leadership on which his media expan-
activity is a direct embodiment of the speaker's autonomy. See Baker, supra note 53, at 72-
79.
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sions in China depended? 20  If the cancellation was a profit-maximizing
decision, it is little different than the bottom-line mentality that leads corpo-
rate newspapers to eliminate five percent of the newsroom jobs in six
years.202 Elsewhere I have argued that economic theory predicts that un-
regulated, market-based production and distribution of media content will
diverge so radically from what audiences want that the goal of providing for
audience desires provides no basis for a presumption against intervention.
203
There remains a potentially powerful reason to oppose intervention, how-
ever. The country might decide that the press's democratic role should take
precedence over merely serving consumer preferences.204 And intervention
might threaten the independence that best serves democracy. Of course, the
reverse could be true instead. Even if predicted to best serve consumer de-
sires, the unregulated market might fall to perform crucial democratic tasks.
If so, democracy might require intervention. Obviously, these alternative
assessments depend not only on predictions about the market, but also on
the content of the press's democratic tasks. The perceived merits of permit-
ting intervention necessarily reflect an understanding of what democracy
requires, an evaluation of the dangers of misguided intervention, and an as-
sessment of the market.
Market forces could conceivably cripple the press's performance of the
checking function. Competitive, profit-oriented pressures could lead media
entities to abandon expensive, investigative journalism and replace it with
cheaper, routine beat reporting, or even cheaper "press-release" or wire
service journalism. The market could tilt journalism towards stories that are
the easiest (that is, the cheapest) to uncover and, even more troubling, the
easiest to explain or the most titillating. An effective watchdog would have
reported early on about the massive savings and loan scandal, which pre-
dictably resulted from deregulation of these financial institutions. The me-
dia, however, found that early reporting was simply too difficult or bor-
ing.
205
201 See Warren Hoge, Murdoch Halts a Book Critical of China, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28,
1998, at A5 (discussing Harper Collins's decision not to publish the memoirs of Chris Patten,
the last British Governor of Hong Kong).
202 See Richard Harwood, When Downsizing Hits the Newsroom, WASH. POST, Apr. 2,
1996, at A13 (discussing the elimination of 3,100 daily newsroom jobs from a peak of 56,900
between 1990 and 1996).
203 See Baker, supra note 112.
204 This supplanting of market-expressed preferences is not necessarily or even presump-
tively paternalistic. People might politically express a preference for a press that serves a vi-
tal democracy rather than their unreflective consumer choices. It would be paternalistic to
automatically privilege their market expressions over their political expressions.
205 In contrast, the faces of welfare recipients make welfare fraud an interesting and eas-
ily comprehended story. But compare. Estimates of the cost to the taxpayer of the savings
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Nevertheless, the watchdog role is arguably the democratic function
least likely to require or benefit from government support.20 6 It is arguably
best guaranteed by a sense of professionalism that exists among journal-
ists. 20 7 The watchdog role requires mostly skill, courage, and freedom. Ex-
posds generally make good, profitable news. News entities will have an in-
centive to devote at least some resources to performing this role. Arguably,
there is little that the government could do to add to either the press's will-
ingness or its ability to perform this role.
Not only is intervention needed least, it can be very dangerous. Argua-
bly, the watchdog role is the democratic function most subject to inappro-
priate, censorious, or "chilling" interventions. The government can unin-
tentionally undermine the capacity for performance by, for example,
requiring testimony that identifies a reporter's publicity-shy informants.
The watchdog role may be even more vulnerable to purposeful attack. The
government can attempt to block performance, as it tried to do by seeking
an injunction against publication of the Pentagon Papers. Censorial ma-
nipulation of privileges are probably more dangerous because they are less
easily combated. Consider a local government's withdrawal of advertising
from a critical newspaper,208 or the Nixon administration's plans to obstruct
and loan scandal vary widely, although $500 billion is a figure commonly cited. See David E.
Rosenbaum, A Financial Disaster with Many Culprits, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1990, at Al (cit-
ing General Accounting Office figures). A former Washington Post reporter, Kathleen Day,
in her book on the scandal, came up with a $1 trillion figure. See Ken Bode, Where the
Streets Are Paved with Depositors, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1993, at 7 (reviewing KATHLEEN
DAY, S&L HELL: THE PEOPLE AND THE POLITICS BEHIND THE $1 TRILLION SAVINGS AND
LOAN SCANDAL (1993)). The Inspector General of the Department of Health and Human
Services during the Bush administration, presumably wanting to come up with a high figure,
stated that fraud (including the costs of unintentional mistakes!) in the country's major wel-
fare program, Aid to Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC"), could be costing $1 bil-
lion a year. See Fraud in Welfare Put at $1 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1987, at A25 (citing
a report by the Inspector General of the Department of Health and Human Services about
fraud in the AFDC program). From the level of press attention, a reader would hardly guess
that it would take over 500 years of welfare fraud to cost the public as much as did the sav-
ings and loan debacle.
206 But cf Curran, supra note 191, at 89 (noting that despite some loss of autonomy due
to an onslaught by the Thatcher government, the state-created and -supported British Broad-
casting Corporation "continued to expose [the] government to more sustained, critical scru-
tiny" than did the newspapers).
207 In response to the survey question of the "importance to you [of] the rewards that
sometimes result from doing 'successfiil' investigative pieces," investigative journalists listed
the following as either most or second most important: A reformer in you satisfied (78%),
increased freedom over time or assignments (54%), personal recognition (36%), journalism
awards (17%), monetary benefits (8%). See PROTESS ET AL., supra note 138, at 276-77. Be-
cause the market operates at the enterprise level, however, these responses implicitly claim
that the economic marketplace did not dominate journalists' orientations.
208 See North Miss. Communications, Inc. v. Jones, 792 F.2d 1330, 1337 (5th Cir. 1986);
Newspaper Is Suing Puerto Rico's Governor, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1997, at A26 (reporting
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a broadcast license renewal after The Washington Post exposed alleged
Watergate-related misconduct.209 Government leaders can also attempt to
"discipline" reporters by means such as denying them prized interviews,
210
and lower level officials exercise similar power by picking recipients of
leaks and background information.
As the history of totalitarian regimes illustrates, the watchdog role is the
democratic function with which government leaders have the most overt,
systemic, self-interested inclination to undermine. A corrupt or incompetent
administration or individual governmental leader has little interest in expo-
sure. In contrast, although they vary in their views of republican issue dis-
cussion, pluralist bargaining, or social groups' self-development, they sel-
dom perceive any of these as an overt threat to their status. Of course, even
media provision of this content is not safe. Any political group may wish to
suppress oppositional media. Suppression could help a dominant political
group to retain power or to improve its position in pluralist bargaining. It
could also reflect the group's ideological objections to outsiders' values.
Still, the watchdog role is most overtly and directly in tension with incum-
bents' interests, and thus might most require protection. If political
branches must be watched, wisdom counsels against granting them power to
control the watchdog.
Anyone with confidence in the market's benign effects-and many with
less confidence but with a healthy fear of government abuse-will view
government intervention as the major danger to the performance of the
checking function. This suggests sharply limiting governmental authority.
A wall of virtually total separation between the government and the press
may seem desirable.211  Thus, elite democrats often interpret the Press
Clause to prohibit or strongly disfavor any media-specific regulation, even
that the Puerto Rican government withdrew $4.5 million a year of advertising after the paper
published a negative evaluation of the first 100 days of the Governor's second term).
209 See Monroe E. Price, The Market for Loyalties: Electronic Media and the Global
Competition for Allegiances, 104 YALE L.J. 667, 689 (1994); Matthew L. Spitzer, The Con-
stitutionality ofLicensing Broadcasters, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 990, 1050-51 (1989).
210 In contrast to the denial of interviews, courts may be able to monitor the reasons for
denial of access to press facilities or press conferences. See, e.g., Borreca v. Fasi, 369 F.
Supp. 906, 911 (D. Haw. 1974) (giving a disliked reporter the right to attend press confer-
ences on the same basis as other reporters).
211 Although some writers appear to suggest such a wall, see, e.g., Bezanson, supra note
120, at 732, it is, in fact, quite implausible and has never been historically approached. As
interpretations of the Establishment Clause suggest, the wall can be breached by manipulating
"carrots" as well as by employing "sticks." However, a government that did not offer the
press "carrots" in the form of interviews with public officials, press releases, access to some
records, maybe press galleries and press facilities, hardly seems plausible. Other privileges,
ranging from the mail subsidies that began with the beginning of the country to reporter shield
laws have been historically routine and seem desirable.
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structural regulation. This partly reflects treating the watchdog role as the
press's only really important democratic function. In addition, I suspect that
as an empirical matter, many elite democrats, as compared to more partici-
patory democrats, have greater confidence in the market, as well as com-
paratively greater worries about government.
Participatory democratic theories all place more comprehensive de-
mands on the press. For these more extensive purposes, faith in the market,
although still possible, quickly seems na'fve. As noted, there are over-
whelming reasons to predict that markets will fail to provide the media that
people want. Markets are even less likely to provide the media that partici-
patory theories identify citizens as needing. Depending on the theory, these
needs may include more educational, societal discourse-oriented, advocacy-
oriented, mobilizing, or group-constitutive media than people would fully
support through their purchases in the market. These media have significant
positive externalities from the perspective of one or another participatory
theory of democracy. An individual's consumption of such media content is
good for the people as a whole or, at least, for others within the particular
consumer's "group." Since the consumer receives only a portion of the
benefit, she is unlikely to spend the full value (to her and others combined)
of her having the product. Because of this under-served need for these me-
dia, participatory democrats are likely to oppose constitutional interpreta-
tions that block all media-specific governmental regulations or interven-
tions.212
Participatory theorists, however, seldom interpret the Constitution as it-
self mandating the needed interventions. Doctrinally, inadequate press per-
formance is not normally seen as "state action., 213 Although one could see
failure of the government to act (or its property and licensing laws that em-
power some but not other private actors) as the objectionable state action,2 4
212 Although they have long been allowed by Supreme Court case law, some commenta-
tors have viewed media-specific laws or any special treatment of the media as presumptively
objectionable. See, e.g., Bezanson, supra note 120, at 733-34 ("mhe press may be subject to
general restrictions .... The government may not, however, single out the press for either
conferral of a benefit or imposition of a burden."); cf Lahav, supra note 1, at 346 (noting the
tendency to hold this view in the United States but arguing "that a special press law in itself
constitutes a threat to press freedom" only under an authoritarian press regime, and observing
that the Swedes see a "specialized press regime as both a manifestation and a guarantee of
press freedom").
213 But cf CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 118 (1973) (Brennan & Mar-
shall, 3., dissenting).
214 See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989) (re-
jecting this approach, in both the majority and the dissent, in the particular case where the
state failed to intervene to protect a child from a violent parent; the dissent emphasized af-
firmative state actions that created DeShaney's dependence on the Social Service agency);
Sunstein, supra note 53, at 36-37, 45 (noting that "broadcasters are given property rights in
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various considerations counsel against easy reliance on this interpretative
strategy. Constitutional adjudication is poorly designed for crafting appro-
priate structural rules and media subsidies. Participatory theorists can more
reasonably argue that the Constitution does not block discretionary legisla-
tive authority to intervene with subsidies and noncensorious structural
rules--even content-motivated or content-based structural rules2l5 -aimed
at supporting the press's performance of its democratic roles. This conclu-
sion may be the central constitutional implication of these democratic theo-
ries. The conclusion, however, is mostly a nonmandate-restricting the
constitutional reach of the Press Clause. Thus, in order to allow needed and
appropriate governmental interventions, participatory democratic theories
recommend interpreting the Press Clause much more narrowly (in this con-
text) than elitist democratic theory suggests.
Of course, participatory theories do not ignore the press's performance
of the checking function. To allow for interventions and to protect against
censorious restraints, constitutional doctrine should block government ac-
tion that has a censorious purpose as either its end or means. z16 In addition,
to be consistent with checking function concerns, these theories should fa-
vor invalidating government actions that undermine the integrity of the
press as an institution,217 or that burden media entities without a convincing
benign explanation.218
their licenses by government, and their exercise of these rights is a function of law," and could
therefore be viewed as state action).
215 See Baker, supra note 53, at 93-114 (describing historical examples and theoretical
justifications for content-motivated interventions).
216 All rules favor some speech over other speech. Thus, a doctrine focused on censori-
ous "effect" provides no standard, and thereby calls for rank judicial policymaking. Ruling
out an intention to suppress should generally provide sufficient judicial protection.
217 See BAKER, supra note 14, at 225-49 (arguing that the Press Clause should protect
"defensive rights" such as a "press privilege" from mandated disclosure of its sources or work
product).
218 For example, "[s]tanding alone," the legitimate interest in raising revenue "cannot
justify the special treatment of the press, for an alternative means of achieving the same inter-
est without raising concerns under the First Amendment is clearly available," Minneapolis
Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 586 (1983); namely, a
more general tax not focused on the media. In contrast, sometimes the government can offer a
benign explanation for media-specific measures that rearrange the allocation of resources
within the media. For example, it might justify media-specific taxes whose revenue is dedi-
cated to those media needed by democracy but underdeveloped by the market. Even then, a
tax directed at particular protected content should sometimes be seen as suppressive. But if
directed at, say, advertising or spectrum usage, then the reallocation should be seen as a non-
censorious structural rule promoting, rather than undermining, democratic media. The reve-
nue, however, must be retained within the communications order. Most dramatically, by
analogy to the tax cases, at least to the extent that radio waves are only valuable for communi-
cation purposes (of all sorts), selling spectrum rights is a communications-specific govern-
mental practice that takes resources away from the communications order. These sales could
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Thus, my initial claim is that markets and private power are much more
likely to frustrate the more ambitious democratic assignments called for by
participatory theories than they are to undermine performance of the
checking function. If so, the preferred interpretation of the Press Clause
would shift depending on the democratic theory adopted. This can be illus-
trated by a simple matrix:
Press Clause Doctrinal Interpretations
Assessment of Market
Theory ofIDemocracy Faith in Market Serious Doubts AboutDemocracy _Market
Elite Democracy Hands off Still maybe hands off
(less demands on (interventions too dan-
market) gerous; gain too small)
Participatory Hands off Allow intervention; pro-
Theories (greater hibit censorship or objec-
demands on mar- tionable purposesket)
* shading indicates the more probable cellfrom the perspective of a
particular democratic theory
This analysis, however, moves too quickly. Consideration of several
additional issues suggests that different participatory theories may support
somewhat different constitutional interpretations.
Can the government provide people other than owners a right to publish
in, or broadcast over, privately owned media, especially as to media that are
monopolistic or at least limited in number within most communities?
Should it do so? Must it? The issue of nonmedia, private speakers' right of
access has been controversial. From the perspective of elite democracy,
such a right may have little significance. 219 Public access is unlikely to be
be seen as unconstitutional unless the proceeds of the sale are kept within the system and un-
less the net effect of the sale could plausibly be seen as improving the communications order.
219 In what follows, I claim to describe the most plausible (not the only possible) view
from the perspective of a particular democratic theory. Admittedly, such views are contest-
able even within the particular perspective. For example, an elite democrat might favor ac-
cess rights if she believed that marginalized groups would occasionally have evidence of gov-
ernmental misfeasance, that the evidence would have significant political effects if effectively
exposed; that a right of access would be necessary to and would be effective at achieving this
exposure, and that creating the right does not unduly risk undermining press performance of
the checking function.
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simultaneously accurate, effective, and necessary for exposing wrongdoing.
In cases where the report would be accurate and effective,220 media entities
are likely to make the report on their own if given the information by the
group seeking access. The elitist could conclude that the main effect of
such laws is to undermine the integrity of the professional watchdog---"ed-
iting is what editors are for."221  Thus, legislation creating such a right
should be unconstitutional.
Access rights are even worse from the perspective of the liberal plural-
ist. These rights can threaten media entities' capacity for partisan mobiliza-
tion. Balance is a centrist ideology. Except for occasional strategic or rhe-
torical purposes, it is often the last thing that a mobilizing media needs. A
militant black newspaper should not be required to carry the Klan's rebut-
tal-or vice versa. Thus, the pluralist should join the elite democrat in
praising the decision to strike down a law that provides candidates a right to
reply to criticism by newspapers.
222
In contrast, republican democrats most fear lack of inclusiveness (and,
maybe, lack of civility). Mandated balance and well-crafted access rights
could further inclusive dialogue, which is helpful to a society that needs to
reason together about potentially common conceptions of the good. Going
beyond support for the fairness doctrine,223 republicans might even strain to
find state action in broadcasting, and then find a station's refusal to accept
public issue or editorial advertising to be unconstitutional.224 Their only
worry is whether a lack of editorial management will cause unmoderated
dialogue to become too unfocused or unbalanced.
Complex democrats should find merit in the opposing views of both the
pluralists and the republicans. Society needs partisan media that are con-
stitutive of groups and that promote group mobilization-and rights of
220 At least in the United States, potentially damaging reports are often made with little
effect unless they are developed and endorsed by the major media. Even a report made by the
major media is often sufficiently buried so that it has no effect.
221 CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 124 (1973). But see Blasi, supra note
6, at 623-31 (using the checking function as a basis for arguing for particular access rights).
2M See Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Toraillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). If, however, monop-
oly status is embedded deeply enough in the economic context, then the pluralist democrat
might give up on the ideal of each group having its own media and accept pluralism within a
single forum as the only partisan possibility available.
2n See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 369 (1969) (describing the fairness
doctrine as a requirement imposed on radio and television broadcasters that "discussion of
public issues be presented on broadcast stations, and that each side of these issues must be
given fair coverage").
224 See CBS, 412 U.S. at 172 (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting) (claiming that a re-
strictive broadcaster policy is subject to, and violative of, the First Amendment).
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access can undermine such media. Society, however, also needs inclusive
collective discourses, a need served by access rights. What society needs
most is an empirical question. No abstract answer or even analytic metric
on which to base constitutional mandates is available. Hence, the complex
democrat should incline toward upholding rights of access created by legis-
lation, especially legislation that leaves some media unaffected, but not in-
cline toward imposing the rights constitutionally2 5 Or, following Curran's
distinction between different media sectors, the complex democrat might
favor something like a balance or diversity requirement in legislatively
identified core media, which perform a societywide discourse role, but not
in media serving pluralist groups.
226
Thus, on first impression, both the elite democrat and the pluralist
democrat, although for different reasons, are likely to oppose mandated ac-
cess. They would agree with Miami Herald and CBS v. DNC, but not Red
Lion. In contrast, the republican democrat would favor mandated access.
She would agree with Red Lion, but not Miami Herald or CBS v. DNC. The
pluralist and republican find opposite constitutional constraints---one ap-
proves what the other would strike down. The complex democrat alone
would accept the government's decision concerning access, whatever it is.
She would agree with both Red Lion and CBS v. DNC, but may reject Mi-
ami Herald.2 7 To modify the earlier matrix, and assuming at least some
skepticism about the market, this suggests the following formulation:
= This approach obviously fits what has happened in the broadcasting context. It even
suggests a basis for the view held by White, Blackmun, and Powell in CBS v. Democratic
National Committee ("CBS v. DNC') that the government could choose not to provide access
even if state action were found, although there are other possible routes to this conclusion.
226 See supra text accompanying note 192.
227 But see infra text accompanying notes 230-33 (discussing a rationale for the Miami
Herald decision which might lead supporters of all theories of democracy to accept the deci-
sion).
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Tentative Formulation
Theories of Democracy Press Clause Interpretation
Elite Democracy Hands-off
Pluralist Democracy Prohibit access rights; allow struc-
tural regulations that promote parti-
san media
Republican Democracy Allow or mandate access rights; dis-
favor laws that promote more parti-
san media
2 28
Complex Democracy Allow, but not mandate, access
rights and legislation that promotes
partisan media or that makes some
media more inclusive
All Democratic Theories Rule out censorship and legislation
or practices aimed at suppressing
media
Although this analysis is more fine grained and precise, it still oversim-
plifies. The analysis ignores both factual contexts and attitudes towards the
judicial role. For example, the Court in Miami Herald reasoned that the
"choice of material to go into a newspaper... constitute[s] the exercise of
editorial control and judgment," and that the First Amendment does not tol-
erate "intrusion into the function of editors.' 229 The liberal pluralist could
228 Some theorists draw other constitutional implications from republican democracy.
For example, racist or sexist speech hardly contributes to discourse aimed at consensus about
a common good. Republicans might be tempted to uphold laws suppressing this speech, es-
pecially if the consequences of the speech make meaningful participation in a collective dis-
course by members of the disparaged group unlikely. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 53, at
186-87, 192, 225-26. But see POST, supra note 53, at 268-331 (1995) (describing and re-
jecting such republican arguments for control); SUNSTEIN, supra note 53, at 219-20. I find
Post's reliance on autonomy and his critique of arguments for suppression to be persuasive,
both theoretically, see C. Edwin Baker, Of Course, More Than Words, 61 U. CEH. L. REV.
1181 (1994) (reviewing KATHERINE MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS (1993)), and pragmatically,
see Kenneth L. Karst, Boundaries and Reasons: Freedom of Expression and the Subordina-
tion of Groups, 1990 U. ILL. L. REv. 95, although Post here does not grapple with the propri-
ety of a government's proper role in structuring media enterprises. However, my conclusion
might be shaped by a preference for complex democracy, which argues that fair and appropri-
ate collective discourse can only occur when all groups are first empowered to develop their
own views. The only meaningful remedy for the groups silenced by other's speech is self-
empowerment-support of their own voices. Suppression, even of denigrating, silencing
speech, in the end does not empower the victim but does limit full inclusiveness, especially of
those restricted.
229 Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241,258 (1974).
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approve of the premise, but the republican might reject it. However, the
premise that the First Amendment does not allow an intrusion into editorial
control was only one of two rationales for the decision. The Court also ob-
jected to the fact that the law made access turn on the paper's earlier criti-
cism of the candidate. The Florida statute "exact[ed] a penalty on the basis
of the content of the newspaper," 230 which could result in "blunted or re-
duced" coverage.231 This deterrence operates like censorship. Recently, the
Court faced the argument that Miami Herald required invalidating rules
which compelled cable systems to carry content (local broadcast stations)
that they would prefer to reject. Since these must-carry rules applied re-
gardless of whatever other speech the cable system provided, the Court
found that the rules could not have the deterrent effect that was fatal in Mi-
ami Herald.232 The intrusion into the "editorial" role apparently did not
matter.233 This sheds a different light on Miami Herald. If convinced of the
empirical basis of its penalty/deterrence rational, and this is a big "if,,
234
supporters of all theories of democracy should accept the decision.
The analysis of CBS v. DNC was also oversimplified. Brennan and
Marshall would recognize issue-oriented speakers' constitutional right of
nondiscriminatory access to broadcasters' advertising slots.235 I suggest that
only republican democrats would agree with this proposition. Liberal plu-
230 Id. at 256.
231 Id. at 257.
232 See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 656 (1994) ("Moreover, in contrast to
Tornillo, no aspect of the must-carry provisions would cause a cable operator or cable pro-
grammer to conclude that 'the safe course is to avoid controversy,' and by so doing diminish
the free flow of information and ideas." (citation omitted)); Baker, supra note 53, at 113-14.
An additional ground for distinguishing Miami Herald was the difference between cable sys-
tems and newspapers. Although hardly necessary for its holding, the Court in Buckley v. Va-
leo, 424 U.S. 1 (1972), also characterized the flaw of the law in Miami Herald as a "legisla-
tive restraint" on the newspaper's freedom to criticize a candidate. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 51.
233 Reasons internal to the decision also suggest that the penalty/deterrence rationale in
Miami Herald was primary. Only this primacy would explain Brennan's concurrence (joined
by Rehnquist), suggesting that the majority's decision did not imply a view about a statute
giving a libeled plaintiff a right to require a retraction. See Miami Herald, 418 U.S. at 258
(Brennan & Marshall, JJ., concurring). Such a statute would intrude into editorial control. It
would not, however, impose a penalty or deter "protected" speech (since the libel is not pro-
tected).
2 Experience in countries like Germany, where the right to reply has a constitutional
basis, hardly supports the empirical basis of this objection. Arguably, deterrence is a greater
problem in relation to completely commercial and timid broadcasters--the FCC during its
repeal of the fairness doctrine produced considerable antidotal evidence of this effect, see
Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654, 659-64 (D.C. Cir. 1989)---han in relation to
more journalistically committed newspaper publishers. Based on these "facts," it is possible
that the outcomes in Red Lion and Miami Herald should be switched.
235 CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 172 (1973) (Brennan & Marshall, JJ.,
dissenting).
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ralists would object because access rights could damage the media's parti-
san role. Without an abstract principle to determine whether the country
was most in need of more partisan pluralist politics or more societywide
discourse, complex democrats would leave this choice for legislative (or,
alternatively, market) determination.
The liberal pluralist and complex democrat's response rings hollow in
at least three situations: first, if the specific media at issue are, and pre-
dictably will continue to be, monopolistic within their community; second,
if advertisers or other commercial interests effectively impose a nonpartisan,
audience-maximizing orientation on these media so that any realistic hope
or expectation that these media will become partisan advocates is naive;2
36
and third, if legal regulations, such as the fairness doctrine, already preclude
this pure partisan role. Under each scenario, the pluralist can conclude that
the access right best empowers diverse groups to pursue their alms. The
complex democrat can conclude that since these conditions have already
made these media entities part of the societywide discourse, they should
perform this role as inclusively (and as intelligently) as possible. Thus,
given plausible empirical observations, all three participatory democratic
theories can accept Brennan and Marshall's conclusion that issue-oriented
speakers' constitutional rights of nondiscriminatory access should be recog-
nized.237
On the other hand, a liberal pluralist or complex democrat judge might
demur. Doctrinally, Brennan and Marshall must identify state action-the
asserted absence of which is the determinative factor for several Justices.23
8
Even given state action, the judge might refuse to create intricate positive
rights based on arguable empirical premises. This refusal might reflect less
her theory of democracy or her appraisal of the market than her view of the
judicial role-a rejection of a type of judicial activism. As these complexi-
ties illustrate, even though different democratic theories lead to different
programmatic objectives in interpreting the Press Clause, democratic theory
will not by itself determine doctrine or specific results.
The capacity of democratic theory to orient, but not determine, inter-
pretations of the Press Clause is seen elsewhere. Media entities have re-
peatedly invoked the First Amendment in asking courts to grant them access
to government facilities or government documents. These requests, typi-
236 Although this factual characterization may be persuasive as applied to network TV
(as involved in this case), it is less applicable to cable and other portions of broadcasting,
such as community radio, which presumably is also covered by the ruling.
237 See supra note 235 and accompanying text (discussing Brennan and Marshall's con-
clusion).
238 See CBS, 412 U.S. at 121 (Burger, C.J., Stewart, J., & Rehnquist, J.).
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cally denied, are usually founded on a claimed right of the people to be in-
formed. The standard view, however, is that the First Amendment provides
a right to speak, not a right to the resources that would make speech in-
formed or effective.239 The argument has fared no better by relying on some
special media status under the Press Clause. Even if the press's institutional
autonomy requires certain, special constitutional (defensive) rights, these
rights do not include affirmative grants of particular resources.240 As Jus-
tice Stewart argued, "The Constitution itself is neither a Freedom of Infor-
mation Act nor an Official Secrets Act. The Constitution... establishes the
contest, not its resolution."241 Over vigorous dissents, the Court has denied
requests for constitutionally based access to documents or facilities except
in the context of judicial proceedings. Even here, the Court's initial analy-
sis of courtrooms' openness was based less on a right of access to informa-
tion and more on a tradition of courtroom trials as places where people
could gather information about their government. For First Amendment
purposes, this led the Court to analogize the courtroom and trial to streets
and parks, rather than to governmentally held informational resources.
242
Despite these results, the issue divided the Court. It is appropriate to
ask whether the disagreements reflect different conceptions of democracy.
Arguments for access to information often are based overtly on the impor-
tance of information for democracy.243 Before considering the implications
239 See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 36 (1973) ("Yet we
have never presumed to possess either the ability or the authority to guarantee to the citizenry
the most effective speech or the most informed electoral choice."). On the other hand, the
government must allow people to use certain public resources, such as the streets and parks,
for purposes of speaking. The Court continually says that the validity of a limitation on the
time, place, or manner of expression depends on "leav[ing] open ample alternative channels
of communication.' Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781,791 (1989); see also Clark
v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (same); Perry Educ.
Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (same). Predictably, this pre-
cept has had little payoff. But see City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 56-57 (1994) (finding
no ample alternatives to displaying a sign on one's private residence, in part because such a
display carries a distinct and significant message about the identity of the speaker).
24 I have argued that the press has the same speech rights as individuals and that, in ad-
dition, the Constitution protects the press as an institution. Following Justice Potter Stewart,
see Stewart, supra note 14, I conclude that this protection requires "defensive rights," such as
reporters' testimonial privileges, that protect their work product, but not "offensive rights"
that would give the press special constitutionally founded rights of access or rights to violate
otherwise applicable laws. See BAKER, supra note 14, at 225-49.
241 Stewart, supra note 14, at 636.
242 See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 579-80 (1980) (finding a
First Amendment right of access to a criminal trial); cf Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 833-
34 (1974) (upholding a restriction on access to prisons); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417
U.S. 843, 850 (1974) (same).
243 See Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry, supra note 1 (noting the importance of
information access to democracy).
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of the different democratic theories, however, I want to make two general
observations.
Virtually everyone agrees that sometimes government should restrict
access to information. Restrictions often serve individuals' interests in their
own privacy, society's interest in military security, the effectiveness of the
Federal Reserve Board's actions or law enforcement investigations, and
possibly, the quality and frankness of courts' in-chamber discussions.244 It
is also widely agreed that some governmentally generated information
should be publicly available. Modem sensibilities find it incredible that re-
porting on debates held in legislative sessions at one time amounted to con-
tempt of the legislative body.245 Given the value and legitimacy of both se-
crecy and information availability--the modem term is "transparency"--
line-drawing problems abound. The diverse policy considerations relevant
to the lines' placement suggest the possible wisdom of viewing access to in-
formation as a legislative issue. Such a legislative issue would be resolved
by statutory freedom of information acts, privacy acts, and open meeting
laws, or by intelligent executive or agency decisions, rather than as a con-
stitutional matter.
On the other hand, bureaucratic bodies instinctually seem to desire se-
crecy (except on occasions where their own agenda or their members' ego-
tism favors publicity). They may perceive secrecy as advancing their flexi-
bility, whether or not these gains in flexibility are legitimate. Information
could expose their misbehavior, failures, or incompetence. It could also
lead to "misguided" criticisms. It forces public officials to defend their ac-
tions. For whatever reasons, including partial information or distortions,
members of the public often react negatively to information about govem-
ment actions even though the official believes her action was legitimate,
maybe even wise. In any event, deference to the political branches on this
issue is often not deference to careful policymaking, but to the self-
protective instinct for secrecy. Such deference is problematic. The combi-
nation of the occasional real need for secrecy and an organization's system-
atic tendency to seek excessive secrecy could lead an activist court to for-
244 Cf Aviam Soifer, Freedom of the Press in the United States, in PREss LAW IN
MODERN DEMOcRAcIEs, supra note 1, at 79, 105 (noting that the U.S. has at least 100 fed-
eral statutes and countless agency rules either prohibiting or limiting disclosure or authorizing
nondisclosure of specified information).
245 In colonial America, printers were jailed for printing the laws and for publishing the
votes or proceedings of colonial assemblies without a license. See LEONARD W. LEVY,
LEGACY OF SUPPREssION 24, 44-46, 76 (1960) (noting various cases in which printers were
charged in criminal proceedings for printing the laws of the colonies); see also THOMAS C.
LEONARD, THE POWER OF THE PRESS: THE BIRTH OF AMERICAN POLITICAL REPORTING 63-
65 (1986); SCHUDSON, supra note 96, at 46-47.
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mulate constitutional principles to guide a modest degree of judicial super-
vision over, and serve to restrict, executive and agency discretion. A less
activist court, in contrast, might rely on the ability of the press and others
seeking access to "coerce" openness by generating negative publicity about
those maintaining unwarranted secrecy, or to obtain legislation requiring
openness. Even for the more activist court, however, democratic theory
could influence the decision to intervene constitutionally-the issue to
which I now turn.
Although all democratic theories see value in popular access to infor-
mation, they vary somewhat in the particular type of information to which
they demand access, in the reason for seeking access, and in the centrality of
broad access for their conception of democracy. Access to certain informa-
tion obviously serves the checking function. For instance, I.F. Stone report-
edly found plenty of dirt merely by using an informed and careful eye to
read publicly available reports and documents.246 My guess is that the most
explosive information will either be made available without the need for a
special constitutional right, as I.F. Stone found, or will be information that,
absent statutory directives, even an activist judge would not force the gov-
247ernment to reveal. Presumptively persuasive arguments will usually sup-
port confidentiality. Of course, my empirical guess may be wrong-and is
more likely to be wrong as more courts are willing to engage in in camera
inspections and discover that secrecy is not justified. But, if I am correct,
then a constitutional right of access to information may do little to serve the
checking function. Moreover, the elite democrat could fear that mandated
access will often interfere with and negatively "politicize" expert delibera-
tion. Thus, an elite democrat should find a constitutional right of access to
be quite problematic.
All participatory democrats should place greater emphasis on routine
access to information. They value access to a much broader range of infor-
mation than do elite democrats. Each of these participatory theories, how-
246 See ROBERT C. COTTRELL, IZZY: A BIOGRAPHY OF I.F. STONE 5 (1992); see also
Michaela Jarvis, Sunday Interview, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 3, 1995, at 3/Z3 (quoting Ben
Bagdikian, who said he "read I.F. Stone, whose chief impact was in saying 'Look, here are
these documents that exist in government that are very important, and nobody's reporting on
them"').
247 Consider an example relevant to the checking function. In a dramatic decision, the
Court did enforce a grand jury subpoena applying to portions of Nixon's Watergate tapes, see
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 713 (1974). But, would even an activist Court have
overridden a President's claim to secrecy and ordered access to the tapes on the basis of a re-
quest by an individual or news agency? Cf Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign
Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725, 733 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en banc) (holding that the Presi-
dent's defeasible, constitutionally based privilege prevails even over the Senate Committee's
subpoena).
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ever, has a somewhat different interest in the constitutional right. For plu-
ralist democrats, information has largely instrumental or strategic relevance.
Interest groups need to know when and where their preformed interests are
most at stake and need assertion. Still, the liberal pluralist may conclude
that sometimes secrecy will support the bargaining that all sides must rely
upon. Arguably normal information disclosure provides most of what the
public needs, in which case the pluralist could conclude that a constitutional
right is not crucial.
In contrast, a democracy that involves wisely and collectively formu-
lating attitudes, values, and conceptions of a common good-as republicans
believe--or conceptions of a subgroup identity-as complex democrats
maintain-calls for a broader range of information. Of course, given the
centrality of identity and value formation, factual information may be less
important for the republican than the pluralist. The republican or complex
democrat could agree with Christopher Lasch, who argued that democracy
depends on argument and discussion, not information (except to the extent
that it is made relevant by, and is the product of, debate). This conclusion
led Lasch to argue "that the job of the press is to encourage debate, not to
supply the public with information." 248 Still, the republican will be unim-
pressed with the need for secrecy to promote bargaining. The republican is
likely to argue not only that government actions should presumptively be
public but also that decisions about these actions should be made only on
the basis of publicly available information. The complex democrat is likely
to share these views. Even if bargaining is an important part of governing,
its legitimacy may depend on its transparency as well as its results, the main
concern of the pluralist.
Despite some differences in their concern with access to information, it
is less clear how, or even whether, these various democratic theories will
differ in their view of a constitutional right. Attitudes about judicial activ-
ism may dominate all other considerations. Cutting one way are doubts
about the propriety of courts engaging in essentially legislative policymak-
ing under the rubric of constitutional law. Cutting in the other direction is a
context in which trust in the judgment of policy-making branches, especially
executive agencies, is particularly problematic. These considerations, rather
than one's choice among democratic theories, may be the key variable in
determining a judge or scholar's attitude toward the legitimacy (and scope)
of a constitutional right to information.
248 Christopher Lasch, Journalism, Publicity and the Lost Art of Argument, GANNETT
CENTER J. 1, 1 (1990).
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The differences among democratic theories have potential constitutional
ramifications in other areas. Consider copyright. Copyright overtly limits a
later communicator's freedom of speech (or writing).249 There is, never-
theless, widespread agreement that copyright serves the public by increasing
"the harvest of knowledge," 250 as well as furthering various private inter-
ests.211 Likewise, all agree that copyright should not give unlimited rights
to an "author," a view reflected in the principle that "facts" and "ideas" are
not copyrightable and in the "fair use" privilege. Beyond these areas of
agreement, however, people vary in their readiness to find something copy-
rightable and to find that a subsequent use is a violation. My suggestion is
that a person's "readiness" in part reflects the democratic theory to which
she is committed.252
A broad conception of copyright should pose few problems for the elite
democrat and may even serve her ends. As long as copyright does not re-
strict use of facts and ideas, as it currently does not, a broad right is unlikely
to interfere with the checking function. To the extent that a broad right in-
creases the rewards of writing and of journalism, it provides greater incen-
tives for undertaking that work.253 Likewise, a pluralist democratic theory
has little objection to extensive rights. A broad right is unlikely to restrict a
group's capacity either to present or to pursue its own exogenously formed
interests. In contrast, republican democracy thematizes the salience and
249 This Article and the following textual paragraphs focus only on democratic theory,
especially as it relates to the interpretation of the Press Clause. Freedom of speech, particu-
larly if identified with individual liberty, might constitutionally require quite extensive "fair
use" exemptions, especially for noncommercial uses.
250 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 545 (1985).
251 Copyright obviously serves some people's pecuniary interests. It can also support a
person's nonpecuniary interest in creative control or personal privacy. Even a writer inter-
ested solely in spreading her message has an interest in stopping "free" copying. Often, only
her ability to transfer rights involving her work will induce a publisher to publish and promote
her message.
252 The most thorough and interesting examination of copyright through the lens of
democratic theory is in Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society,
106 YALE L.J. 283 (1996), and in Neil Weinstock Netanel, Asserting Copyright's Democratic
Principles in the GlobelArena, 51 VAND. L. REV. 217 (1998). The following textual para-
graphs attempt to extend Netanel's work by emphasizing that the specific content of demo-
cratic theory should have implications for the proper reach of copyright.
253 The issue here is actually more complicated, particularly with respect to providing
comparatively greater or lesser incentives to engage in particular types of communicative ac-
tivities. For example, lack of copyright for facts-a rule that hopefully any democrat would
demand-reduces the value of investing in costly, factual investigations that may be valuable
for purposes of an expos6 or other democratic concerns. In contrast, to the extent that a
broadcaster is the unique employer of its anchorpeople, investment in promoting the appeal of
their personality-centered "chatter" becomes a better strategy than investment in news gath-
ering.
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openness of cultural dialogue. Both political and cultural dialogue affect
the community's conception of itself and the public good. By providing an
economic incentive for production and publication, copyright encourages
such cultural discussions. But, by restricting creators' or discussants' use of
previously copyrighted materials, copyright narrows cultural dialogue.
Moreover, if, as Lasch contends, broad participation in discussions is more
important than facts--or, to restate the claim, if the democratic value of in-
creased, noncommercial, popular involvement in discussion is greater than
the democratic value of the lost media commodities-then a narrower right
should be favored. This conclusion, however, is arguable. It depends on
both normative judgments (what discourse is valued) and empirical predic-
tions (how different definitions of rights will affect the discourse). Still, a
plausible conclusion is that narrowing copyright protection should facilitate
diverse public discussion and cultural explorations of common interests
more than it dampens commercial incentives to produce useful communica-
254tions.
Unlike either elite democrats or pluralists, complex democrats agree
with republicans that cultural discourses are central to democracy. This
may help to explain the variation between those democratic scholars who,
when discussing the media, focus solely on nonfiction (with news being the
paradigm concern) and those who take a more expansive view of media
content that includes fiction, art,255 and other cultural materials. 256 Demo-
cratic elitists and liberal pluralists are more likely to be in the first group and
republicans and complex democrats in the second. Moreover, the second
group is especially likely to value these discourses when participation is
popular and noncommodified, although commodified forms can provide
substance to popular discussion and commodification sometimes helps to
pay for higher levels of participation.
254 Of course, the arguments in favor of narrowing copyright protection also suggest rea-
sons that other legal practices, most importantly contract, should not be allowed free reign to
again limit the use of intellectual creations. See generally Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyber-
space: The New Economic Orthodoxy of "Rights Management, " 97 MICH. L. REV. 462
(1998).
255 See Amy Adler, What's Left: Hate Speech, Pornography, and the Problem for Ar-
tistic Expression, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1499, 1502 (1996) ("Race, gender, and sexual orientation
have become the subjects of art, and art has become a central medium to activists concerned
with achieving equality in these realms.").
256 Having this point driven home may explain the movement in Alexander Meildejohn's
work. After first arguing in 1948 that the First Amendment only protects political speech, see
ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLmCAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE
PEOPLE (Oxford Univ. Press 1965), his republican sentiments predictably lead him eventually
to see the importance of most art and literature for political life. See Alexander Meiklejohn,
The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. REV. 245.
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Beyond this area of agreement with republicanism, complex democracy
is additionally concerned with the effect of copyright on a group's ability to
(culturally) discuss, form, and maintain its identity. More than republicans,
complex democrats especially value the opportunity of nondominant groups
to explore, develop, and maintain their own identity-an interest that is un-
dermined to the extent that mainstream actors control and constantly orient
cultural discourse toward presumptively "common" concerns. Thus, com-
plex democrats first note that existing (and likely future) copyright law pro-
tects individual authors (or their corporate employers) rather than collective
creations of culture. The law fails to adequately protect a group's cultural
identity from commercial exploitation. This failure is evidenced by "in-
digenous peoples protest[ing] the stereotypical Indian caricatures used to
market a sports team"25 7 or any group whose "folk" stories, wisdom, and
practices are commercialized (and often degraded) without compensation or
258return of value to the community. More dramatically, intellectual prop-
erty rights can restrict internal cultural development and discussion by mar-
ginalized groups. Mainstream owners can often stop or restrict the use of
their "owned" images for cultural purposes of outside groups. Extensive
intellectual property rights would aid this process. For example, they would
have allowed the estate of John Wayne to ban a postcard portraying Wayne
wearing lipstick and saying, "It's such a bitch being butch."25 9 Complex
democracy's cultural pluralists seldom find that copyright effectively pro-
tects the discursive or cultural integrity of unpopular or politically marginal
groups. Rather, intellectual property rights often impede these groups' cul-
turally based discussions, and consequently their creation of identity.
Again, the empirical points are arguable. These considerations nevertheless
can lead complex democrats, even more so than republicans, to strongly fa-
vor limiting the scope of traditional copyright.26° In many contexts, they
257 Rosemary J. Coombe, Authorial Cartographies: Mapping Proprietary Borders in a
Less-Than-Brave New World, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1357, 1357 (1996).
258 This point is the reference implicit in the word "shamans" in the title of JAMES
BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFrWARE, AND SPLEENs: LAW AND THE CONsTRUcTION oiF TH
INFORMATION SOCIETY (1996).
259 Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Public-
ity Riffhts, 81 CAL. L. REv. 125, 144 (1993).
Their recognition of group practices as the source of much intellectual creation sug-
gests the possible desirability of legal innovations recognizing a group's right to control or be
compensated for its creations. Although this suggestion merits consideration, it seems to go
more to distributive notions of fairness than to democratic practice. Likewise, the observa-
tion, sometimes offered as an attack on the very notion of individual authorship, namely, that
all individual authors and their works piggyback on (in property terms, "steal" from) a host of
earlier creators-a host that created language and all other elements of existing culture-
might discredit any notion of the normative necessity of recognizing rights in an individual
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should favor expressive claims inspired by the First Amendment over ex-
pansive copyright protections.
CONCLUSION
As commentators repeatedly assert, democracy depends on a free press.
But different conceptions of democracy are served by different free presses.
This insight has direct significance for the practice of journalism. Even the
most intelligent and democratically committed journalists, however, write
and report within a communications order structured both by law and by the
market. Both law and the market can reward but often also can impede de-
sirable journalistic practices. Even more troublesome are the market forces
that bankrupt certain types of media entities, sometimes the very media that
democracy most needs. The obvious response, even if politically difficult to
enact, is legislation favoring, protecting, subsidizing, or even creating the
type of media entities or communication practices required by democracy.
Because identifying these requirements depends on the specifics of demo-
cratic theory, the foregoing analysis should have significant policy rele-
vance for media law and legislative reform.
Finally, there is constitutional law. The press's democratic functions
provide the best perspective for understanding the First Amendment guar-
antee. Elitist democracy and its checking function (a value shared with all
other democratic theories) have been most influential in giving the Press
Clause doctrinal content that restricts government power. To the extent an-
other theory of democracy is favored-I have implicitly claimed that com-
plex democracy is the soundest theory-that theory may provide further
content to the Press Clause. Nevertheless, the primary implication of com-
plex democracy for constitutional interpretation is probably that the Press
Clause should be read narrowly. Complex democracy requires a constitu-
tional reading tolerant of structural regulation of the press by government.
At any given time, democracy's primary communicative needs inevitably
will be disputed. Complex democracy recognizes that the market could be
failing, either by providing a media too homogeneous or too pluralistic, or
by corrupting the available versions of either or both. These possibilities
suggest that the Press Clause should be read to allow the government to
promote a press that, in its best judgment, democracy needs but that the
market fails to provide.
author. This observation, however, does not show whether to do so is desirable and certainly
does not show that it is illogical, romantic, or illegitimate to do so.
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